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The Constitutional Duty To Supervise
ABSTRACT. The IRS targets Tea Party organizations' applications for nonprofit tax-exempt
status for special scrutiny. Newly opened online federal health exchanges fail to function. Officials at some Veterans Administration hospitals engage in widespread falsification of wait times.
A key theme linking these examples is that they all involve managerial and supervisory failure.
This should come as no surprise. Supervision and other systemic features of government administration have long been fundamental in shaping how an agency operates, and their importance
is only more acute today. New approaches to program implementation and regulation mean that
a broader array of actors is wielding broader discretionary governmental authority. The centrality of systemic administration in practice contrasts starkly with its virtual exclusion from contemporary U.S. constitutional law. This exclusion of administration takes a variety of doctrinal guises, but it surfaces repeatedly in both structural and individual rights contexts.
This Article argues that the exclusion of systemic administration from constitutional law is a
mistake. This exclusion creates a deeply troubling disconnect between the realities of government and the constitutional requirements imposed on exercises of governmental power. Just as
importantly, the current doctrinal exclusion of administration stands at odds with the Constitution's text and structure, which repeatedly emphasize one particular systemic administrative feature: supervision. This emphasis on supervision is most prominently manifest in Article II's
Take Care Clause, but it also surfaces more broadly as a constitutional prerequisite of delegation
of governmental power. Whether it is rooted in Article II, general separation of powers principles, or due process, a duty to supervise represents a basic precept of our federal constitutional
structure.

Moreover, concerns about judicial role do not justify the Court's refusal to engage with systemic administration, and judicial recognition of a constitutional duty to supervise is critical even
if the duty is entirely politically enforced. Indeed, recognizing a constitutional duty to supervise
is as central to the overall project of constitutional interpretation as it is to the aim of better keying constitutional law to the realities of contemporary governance. Recognizing this duty underscores the need for greater attention to how courts can support constitutional enforcement by the
other branches and highlights the porous and critical relationship between constitutional and
subconstitutional law.
A U THO R. Stanley H. Fuld Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Special thanks to Barry
Friedman, Rob Jackson, John Manning, Jerry Mashaw, Jon Michaels, Henry Monaghan, Trevor
Morrison, Jeff Powell, Bill Simon, Richard Squire, Kevin Stack, Adrian Vermeule, David Zaring,
and participants at faculty workshops at American, Columbia, and Northwestern law schools
and the University of Pennsylvania Wharton School. Perrin Cooke and Evan Ezray provided
outstanding research assistance.
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO SUPERVISE

INTRODUCTION

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) targets applications for nonprofit taxexempt status by organizations using the name "Tea Party" for special scrutiny.' The National Security Agency (NSA) repeatedly violates governing privacy requirements and oversteps its authority in conducting surveillance. 2 Recently opened online federal health exchanges fail to function, preventing
individuals from signing up for health insurance or determining their eligibility for benefits.3 Officials at some Veterans Administration (VA) hospitals manipulate data to hide long delays in scheduling appointments, and there are al4
legations that some veterans died while on waiting lists.
A key theme that links these examples is that they all involve managerial
and supervisory failure. Most commonly, the problem is too little supervision,'
but sometimes the concern is too much supervision or supervision of the
wrong kind. 6 The Obama Administration's experience is hardly unique; simi-

1.

z.

See Jonathan Weisman, Management Flaws at I.R.S. Cited in Tea Party Scrutiny, N.Y.
TIMES, May 14, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/os/15/us/politics/report-on-irs-audits
-cites-ineffective-management.html [http://perma.cc/C4FN-FL6M].
Barton Gellman, NSA Broke Privacy Rules Thousands of Times Per Year, Audit Finds, WASH.
POST, Aug. 15, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-broke

-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-per-year-audit-finds/2o3/8/5/33loe554-05ca-1e3-aO7f
3.

-49ddc7417125_story.html [http://perma.cc/3UsB-TC6W].
See Robert Pear et al., From the Start, Signs of Trouble at Health Portal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
12, 2013,

http://www.nytimes.com/2o13/io/13/us/politics/from-the-start-signs-of-trouble-at

-health-portal.html [http://perma.cc/JL7M-G6D6].
4.

See Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Michael D. Shear, Severe Report Finds V.A. Hid Waiting Lists

at Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/o5/29/us/va-report
-confirms-improper-waiting-lists-at-phoenix-center.html [http://perma.cc/73JM-BRgF].
S. See Carol D. Leonnig, Court: Ability To Police U.S. Spying Program Limited, WASH. POST,
Aug. 15, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/court-ability-to-police-us-spying
-program-limited/2013/o8/15/4a8c8c44-o5cd-11e3-ao7f-49ddc 741712 5 "s tory.html

[http://

perma.cc/gXWB-4JJK] (discussing limits on the oversight capacity of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court); Oppel & Shear, supra note 4 (noting that an investigation revealed VA hospital administrators were responsible for manipulating waiting lists); Pear et
al., supra note-3 (noting the limited capacity of the agency overseeing development of the
federal health exchange); Weisman, supra note 1 (reporting that a Treasury inspector general blamed the IRS's inappropriate tea party targeting on ineffective IRS management).
6. See Pear et al., supra note 3 (identifying the impact of White House political considerations
and last-minute decisions on the flawed rollout of the exchanges); see also Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration'sNonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEx. L. REV. 781, 784-85 (2013)

(faulting President Obama for initiating a policy that granted immunity to a large group of
young illegal aliens).
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lar lists of instances of failed oversight exist for prior administrations and at all
levels of government.
The central importance of supervision should not come as a surprise. Supervision and other systemic features of government administration with
which it overlaps -planning, policy-setting, monitoring, resource allocation,
institutional structures, personnel systems, and the like-are fundamental in
shaping how an agency operates and its success in meeting its statutorily imposed responsibilities.7 These systemic features are also precisely what distinguish administrative government. Agencies not only adjudicate individual cases, take specific enforcement actions, or issue discrete rules. They do all these
activities on a massive scale as part of a broader project of law implementation
that requires coordination, investigation, and prioritization. 8 Moreover, if anything, the importance of administration is only more acute today than it has
been historically, with new approaches to program implementation and regulation resulting in a broader array of actors wielding greater discretionary authority, often in contexts lacking external controls like judicial review. 9 As a result, systemic features of administration -in particular, internal supervision
through planning and ongoing monitoring -are increasingly the linchpin for
achieving accountability of federal government programs and actions.1"
Multiple avenues exist for addressing management and supervisory failures. The recent IRS, NSA, VA, and Health and Human Services (HHS) debacles have triggered extensive media coverage, internal and independent investigations, resignations, proposed legislation, and lawsuits, and they may
ultimately lead to criminal prosecutions." One route of response that comes
much less quickly to mind than these options, however, is constitutional law.
Indeed, the centrality of systemic administration in practice contrasts starkly
with its virtual exclusion from contemporary U.S. constitutional doctrine. The
7.

See PATRICIA W. INGRAHAM ET AL., GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE: WHY MANAGEMENT MATTERS 2, 8 (2003); Jerry L. Mashaw, Foreword: The American Model of FederalAdministrative

Law: Remembering the First One Hundred Years, 78 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 975, 992 (2010) (not-

8.

ing that "in many ways, it is the internal law of administration - the memos, guidelines, circulars, and customs within agencies- that mold most powerfully the behavior of federal officials").
Edward Rubin, It's Time To Make the Administrative ProcedureAct Administrative, 89 CORNEL L. REv. 95, 97, 100-37 (2003).

9.

See infra Part I.B.

io.

See Rubin, supra note 8, at 97; William Simon, The OrganizationalPremises of Administrative
Law 6, 12 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No.
13-356, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2332o79 [http://perma.cc/872T-PYUK].

11.

See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Official Says ProsecutorsAre Looking at V.A. Lists, N.Y. TIMES,
May 15, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2oi4/o5/16/us/poliics/veterans-secretary-shinseki
-to-testify-on-long-waits-for-patients.html [http ://perma.cc/S3J7-3QUQ.

1840

THE CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO SUPERVISE

exclusion of administration takes a variety of doctrinal guises, such as restrictive standing requirements, individualistic mens rea requirements, and limitations on respondeat superior and supervisory liability in suits against government officers.' To be sure, there are exceptions: procedural due process
challenges and institutional reform litigation represent two instances in which
administrative and systemic functioning play a more central role in assessing
whether constitutional requirements are violated. But in many ways these exceptions prove the rule, as judicial resistance to engaging with administration
has led courts to view the exceptions quite narrowly. 3
In short, constitutional law stands largely aloft from the reality of administrative governance, with the Supreme Court refusing to subject systemic features of government operations to constitutional scrutiny. I use constitutional
law here to refer to judicially determined constitutional doctrine. This is not to
deny that constitutional doctrine represents only one dimension of constitutional law. It is judicially enforced constitutional law, as opposed to forms of
constitutional law that emerge from the actions of Congress and the President,
or constitutional understandings generated by other actors such as administrative agencies, state and local governments, and social movements. 4 Yet despite
the scholarly attention paid to non-judicial constitutional law of late, the courts
continue to play a dominant role as expositors of constitutional meaning. And
their willingness to defer to constitutional interpretation by other branches appears, if anything, to be dwindling." As a result, the courts' resistance to incorporating administration serves to exclude it from our most recognized form of

iz.

See infra Part I.C.

13.

See infra notes 92-97, 121-127, 133-135 and accompanying text.

14.

See generally JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011); WiLLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN

FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010); KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL

MEANING (1999); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism,91 TEX. L. REV. 1897
(2013); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalismand Backclast, 42
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007).
i5.

See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2686 (2013) (expressing concern that

"the Supreme Court's primary role in determining the constitutionality of a law that has inflicted real injury on a plaintiff... would become only secondary to the President's" if the
President's agreement that a challenged statute was unconstitutional were enough to preclude judicial review); Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (rejecting Congress's determination that the Voting Rights Act's trigger for requiring preclearance was an
appropriate means of enforcing the constitutional prohibition on racial discrimination in
voting); Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427-30 (2012) (rejecting the
claim that the constitutionality of a statute regulating foreign relations represented a political question outside of the courts' purview). But see NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550,
2559-60 (2014) (emphasizing the weight given to historical political-branch practice in separation of powers disputes).
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constitutional interpretation and perpetuates the view that general aspects of
administration fall outside the Constitution's ambit.
In this Article, I argue that the exclusion of systemic administration from
constitutional law is a mistake.16 This exclusion creates a deeply troubling disconnect between the realities of government and constitutional requirements
imposed on exercises of governmental power. Authorizing and controlling
governmental action, along with establishing the federal government's structure, are critical constitutional functions. 17 Incorporating systemic administration is essential if the Constitution is to perform these functions in ways that
are responsive to modern governance.
Furthermore, the current doctrinal exclusion of administration stands at
odds with the Constitution. The Constitution specifies few details of federal
administrative government, but its text and structure repeatedly emphasize one
particular systemic administrative feature: supervision. This emphasis on supervision manifests itself most prominently in Article II's imposition on the
President of a duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, ' s but
also surfaces more broadly as a constitutional prerequisite for delegation of
governmental power, rooted in separation of powers principles and due process. With such delegation comes responsibility to supervise so as to ensure
that the transferred authority is used in a constitutional and accountable fashion. A central claim of this Article is that the Constitution embodies a duty to
supervise that current doctrine has simply failed to acknowledge. The precise
contours of this duty vary depending on how one conceives of its-constitutional
basis. A version of the duty based on Article II demands supervision by and
within the executive branch, while a version based on principles of delegation
extends supervisory obligations to the courts, Congress, and potentially the
states. But under both accounts, a duty to supervise represents a basic precept
of our federal constitutional structure,

16.

The same point is true of administration's exclusion from administrative law doctrines, as
several scholars have recently argued. See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell, The
Lost World ofAdministrative Law, 92 TEX._L. REv. 1137, 1140 (2014); Sidney A. Shapiro, Why
Administrative Law MisunderstandsHow Government Works: The Missing InstitutionalAnalysis,
53 WASHBUN L.J. 1 (2013); Simon, supr note io. In addition, some scholars have criticized
the divide between administration and administrative-law doctrine from a public administration standpoint and offered accounts that assign public administration and public management a constitutional role. See ANTt.ONY M. BERTELLI & LAURENCE E. LYNN, JR., MADISON'S MANAGERS: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 12, 103-66 (2006);
JOHN A. ROHR, To RUN A CONSTITUTION: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
15-53 (1986).

See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., ConstitutionalConstraints,97 CALIF. L. REv. 975, 987-95
18. U.S. CONST. art. 11,
§ 3.
17.

(2009).

THE CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO SUPERVISE

Systemic features of administration thus carry huge practical import and
substantial constitutional salience. What then explains their exclusion from
constitutional law? The answer is separation of powers concerns and fears of
overstepping the judicial role. The Supreme Court put the point bluntly in
Lewis v. Casey, insisting that "it is not the role of courts, but that of the political
branches, to shape the institutions of government in such fashion as to comply
with the laws and the Constitution."19 The Court has elsewhere emphasized
that "[t]he Constitution... assigns to the Executive Branch, and not to the Judicial Branch, the duty to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.""'2
Moreover, the concern is not just with respecting the purview of the political
branches but also with protecting the courts, because overseeing administration and managing government institutions are not tasks for which the courts
have much institutional competence. Courts both lack political accountability
and have little expertise in running administrative institutions or in navigating
the substantive policy areas at stake.
These concerns about judicial role and competency are real, but they do not
justify the Supreme Court's current refusal to engage with systemic administration. In particular, the challenges that courts would face in directly enforcing a constitutional duty to supervise do not support refusing to recognize that
such a duty exists. Direct judicial enforcement sometimes may be appropriate,
even if difficult, and recognizing that a supervisory duty exists may open up
important avenues for indirect enforcement through subconstitutional law. In
addition, recognition of a constitutional duty to supervise may actually serve to
mitigate some concerns about judicial aggrandizement. Perhaps most importantly, given the current dominance of the courts in determining constitutional meaning, judicial recognition of a constitutional duty to supervise is critical even if responsibility for enforcing this duty falls entirely on the political
branches.
Indeed, recognizing a constitutional duty to supervise is as central to the
overall project of constitutional interpretation as it is to better connecting constitutional law to the realities of contemporary governance. The judicial-role
concerns implicated by the duty to supervise underscore the need for greater
attention to ways in which courts can support constitutional enforcement by
the political branches. Recognizing such a duty also highlights the porous
boundary between constitutional and subconstitutional law, with statutory or
administrative law disputes increasingly functioning as mechanisms for consti-

19.

518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.

520,

548, 562 (1979) ("[T]he oper-

ation of our correctional facilities is peculiarly the province of the Legislative and Executive
Branches of our Government, not the Judicial.").
20.

Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984).
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tutional articulation. Acknowledging this constitutional-subconstitutional interplay and theorizing its proper bounds should be a central focus of contemporary constitutional law and scholarship.
This Article aims to demonstrate the constitutional significance of systemic
administration and justify recognition of a constitutional duty to supervise.
Such recognition should come from all the branches, and it is notable that
President Obama recently referenced his "constitutional duty to supervise the
executive branch" in a signing statement. ' But recognition of the duty is particularly needed from the courts, given their preeminent role in constitutional
interpretation and their current flawed rejection of administration's constitutional relevance. Critically, however, judicial recognition does not automatically translate into direct judicial enforcement. Judicial recognition fosters enforcement by Congress and the President by putting the political branches on
notice of their constitutional obligations. Moreover, to the extent judicial enforcement occurs, it will commonly be indirect-by means of administrative
law. Indeed, recognizing the constitutional duty to supervise will likely have its
greatest import as a basis for refraining current administrative-law doctrines
and analysis, which-like current constitutional law-insistently exclude administration from their reach.
Part I of this Article describes systemic administration and supervision as
well as the variety of forms administration and supervision can take. It then
demonstrates the increasingly critical role that both administration and supervision play by focusing on four major trends in contemporary federal government: (i) privatization, (2) cooperative federalism and federal reliance on the
states, (3) crisis governance, and (4) presidential administration. In addition to
transforming the shape of modern government, all four of these trends represent instances in which judicial review is limited and general administrative
constraints like supervision provide critical protections against arbitrary and
unaccountable government action. Part I then turns to identifying the numerous doctrinal contexts in which the Supreme Court has rejected or limited the
constitutional relevance of systemic administration, with the net result that
constitutional law has little to say about key features of modern administrative
governance.
Part II undertakes the reconstructive project, offering textual and structural
justifications for inferring a constitutional duty to supervise and assessing the
extent to which historical practice and precedent provide support for such an
approach. This Part focuses on two central constitutional bases, each of which

21.

See Barack Obama, Statement by the President on H.R. 431o, WHITE HOUSE (Jan.
3, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2oi3/ol/o3/statement-president-hr
-4310 [http://perma.cc/KU3J-YYJG].

THE CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO SUPERVISE

support a distinct version of the duty to supervise: (1) Article II and the Take
Care Clause, and (2) structural principles governing delegation. Article II signals the mandatory nature of internal supervision within the executive branch,
a key feature unfortunately obscured by the ongoing debate about the scope of
the President's own power over administrative decisionmaking. Supervision's
constitutional importance is also evidenced by the emphasis elsewhere in the
Constitution on hierarchical oversight in connection to delegation, as well as by
the need for supervision in order to achieve political and legal accountability.
This Part next turns to articulating the scope of the duty to supervise.
Although the Article II and delegation bases yield somewhat different accounts,
under both bases the duty requires, at its core, systems and structures of internal supervision adequate to preserve the overall hierarchical control and accountability of governmental power. Importantly, a variety of different supervisory arrangements, ranging from traditional bureaucratic rule-bound overoversight to more open-ended performance-and-monitoring-based regimes,
will often suffice to satisfy the constitutional duty to supervise. The critical
question then becomes whether a duty to supervise could be incorporated into
constitutional doctrine without exceeding the limits of judicial competence or
unduly interfering with the political branches. That question requires a more
nuanced assessment than the Supreme Court has so far provided. White the
barriers to direct judicial enforcement of a duty to supervise are quite substantial in some contexts, that is not true across the board. In addition, indirect enforcement through subconstitutional means such as administrative law is often
a possibility. And judicial recognition of a constitutional duty to supervise,
even one entrusted to the political branches to enforce, could yield significant
benefits. These include not only better alignment of constitutional doctrine to
the realities of administrative government, but also an expansion of the standard judicial account of how constitutional demands are addressed in the modern administrative state.
Part III takes up the task of describing what a constitutional duty to supervise might look like in practice. It first examines the possibility of direct judicial
enforcement, focusing on enforcement in the contexts of privatization and institutional reform litigation. It then explores the possibility of indirect and subconstitutional judicial enforcement of a duty to supervise through administrative law. Such an administrative-law approach could prove particularly
important in cooperative federalism and crisis governance contexts, but it will
entail substantial changes in existing doctrine. This Part concludes by examining non-judicial enforcement, considering possible implications of recognizing
a duty to supervise for presidential administration and congressional oversight.
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THE MISMATCH OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND GOVERNMENTAL

I.

REALITY

Administration and supervision encompass a wide range of phenomena.
Two features merit particular emphasis: the systemic cast of administration
and the broad and diverse forms that supervision can take in practice. Systemic
administration and internal oversight are becoming increasingly central mechanisms for ensuring accountability in government operations and programs.
Yet notwithstanding this growing centrality, a number of doctrines serve to exclude systemic features of administration from constitutional analysis. The net
result is a troubling and expanding mismatch between current constitutional
doctrine and contemporary governmental reality.
A. Administration and Supervision
Administration is a familiar concept. The term appears in a variety of contexts (not just in connection to government) and is used to describe generic
phenomena-household or business administration, for example-as well as
specific entities, such as the Obama Administration or the Social Security Administration. Yet across these diverse settings, the core meaning of administration remains similar: it refers to the running or managing of an organization or
activity.' As this definition suggests, administration has a basic systemic character. Though the term is given substance through discrete acts and decisions,
"administration" refers more to the overarching operations that underlie and
frame these discrete phenomena than to the phenomena themselves. Key components of administration are planning and prioritization, policy creation, program design and evaluation, budgeting and resource allocation, internal organization and structure, intra-agency and interagency coordination, networking
and collaboration, personnel systems, technology, and -of particular relevance
here - supervision.23

See,

22.

e.g., Administration, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (2015),
http://www.merriam-webster
.com/dictionary/administration [http://perma.cc/4626-3LD2]; Administration, OxFoRD
DICTIONARIES (2015), http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american-english
/administration [http://perma.cc/Y7M6-8AZQJ.

23.

See Luther Gulick, Notes on the Theory of Organization, in PAPERS ON THE SCIENCE OF ADMIN-

13 (Luther Gulick & L. Urwick eds., 1937) (stating core administration skills as
POSDCORB: planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, and budgeting); Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An IntroducISTRATION

tion, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 1, 16-18 (Lester M.

Salamon ed.,
97.

1846

2002)

(emphasizing collaboration and networking); Rubin, supra note 8, at

THE CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO SUPERVISE

Supervision, in turn, entails direction and oversight, but it too can take a
variety of forms. Supervisors may specify in detail how subordinates are to act
or the tasks to be undertaken and then review closely for compliance. Or they
may stipulate certain performance goals but grant subordinates or organizational units they oversee broad discretion in determining how to achieve those
goals. Supervision can also take any number of forms between these poles. It
can occur ex ante, ex post, or on a continuous basis, and it can be more topdown or collaborative. The actual mechanisms of supervision are similarly varied, spanning formal complaint and appeals procedures for challenging specific
decisions, ad hoc or peer review, or general monitoring through audits and
performance assessment. 4 Agency managers adopt rules and requirements that
bind agency personnel and also oversee lower-level decisionmaking through
more informal guidance or revisable plans.' Supervision involves not simply
internal oversight of the agency, but also oversight of private contractors and
other governments implementing federal programs, as well as of interagency
undertakings and in some instances review of other agencies' actions.26 Supervision most frequently occurs within an agency, but sometimes a statute gives
one agency power to supervise the actions of another agency or its employees,
and some agencies and offices undertake supervision across the federal government as a whole. 27
Bureaucracy represents the traditional model for modern public administration. In Max Weber's seminal account, "[B] ureaucracy consists of a hierarchically structured, professional, rule-bound, impersonal, meritocratic, appointed, and disciplined body of public servants with a specific set of
competencies."28 Supervision in a Weberian bureaucracy takes a decidedly hierarchical and rule-bound form, with "a clearly established system of super24.

Kathleen G. Noonan et al., Legal Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare State: Lessonsfrom
Child Welfare Reform, 34 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 523, 535-48 (2009); Simon, supra note io, at 23, 11-13, 25-26.

25.

See Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 859, 866-69, 884-86
(2009); Simon, supra note io, at 2-3, 11-13.

26.

See Donald F. Kettl, Managing Indirect Government, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT, supra
note 23, at 490, 492-96, 505-08; Salomon, supra note 23, at 2-9.

27.

See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 1204 (2012) (Merit Systems Protection Board); 42 U.S.C. § 4526 (2012)
(Government Accountability Office); Exec. Order 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994) (Office of In-

formation and Regulatory Affairs); see also Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination
in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HAPv. L. REV. 1131, 1158, 116o-6i (2012) (detailing examples
of interagency consultation and approval requirements).
28.

Fritz Sager & Christian Rosser, Weber, Wilson, and Hegel: Theories of Modern Bureaucracy,69
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 1136, 1137 (2009). For a more recent account of bureaucracy's characteris-

tics and dynamics, see JAmEs Q. WILSON, BuREnAucRAcy: WHAT GOvERNMENT AGENCIES Do
Do IT (2000).

AND WHY THEY

1847
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and subordination in which there is a supervision of the lower offices by higher
ones," as well as "the possibility of appealing, in a precisely regulated manner,
the decision of a lower office to the corresponding superior authority."2 9
Federal administrative agencies, along with many other organizations, display many of the characteristics that for Weber typified bureaucracy: major
federal agencies are generally hierarchically organized and staffed substantially
by career public servants with removal protection. In addition, agency modes
of operation are frequently governed by detailed rules.30 Yet the reality of power in modern government bureaucracies is much messier and more complex
than the Weberian ideal, with lower-level staff and street-level employees often
exercising substantial discretion over day-to-day implementation of government programs.31 In any event, federal agencies have always been an amalgam,
subject to sometimes dueling political principals and fragmented leadership,
containing many more political appointees than their European counterparts,
and heavily dependent on independent state and local governments for program implementation.

32

Over the last few decades, moreover, new forms of public administration
and oversight have risen to the fore. Brought to prominence at the federal level
in the 199os by the Clinton Administration's National Performance Review
and often falling under the "new governance" or experimentalist labels, these
approaches involve greater flexibility and discretion for lower-level officials,
more decentralized implementation, and greater reliance on private actors.33
29. MAXWEBER, ECONOMYAND SOCIETY 957

30.

(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 2013).

See DONALD F. KETTL, THE TRANSFORMATION OF GOVERNANCE: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AMERICA 8-9, 44-45 (2002); DAVID E.LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: POLITICAL CONTROL AND BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE 2026 (2008); PAUL C. LIGHT, THICKENING GOVERNMENT: FEDERAL HIERARCHY AND THE DIFFUSION OF ACCOUNTABILITY 6-15 (1995); Magill, supra note 25.

31.

See, e.g., MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN
PUBLIC SERVICES 13-18 (1980); WILSON, supra note 28, at 33-49; see also NORMA M. RICCUCCI, How MANAGEMENT MATTERS: STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRATS AND WELFARE REFORM

59-76, 115-17 (2005) (describing the role of managers and the greater importance of work
32.

33.

cultures and professional norms in determining actions by street-level officials).
See LEWIS, supra note 3o, at 27-43 (identifying methods of agency politicization); DAVID E.
LEWIS & JENNIFER L. SELIN, ACUS SOURCEBOOK OF THE UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE AGENCIES 40-65 (2012) (detailing different executive-branch structures); Bruce Ackerman, The
New Separation of Powers, 113 HARv. L. REV. 633, 698-709 (2000) (describing the politicization of the American bureaucracy); Philip J. Weiser, Towards a ConstitutionalArchitecturefor
Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 668-70 (2000) (describing federal agencies' reliance on state and local governments).
See H. GEORGE FREDERICKSON & KEVIN B. SMITH, THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION THEORY
PRIMER 208 (2003); KETTL, supra note 30, at 51-54, 59-68, 90-96, 129; Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89
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Supervision in such arrangements also takes a different guise, one characterized more by planning, audits, ongoing monitoring, performance assessment,
and peer review than by rule-bound appeals to superior officials or review of
specific decisions.' Evidence suggests that these new approaches have not displaced overarching hierarchical arrangements so much as supplemented them,
with the net result that multiple forms of supervision occur simultaneously."
B. Administration's Contemporary Centrality
Systemic administration and supervision have long been central features of
executive branch functioning.6 But they are becoming even more important in
contemporary regulatory and administrative contexts, with supervision in particular increasingly critical to preserving the rule of law and governmental accountability. Four recent administrative developments demonstrate the enhanced importance of systemic administration and supervision: increasing
privatization, expanding federal-state cooperation, crisis governance, and the
growth in presidential administration.
1. Privatization

Privatization in the United States involves the government contracting with
private entities and individuals for services or in other ways transferring responsibility for performance of governmental functions to private hands. 7 Privatization is perhaps the most prominent manifestation of the broader tiend
towards more decentralized, collaborative, and discretionary administrative arrangements associated with new governance. As Jon Michaels has noted, priMINN. L. REv. 342, 343-47 (2004); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and
Experimentalism in the Administrative State, lOO GEo. L.J. 53, 55-56, 78-93 (2011); Salamon,
supra note 23, at 11-18.
34.

See Noonan et al., supra note 24, at 535-48; Simon, supra note lo, at 3,

35.

See FREDERICKSON & SMITH, supra note 33, at 224; WILSON, supra note 28, at ix-xvi; Carolyn
J. Hill & Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., Is HierarchicalGovernance in Decline?Evidence from Empirical
Research, 15 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 173, 189 (2005).

36.

See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATWVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST

11-12.

ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATWVE LAw (2012).

37.

See Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Introduction: Refraining the Outsourcing Debates, in
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1-2 (Jody Freeman
& Martha Minow eds., 2009); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatizationas Delegation, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1367, 1370 (2003). Jon Michaels recently has argued that a second generation of privatization is emerging and becoming increasingly dominant, including "marketization of bureaucracy" and "government by bounty." Jon D. Michaels, Privatization'sProgeny, io GEO.
L.J. 1023, 1025-27 (2013).
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vate "service contracting is now ubiquitous in military combat, municipal policing, rule promulgation, environmental policymaking, prison administration,
and public-benefits determinations.", 8 Although current hard data on federal
service contracting is difficult to obtain, the Office of Management and Budget
estimated that "$320 billion-or about 6o percent of all federal dollars spent on
contracts for goods and services-went to support the contract workforce in
fiscal 2010."' 9
Privatization has many important effects on government programs and institutions. It can inject innovation and flexibility, as well as result in improved
performance.4" At the same time, private contractors gain day-to-day control
over program implementation, institutional operation, and service delivery.4 '
But private contractors are largely exempt from the statutory or regulatory controls applicable to governmental employees and are rarely subject to constitutional demands under the state-action doctrine. Political oversight is often lacking, and information on how contractors operate can be difficult to obtain, due

38.

Michaels, supra note 37, at

1025;

see also PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY:

WHY PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE
CAN Do ABOUT IT 23-57 (2007) (providing examples of privatization); Freeman & Minow,

supranote 37, at 1-2, 6 (defining privatization).
39.

Louis

Peck,

America's

$32o

Billion

Shadow

Government,

FISCAL

TIMES,

Sept.

http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2oil/o9/28/Americas-32o-Billion-Shadow
-Government [http://perma.cc/4SDS-Y2FS]. The federal contractor workforce is estimated
to have grown from "an estimated 4.4 million in 1999 to more than 7.5 million by the end of
the 200S fiscal year." Paul C. Light, Op-Ed, The Real Crisis in Government, WASH.
POST, Jan. 12, 20O,
http://www.washingtonpost.conVwp-dyrVcontent/article/2olo/ol/11
/AR2oloo111o3255.html [http://perma.cc/52NZ-HMFR]. But see Peck, supra (noting that an
association of government contractors argues that Peck's estimate is too high). Data on federal service contracting should become more readily accessible as a result of section 743(a) of
the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, § 743(a), 123 Stat. 3034,
3216-17 (2009), which requires most executive agencies other than the Department of Defense to submit an "annual inventory" on service contractors' activities to OMB. Those inventories will begin with service contracts issued in fiscal year 2014 worth $2.S million or
more. 48 C.F.R. § 4.1703 (2014).
28, 2011,

40.

See Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships:Accounting for the New Religion, 116
HARV. L. REv. 1229, 1242-46 (2003); Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci, Privatization and Accountability, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1422, 1435-50 (2003). For skeptical views of privatization's benefits on government performance, see ELLIOTT D. SCLAR, You DON'T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU PAY FOR: THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATIZATION 9-11, 18-19, 92-93
(2000); David A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 CAL. L. REV. 393

(2008).
41.
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See Metzger, supra note 37, at 1395.
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in part to the inapplicability of freedom-of-information laws. 4 The result is
that privatization poses a serious risk to "principle[s] of constitutional accountability" and "constitutionally constrained government."4 3 Such concerns about
undermining constraints on government arise in a range of contexts, from wel4
fare privatization to national security, each with somewhat different features."
A core example of privatization in national security, for example, is private contractors' supplying key security and interrogation services.' But nationalsecurity privatization also extends to private companies' allowing the government to access massive amounts of privately held data on individuals' communications .46 The latter type of arrangement -the scope of which was revealed
by an independent national-security contractor-is not privatization in the
sense of private entities' performing governmental functions. But it raises similar concerns about how reliance on the private sector can expand government
power in ways that are not easily susceptible to traditional legal controls.47
Although traditional governmental controls are limited in privatization
contexts, alternative accountability mechanisms may exist, particularly in the
guise of contractually imposed remedies and requirements." Critically, the ef42.

See Nina A. Mendelson, Six Simple Steps To Increase ContractorAccountability, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 37, at 241, 24453; Metzger, supra note 37, at 1411-37.

43. Metzger, supra note 37, at 14oo-o; see VERKUIL, supra note 38, at 1-6; Minow, supra note 40,
at 1246.
44. See Metzger, supra note 37, at 1396-1403.
45.

See MOSHE SCHWARTZ & JOYPRADA SWAIN, CONG. RES. SERV., R40764, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ_ AND AFGHANISTAN: BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
(2011), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40764.pdf [http://perma.cc/WA2N-4WNR]

(describing extensive use of private military contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2010);
VERKUIL, supra note 38, at 23-42 (describing forms of national security privatization); Steven L. Schooner, ContractorAtrocities at Abu Ghraib: CompromisedAccountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced, Government, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 549, 554-56 (2005) (describing the
use of private contractors for interrogation).
46. See Jon D. Michaels, All The President's Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships in
the War On Terror, 96 CAL. L. REV. 9O1, 908-22, 929-31 (2008); Barton Gellman
& Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google Data Centers Worldwide,
Snowden Documents Say, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost
.coim/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-inks-t-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide
-snowden-documents-say/213/o/3/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d71 4 ca4dd-story.html
[http://perma.cc/M483-82VD].
47. See Jon D. Michaels, Deputizing Homeland Security, 88 TEx. L. REV. 1435, 1452-66 (2010) (describing the legal uncertainties created by national security public-private partnerships).
48. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 664-66
(2000). An additional check that has arisen in the national security context is private businesses' reputational concerns. See Nick Wingfield, Microsoft's Top Lawyer Is the Tech
World's Envoy, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2014, http://www.nytimes.coM/2o14/o7/21/technology
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fectiveness of these contractual mechanisms largely depends on the extent of
supervision and contract oversight undertaken by government agencies. 49 As
the botched rollout of the federal healthcare exchanges revealed, poor government oversight can fundamentally undermine government programs by allowing private contractor failures to go unidentified and unaddressed.5 ° Equally
important are other systemic features of contracting relationships, such as the
degree to which program participants can choose among private service providers or the level and structure of contract payments." Indeed, viewing privatization systemically is crucial for assessing its full impact on governmental
structure, including gauging the extent to which it operates to aggrandize the
executive branch and presidential power.5 2 Hence, the tremendous growth in
privatized institutions and programs serves to make systemic features of administration especially important as mechanisms for controlling private contractors and serves as the main point of entry for assessing the operation of privatized programs.
2.

CooperativeFederalism

Cooperative federalism is an even more familiar aspect of modern government than privatization is -one that some have traced back to the nation's early administrative arrangements, but one that became particularly prominent
first with the New Deal and then with federal health and environmental regulatory initiatives in the 196os. s3 Cooperative federalism denotes instances in
which state and local governments undertake primary responsibility for implementing federal programs or enforcing federal law under the supervision
and oversight of federal agencies. 4 Although the federal government imposes

/microsofts-top-lawyer-is-the-tech-worlds-envoy.html [http://perma.cc/XKY-PXQB]. A
third potential check is the competitive pressure of the market, but only a few companies
may have the capacity to bid for government contracts and program participants frequently
lack choice about which contractor to use. See Freeman & Minow, supra note 37, at 2-5; Super, supra note 40, at 407-41.
49.

See Freeman, supra note 48, at 6o8, 623-25, 634-36; Schooner, supra note 45, at 557-60.

50.

See Pear et al., supra note 3.

s.

See Metzger, supra note 37, at 1470-8o.

52.

SeeJon D. Michaels, Privatization'sPretensions,77 U. CHI. L. REv. 717, 719-24

53.

See Robert L. Fischman, CooperativeFederalism and NaturalResources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 179, 182-207 (2005); Weiser, supra note 32, at 668-71; see also Harry N. Scheiber, American Federalism and the Diffusion of Power: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, 9 U. TOL.
L. REv. 619 (1978) (describing the debate over cooperative federalism's tenure).
See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguardof the Separationof Powers, 112 COLUM. L.

54.

REV. 459,472-75

(2012);

Weiser, supra note 32, at 665, 671.

(2010).
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program requirements and conditions that states must meet to receive funds,
many scholars contend that "the real authority under such regimes often rests
with the states which ultimately exercise considerable discretion in making and
55
implementing policy."
Major legislative and administrative initiatives of the last few years have
significantly increased the scope of such federal-state cooperation. Not only is
the federal government asking states to play new roles in federal programs, but
it is also giving states broader discretion and control over the shape of their
participation. The Affordable Care Act is a prime example. It relies partly on
state-run health benefit exchanges, expanded federally ftinded state Medicaid
programs, and state enforcement of its insurance requirements. Under both the
statute and governing federal regulations, states have substantial leeway in determining how these functions will be performed. s6 Another manifestation of
increased federal-state cooperation is the recent expansion in the use and scope
of administrative waivers in a number of cooperative federalism programs,
with the federal government's acceptance of state implementation plans that
operate under terms notably different from those set out in governing federal
57
statutes.

At the same time as state discretion in implementing federal programs has
increased, courts have restricted the availability of judicial review of state implementation decisions. The doctrinal culprits here are many, including increased refusal to find implied statutory rights of action, new restrictions on
Section 1983 suits to enforce federal statutes, heightened standing barriers, and
pullbacks in institutional reform litigation."' Indeed, these two trends are mu55.

Weiser, supra note 32, at 671. For similar views, see JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: How STATES PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING 172-93
(2009); Bulman-Pozen, supra note 54, at 478-86; Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative
Federalism, the New Formalism, and the Separation of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund
and the Problem ofPresidentialOversight of State-Government Officers Enforcing FederalLaw, 61
DUKE L.J. 1599, 1639 (2012). But see Nat'l Fed'n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566,
2606-07 (2012) (invalidating funding conditions imposed under Medicaid, a leading example of cooperative federalism, as unduly coercive of states).

S6.

See Abbe R. Gluck, IntrastatutoryFederalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation
of FederalLaw in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 576-94 (2o11) (describing a variety of state-federal interactions in the Affordable Care Act); Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism
Under Obama, 53 WM. & MAY L. REv. 567, 571-93 (2011) (describing state roles in the ACA,
Dodd-Frank, and Recovery Acts).

57.

See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Federalism by Waiver After the Health Care Case, in THE HEALTH
CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 227 (Nathaniel Persily
et al. eds., 2013); David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense ofBig Waiver, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 265, 277-91 (2013).

58.

See Home v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 447-50 (2oo9) (institutional reform litigation); Gonzaga
Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002) (litigation involving S 1983); Alexander v. Sandoval,
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tually reinforcing, as greater state implementation discretion heightens the risk
that courts will find barriers to reviewing the substance of state decisionmaking. 9 Meanwhile, congressional oversight tends to focus on the federal part of
federal-state programs, with Congress more likely to intervene to question federal administrative requirements
at the states' behest than to investigate state
6
implementation directly. ,
The net effect of these trends toward increased state discretion and reduced
judicial review is to make federal administrative supervision an increasingly
important means for ensuring accountability of state-implemented federal programs. Cooperative federalism can yield accountability gains as well: state administrative processes and state oversight mechanisms are significant in ensuring that state-run programs adhere to governing federal requirements.
Moreover, states play an important role in challenging requirements that they
consider to be unlawful or excessive and in developing new programmatic approaches for the federal government to adopt. 6' A danger of enhanced federal
administrative oversight is that it may undercut these important state functions
in national programs. But the costs of allowing states to operate federal programs in ways that are at odds with core federal policies also need to be taken
into account, and in any event federal administrative engagement and oversight will be a prime mechanism for changing federal requirements in response
to state protests. 6 2 The Court's recent decision in Douglas v. Independent Living
Center6 , underscores the growing centrality of federal administrative oversight
in the cooperative federalism realm, with the Court there emphasizing the importance of federal agency approval
of a challenged state policy to the nature
6
and scope of judicial review. ,
U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001) (implied private rights of action); see also Exceptional Child Ctr.,
Inc. v. Armstrong, 567 Fed. App'x 496, 497 (9 th Cir. 2014) (upholding an implied right of
action to challenge a state Medicaid program's reimbursement rates as preempted), cert.
532

granted, 135 S. Ct. 44 (Oct.
59.

2,

2014).

See Alexander, 532 U.S. at 288-9o; Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 358-63 (1992).

6o. See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T AccOuNTABLuTY OFFICE, GAO-12-1016, GRANTS TO STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS: AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL FUNDING LEVELS AND SELECTED CHALLENGES 1529 (focusing on federal agencies' ability to manage grant programs and monitor perfor-

mance by state and local governments); see also Bulman-Pozen, supra note 54, at 496-98 (describing how states can monitor the executive branch for Congress).
61.

See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 18 YALE L.J. 1256
(2009); Gluck, supra note 56, at 564-76; Cristina M. Rodriguez, Negotiating Conflict Through
Federalism: Institutionaland PopularPerspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 2094 (2014).

62.
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3. Crisis Governanceand PresidentialAdministration

A third development, crisis governance, refers to the expansive assertions of
authority made by the executive branch in response to sudden emergencies .6
Crisis governance -evident in national-security actions taken after the September lith attacks and in the dramatic actions taken by the Federal Reserve
and Department of the Treasury during the financial crisis of 2008-is less
clearly a growing administrative phenomenon than one that is of great salience
when it occurs. On the other hand, programs and initiatives adopted in response to crisis events often continue after the immediate urgency has passed,
as recent disclosures about ongoing NSA surveillance demonstrate. 6 6
A prominent feature of crisis governance is limited contemporaneous scrutiny by entities outside of the executive branch, including the courts or Congress. To be sure, both the courts and Congress have imposed constraints on
executive-branch national-security and financial-crisis initiatives .6' But as Eric
Posner and Adrian Vermeule contend, the need for urgent action means that
both congressional and judicial interventions largely occur after the fact and
often involve substantial deference and delegation to the executive branch.68
Moreover, even post hoc judicial review is often quite limited as a result of the
types of actions agencies take, statutory exemptions, and justiciability barriers. 6 , Clapper v. Amnesty International USA provides a prime example of these
barriers. There, the Supreme Court denied standing to individuals seeking to
(insisting that no right of action existed to challenge the state's rate change in court, with
the sole remedy available being federal administrative review); see also Home v. Flores, 557
U.S. 433, 456 n.6 (2009) (noting that "[No Child Left Behind] does not provide a private
right of action" and is "enforceable only by the agency charged with administering it").
65.

See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State:
9/11 and the FinancialMeltdown of 2oo8, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 1613 (2009).
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see also Steven M. Da-

vidoff & David Zating, Regulation by Deal: The Government's Response to the FinancialCrisis,
61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 513-25 (2009) (noting that Congress did impose constraints, albeit
limited ones, on the new authorities delegated to the Treasury Department).
68.

69.
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67, at 468, 534 (noting the lack of judicial review of executive branch actions during the financial crisis).
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challenge a national-security surveillance program on Fourth Amendment
grounds because the plaintiffs could not show that interception of their own
communications was "certainly impending."7' Given the clandestine nature of
the program and its targets, this was a nearly impossible task until the government began informing defendants when their trials involved evidence obtained through the program."
Crisis governance is itself one manifestation of the fourth trend: expanding
presidential administration. The President today plays a central lawmaking
role, spurred by multiple causes, including the birth of the modern national
administrative state; new economic, social, and global realities; divided government and changed political practices.' Acting through administrative agencies as well as more unilaterally by means of executive orders and presidential
memoranda, Presidents wield broad power to set national policy on a wide

range of issues.' 3 Recent examples include President Obama's immigration enforcement initiatives and his directive to the EPA on greenhouse gases,74 but he
is far from the only President to undertake major policy moves in this fashion. 7
To note the President's de facto lawmaking role is not to contend that all
such presidential assertions of authority accord with the Constitution. 7'6 Indeed, in NLRB v. Noel Canning, the Supreme Court last Term rejected President Obama's wielding of the recess appointment power during pro forma

70.

133 S. Ct. at 1147-48.
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114 HARV. L. REv. 2245, 2281-2319 (2001); Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of UnilateralAction, i J. L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 133-38 (1999).
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Nov. 20, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2o14/l/2o/remarks-president
-address-nation-immigration [http://perma.cc/ABE9-9BFW]; Barack Obama, A Nation
of Laws and a Nation of Immigrants, TIME, June 17, 2012, http://ideas.time.com
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See HOWELL, supra note 72, at 6; Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty,
67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 686 (2014).

76.

For an argument against inherent presidential authority or lawmaking power, see Henry P.
Monaghan, The ProtectivePower ofthe Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22-24, 39-61 (1993).
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Senate sessions.' Realistically, however, presidential lawmaking and unilateralism represent a central feature of contemporary federal government. 8 Expanded presidential authority is also a context in which administration and supervision are particularly relevant. This expansion has both spurred and been
reinforced by a tremendous growth in distinctly presidential administrative capacity or what is often called the institutional presidency, which encompasses
White House staff, OMB, and the Executive Office of the President more
broadly. Such increased capacity reflects two key dynamics that Terry Moe
identified as accompanying increased popular expectations of presidential leadership: centralization of decisionmaking and politicization of agencies. 7 9 Current manifestations of these dynamics are centralized regulatory review by
OMB and OIRA pursuant to executive order, presidential directives, expanded
use of political appointees, and White House policy czars.s °
External scrutiny of presidential administration occurs more frequently
outside of the crisis governance context, but again is often quite limited. Executive orders and other presidential actions can be subject to judicial review if
they affect rights or duties of individuals outside the executive branch."' Often,
however, these measures escape judicial scrutiny-either because they are expressly not judicially enforceable or involve actions that are presumptively nonreviewable, or because courts tend to ignore presidential involvement when reviewing agency actions.8s Presidential unilateral actions often trigger
congressional attention, but the obstacles built into the legislative process (including the President's veto power) make enacting legislation overturning such
actions quite difficult.5 s

77.

134 S. Ct. 2550, 2574-77 (2014).

78.

See Kagan, supra note 72, at

79.

See Terry M. Moe, The PoliticizedPresidency, in THE NEW DIRECTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS
235, 238, 244-63 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985); see also LEWis, supra note 30,

2246.

at 89 (discussing politicization techniques).
go. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994); LEwIS, supra note 30, at 6-8, 30-43; Kagan,

supra note 72, at 2284-3303; Aaron J. Saiger, Obama's "Czars"forDomestic Policy and the Law
of the White House Staff, 79 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2577, 2579-94 (2011).

81.

See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 583-89 (1952) (reviewing
and overturning President Truman's executive order that seized steel mills).

82. See, e.g., Franklin v. Massachusetts, 5o5 U.S. 788, 8oo-ol (1992) (holding that presidential
actions are not reviewable for abuse of discretion under the APA); Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821, 831-33 (1985) (holding that agency nonenforcement is presumptively not reviewable); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994) § 1O (1994) (stating that executive orders
do not create rights or duties enforceable in court).
83."See HOWELL, supra note 72, at 43-64, 101-27; see also Josh Gerstein, 5 Questions About John
Boehner's Lawsuit Against Barak Obama, POLITICO, July 6, 2014, http://www.politico.com
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These limits to congressional and judicial review do not mean that the executive branch operates essentially unconstrained in instances of crisis governance or presidential action. But the relevant constraints come largely from
within the executive branch itself, through what is sometimes called the internal separation of powers: internal review structures, involvement of multiple
agencies, inspectors general, agency-generated procedural and substantive limitations, professional commitments and reputational concerns, and executive
branch adherence to governing law. 4 In other words, systemic features of internal administration are again critical to ensuring accountable government.
Moreover, it bears emphasizing that presidential administration and supervision themselves can be key mechanisms for ensuring executive branch accountability. Justice (then-Professor) Kagan famously emphasized the political
accountability benefits of presidential administration, and others have focused
on the ways that presidential or centralized review can check agency capture or
excessive tunnel vision."s In some instances, such as the Obama Administration's instructions to agencies to grant same-sex couples equal rights in a range
of contexts after United States v. Windsor, presidential direction helps enforce
legal constraints. 86 Hence, assessing the constitutionality of the President's expanded role entails close attention to systemic administrative features and their
full impact on how the government operates.

/story/2o14/o7/john-boehner-barack-obama-lawsuit-io8968.html
[http://perma.cc/TM69
-QK9W] (noting significant legal obstacles to Congress's suit).
84. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 67, at 537-38; Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of
Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (20o6);
Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors General and National Security Oversight, 6S STAN. L. REv. 1027 (2013). Whether, and to what extent these internal mechanisms

exert any constraining force is a matter of substantial debate. Compare BRUCE ACKERMAN,
THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010) (arguing that internal legal offices impose little constraint), and ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 15 (2010) (arguing that the constraints come
from politics and public opinion, not law), with Richard H. Pildes, Law and the President, 125
HARV. L. REv. 1381, 1403-09 (2012) (reviewing POSNER & VERMEULE, supra) (arguing that

presidents have strategic reasons to comply with law and there is little empirical support for
the claim they do not).
8s. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 72, at 2331-46; Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, ioi GEO. L.J. 1337, 1361-77 (2013); Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARv. L. REV.
1838, 1840-42 (2013).
86.
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Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Eric Holder to President Barack Obama (June 20, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/9722o1462O1O393o9o4785.pdf
[http://perma.cc
/9P 7 D-AJY 3].
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C. ConstitutionalLaw's Exclusion ofAdministration
Administration and supervision's centrality to the functioning of modern
government contrasts mightily with constitutional law, where systemic administration is largely excluded from judicial analysis. The judicial separation of
administration from constitutional law is of long duration, articulated in Marbury v. Madison's famous statement that "the province of the court is, solely, to
decide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion.",8 This separation
takes a multitude of doctrinal guises, but they combine to make resistance to
incorporating systemic administration into an indelible feature of current constitutional law.
i. Structural ConstitutionalLaw: Standing Doctrine and the Separationof
Powers
Standing doctrine serves as the front line in precluding judicial consideration of systemic administration, with its requirement of individualized injury
and connected prohibition on suits raising generalized grievances.8 8 True, individuals able to demonstrate the requisite individualized injury can challenge
government administration, and the determination of what constitutes a generalized grievance is highly malleable. 8, So the generalized grievance prohibition does not operate as a categorical bar to considering challenges to administrative structures. 90 But the Court's insistence on an individualized focus, along
with the high threshold it imposes for proving injury, suggests that the instances in which an individual is able to challenge systemic features of administration will be few and far between. As the Court put the point in Allen v.
Wright, "[S]uits challenging, not specifically identifiable Government violations of law, but the particular programs agencies establish to carry out their
legal obligations . . . are rarely if ever appropriate for federal-court adjudica91
tion."

87.

5 U.s. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803); see Henry P. Monaghan, ConstitutionalLitigation: The Who
and the When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1365-67 (1973).

88. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74, 576-77 (1992).

89. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563.
go. See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?: Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article
III, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163, 212-13 (1992).
91.

468 U.S. 737, 759-6o (1984); see also Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147-48
(2013); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149-53 (2009) (denying an organization standing to challenge a Forest Service regulation on timber sales as unlawfully promul-
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Institutional reform litigation might seem at first glance to be a significant
exception. The primary aim of institutional reform litigation is to use discrete
instances of individual-right violations to justify broad remedial measures that
reengineer how the institutions or programs at issue are administered. 92 Nonetheless, courts allow institutional reform litigation to proceed despite its systemic edge. A recent striking example is Brown v. Plata,a case involving class
actions on behalf of California prisoners with serious medical and mental
health disorders.93 The plaintiffs did not challenge specific "deficiencies in
care" to which they were individually subject but instead alleged that "systemwide deficiencies in the provision of medical and mental health care... ,
taken as a whole," violated the Eighth Amendment-a claim the Supreme
94
Court accepted in affirming the lower court's remedial order.
Yet the facts of Plata were extreme, and it would be a mistake to read the
decision as signaling broad availability of systemic challenges.9" The Court has
rejected institutional reform suits on standing grounds precisely because of
their unduly systemic character, insisting in Lewis v. Casey that "merely the status of being subject to a governmental institution that was not organized or
managed properly" was an insufficient basis on which "to invoke the intervention of the courts" absent evidence of a distinct and concrete injury caused by
that improper management. 96 Nor has the Court demonstrated much sympagated absent identification of a specific timber sale authorized by the regulation that injured
its members); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564.
See Charles F. Sabel &William H. Simon, DestabilizationRights: How Public Law Litigation
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REv. l15, 1o18-19 (2004). Institutional or structural reform litigation

92.

thus became one of the most prominent intersections of constitutional rights and internal

administration. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, StructuralReform Revisited,
95 C.AIF.L. REv. 1387, 1412-15 (2007) (describing structural reform litigation and noting the
preeminence of constitutional claims in this context).
93.

131 S.Ct. 1910, 1926-27 (2011).

94.

Id. at 1925 n.3, 1940-41; see also id.' at 1952 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("Under this theory, each
and every prisoner who happens to be a patient in a system that has systemic weaknesses...
has suffered cruel and unusual punishment, even if that person cannot make an individualized showing of mistreatment.").
Id. at 1923-28, 1932-37 (majority opinion) (documenting the complete failure of California's
prison health system -a failure that had been ongoing for well over a decade, was worsening, and resulted in frequent deaths and unnecessary suffering).

95.

518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996); see City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-11 (1983) (hold-

96.

ing that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the Los Angeles police department's practice of using chokeholds absent threat of deadly force); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 365,
371-73 (1976) (denying equitable standing to challenge a police department procedure for

handling citizen complaints); see also Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through
1, 11-12 (2009) (noting that structural reform litigation is a weaker tool to force police department change as a result of Lyons and Rizzo);
Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court

ProactivePolicingReform, 62 STAN. L. REv.
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thy for institutional reform litigation of late, criticizing such litigation as entailing judicial assumption of responsibility for administrative choices that should
be made by the political branches or state governments.9 7 Hence, institutional
reform litigation demonstrates the limitations on judicial consideration of systemic administration as much as it represents a deviation from the norm.
Standing's barrier to generalized challenges is well known. Less broadly
appreciated is the judicial resistance to considering systemic administration
that appears in separation of powers challenges. Overall administration would
seem particularly relevant to doctrines addressing the constitutionality of different federal governmental structures. Surprisingly, however, consideration of
systemic administration in separation of powers analysis is uneven and narrow
in scope.
Take, for instance, contemporary nondelegation doctrine. Although challenges to legislation as delegating excessively broad authority to the executive
branch are almost uniformly rejected, the basis on which these claims falter has
varied over time. Some early post-New Deal cases paid particular heed to how
agencies wielded their delegated powers, emphasizing administrative rules or
internal procedures that governed agency determinations. s More recently,
Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 564-67 (2006) (noting broader changes under the Rehnquist

Court and limitations by Congress on structural reform litigation).
97. See Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 447-50 (2009); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 97-102

(1995). Although institutional challenges continue to be successful in a number of contexts,
the conventional view is that there has been a significant retrenchment in broad structural
reform by judicial order since the 197os. See Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 92, at 14o8-12

(offering a brief history of structural reform litigation); see also Schlanger, supra note 96, at
564-66 (describing the conventional view). Some scholars maintain that the conventional
prediction of institutional reform litigation's death in federal court are premature. See, e.g.,
Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the StructuralReform Injunction: Oops . . . It's Still Moving!, 58
U. MIAMI L. REV. 143, 146-47, 169-71 (2003). Recent decades have witnessed an expansion in

lawsuits in some areas, like child welfare, education, or law enforcement. See Catherine Y.
Kim, Changed Circumstances: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedureand the Futureof Institutional
Reform LitigationAfter Horne v. Flores, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1435, 1444-48 (2013). But more

of this litigation is in state court or involves the Department of Justice as a plaintiff, pursuant to congressional authorization. See 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012); Erica Goode, Some Chiefs
Chafing as Justice Department Keeps Closer Eye on Policing, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2013, http://

www.nytimes.com/2013/o7/28/us/some-chiefs-chafing-as-justice-department-keeps-closer
-eye-on-policing.html [http://perma.cc/7LDF-YAAL]. Moreover, the shape of institutional
reform litigation appears to have changed even when successful, with consent decrees now
framed more narrowly and containing weak enforcement provisions. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 92, at lO18-21 (arguing that decrees have become more flexible and provisional,
with a move towards more experimentalist remedies and procedures for ongoing stakeholder participation); Schlanger, supra note 96, at 589-90, 602-05, 612-21, 623-26 (arguing that

the main change is in weaker enforcement provisions).
98. See Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 777-78, 783 (1948) (emphasizing administrative
practices in implementing the Renegotiation Act); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 252-253
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however, the Court has downplayed the role that internal administrative constraints play in assessing a delegation's constitutionality, insisting that the onus
is on Congress to provide an intelligible principle; self-limitation by an agency
is constitutionally insufficient.99 Post-New Deal jurisprudence emphasizing
the importance of government supervision of private delegations has not been
questioned, but in these cases the courts never required much by way of actual
supervision or probed behind formal provisions for government ratification of
private decisionmaking, however perfunctory.'
Administrative structure surfaces more centrally in cases addressing Article
II and the scope of presidential power. Thus, for example, the extent to which
an executive branch officer's decisionmaking is supervised determines whether
she qualifies as a principal or inferior officer, resulting in scrutiny of oversight
mechanisms in Appointment Clause challenges.' Similarly, removal challenges focus on the extent to which a removal restriction unconstitutionally limits
the President's ability to oversee the executive branch. 2
Yet many important aspects of systemic administration are often excluded
from analysis even in the Article II context. Again, courts place emphasis largely on formal oversight mechanisms rather than on the extent to which an officer's decisions are actually reviewed or controlled. The Court's 201o decision
in Free EnterpriseFund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board is a case in point,
with the majority there zeroing in on one slice of administrative structure removal power -and discounting other ways in which the Securities and Exchange Commission exercised broad power over the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's functions.0 3 Moreover, removal is an individualistic

(1947) (emphasizing rules the Federal Home Loan Bank Board had promulgated); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 759 (D.D.C. 1971) (emphasizing stand-

ards promulgated by the agency restricting its own discretion).
99. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).
loo. See, e.g., Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 397-401 (1940); Gillian E.
Metzger, Privatizationas Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1367, 1440-41 (2003).
101.

See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1997); see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub.
Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 481 (2010) (reiterating the Edmond test as determina-

tive of an officer's status).
102. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 483-84 (holding that multiple levels of for-cause removal

protection rendered the President's control too attenuated); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654, 692-93, 696 (1988) (concluding that the Attorney General's ability to remove the independent counsel for cause and the counsel's obligations to follow Department ofJustice policy provided sufficient opportunity for presidential oversight).
103. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 504 ("Broad power over Board functions is not equivalent to
the power to remove Board members .... The Commission cannot wield a free hand to su-

pervise individual members if it must destroy the Board in order to fix it."); id. at 529 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for ignoring the "virtually absolute" control the
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mechanism of supervision. It focuses on controlling a particular official and assumes that the single official can then control how a vast modern agency operates. Perhaps most notably, this Article II case law is largely silent on the idea
of presidential oversight as a duty that the President must undertake and not
just a power the President must have available. Although Free Enterprise described the President as subject to a nondelegable duty to "active [ly] ... supervise," the concept of a presidential duty to supervise received no further development there or in other decisions." 4
2.

IndividualRights: The Eighth Amendment, Due Process, and Restrictions
on Liabilityfor Failed Supervision

An even clearer pattern of exclusion or limited acknowledgement of systemic administration occurs in the individual rights context. Again, this exclusion is not absolute, with the Court at times giving internal administration
mechanisms constitutional significance; examples include administrative licensing systems in First Amendment challenges and internal administrative
procedures in the habeas and Bivens contexts."0 But there are many other instances in which the Court has refused to accord constitutional salience to administration despite its seeming relevance."

6

More importantly, the Court has

developed substantive standards that restrict constitutional consideration of
systemic administration and have largely eviscerated supervisory liability.

SEC wielded by virtue of its control of the PCAOB's budget and review of its decisions); see
also Krotoszynski, supra note 55 (underscoring Free Enterprise's formalism). But see Morrison,
487 U.S. at 695-96 (considering limits on the independent counsel separate from removal in
concluding that opportunities for presidential oversight were adequately preserved).
104. 561 U.S. at 496 (quoting Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 713 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in
the judgment) ("[A] President, though able to delegate duties to others, cannot delegate ultimate responsibility or the active obligation to supervise that goes with it.")).
105. See Gillian E. Metzger, OrdinaryAdministrative Law as ConstitutionalCommon Law, 11o COLUM. L. REV. 479, 488-89, 498 (2010).
1o6. See id. at 483-84, 5OO, 519-34 (noting the Court's failure to require or encourage internal
administrative controls to protect against Fourth Amendment violations, despite recognizing their value, and its refusal to use ordinary administrative law as a means for encouraging
administrative agencies to take constitutional concerns seriously). But see Daphna Renan,
The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Procedure 21-22 (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author) (noting the suggestions of an administrative model in some Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence).
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a. Eighth Amendment and Due Process
The phenomenon of anti-systemic substantive standards is clearly evident
in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Extension of the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment to the conditions under which
prisoners are held has led to substantial court involvement in the administration and operation of prisons."0 7 Yet the tests the Court has developed over
time to identify Eighth Amendment violations (perhaps, in part, to limit that
involvement) are remarkably individualistic and noninstitutional in their framing."8 In particular, the Court requires that a prisoner demonstrate not just a
grave deprivation-in the Court's words, a deprivation of "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities" -but also that prison officials act with subjective "deliberate indifference" to the harm they are imposing.'0 9
Two decisions, Wilson v. Seiter"' and Farmerv. Brennan,"' demonstrate the
resulting exclusion of administration from judicial review. Wilson involved a
Section 1983 action alleging systemic failures in Ohio's operation of a state
prison."2 The Court held that prisoners must demonstrate a culpable state of
mind on the part of prison officials that rises to the level of "deliberate indifference" in order for inadequate prison conditions to constitute punishment sufficient to trigger the Eighth Amendment." 3 But as Justice White noted in concurring in the judgment, "Inhumane prison conditions often are the result of
cumulative actions and inactions by numerous officials inside and outside a
prison, sometimes over a long period of time.... [I]ntent simply is not very
meaningful when considering a challenge to an institution, such as a prison
system."" 4 In Farmer,the Court took this individualistic focus one step further,
holding that the requisite test for deliberate indifference was recklessness and

that recklessness should be measured subjectively."' To be subject to liability,

107.

See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976) (recognizing an Eighth Amendment
claim against unconstitutional conditions based on inadequate healthcare).

io8. For an account of how an individualistic model has dominated over more systemic approaches in constitutional torts generally, see Christina B. Whitman, Governmental Responsibilityfor ConstitutionalTorts, 85 MICH. L. REV. 225 (1986).
log. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 303 (1991) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,

347 (1981)); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 1o6.
110. 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
Ill. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).

296.

112.

5o U.S. at

113.
114.

Id. at 300-03.
Id. at 310.

115.

511 U.S. 835-37.
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therefore, "[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also
draw the inference."" 6 As in Wilson, the opinion in Farmerfocuses on the state
of mind of specific prison officials, not on how the prisons they oversaw actually operated or whether these prisons were administered in a manner well below
the norm." 7
In the due process realm, the reigning Mathews v. Eldridge analysis -under
which the court balances the individual's private interest at stake against the
government's interest and the potential accuracy benefits from different or additional procedures -has a decidedly systemic and managerial cast." 8 The relevant governmental interests are overall administrative concerns, and accuracy is
also defined systemically." 9 Even the individual interest at stake is often abstracted away from the particulars of the plaintiffs situation. 2 ° Still, substantial aspects of government administration are denied constitutional relevance
even here. A prime culprit is limitation on the types of property interests that
trigger due process protection to those to which an individual has "a legitimate
claim of entitlement." 2' This limitation precludes procedural due process scrutiny of the numerous administrative arrangements under which administrators

at 837. In truth, Justice Souter's majority opinion appears to waver somewhat on exactly
how rigorously this requirement of subjective awareness should be enforced, emphasizing
that evidence of risks that were "longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly
noted by prison officials in the past" could suffice unless officials could show that they were
nonetheless unaware of the risks involved. Id. at 842-44; see also Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty,
PrisonConditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 889-92 (2009) (criticizing the individualistic focus of Farmer).
Moreover, Farmersimilarly justified its individualistic and subjective focus on the argument
that otherwise the conditions at issue would not rise to the level of punishment, 511 U.S. at
837-40, thereby defining punishment in terms of "specific acts attributable to individual
state officials" instead of as "a cumulative agglomeration of action (and inaction) on an institutional level," id. at 855 (Blackmun, J., concurring (quoting The Supreme Court, 199o

116. Id.

117.

Term-Leading Cases, 105 HARV. L. REv. 177,
118.

243

(19 9))).

U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some ConfuisionsAbout Due Process,Judicial Review, and ConstitutionalRemedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 311 (1993).
424

See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 227-28 (2005) (ensuring governments' ability to
control prisons); Mathews, 424 U.S. at 345 (1976) (characterizing written procedures as adequate, despite evidence of the potential benefit of an oral hearing in Eldridge's own case).
12o. Fallon, supra note 118, at 311 ("Courts seldom inquire into whether procedures sufficed to
ensure fair resolution of a particular case. Attention centers instead on whether decisionmaking structures are adequate to achieve, on average, a socially tolerable level of accuracy ....).
119.

izi. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
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exercise broad discretion and such entitlements are deemed lacking. 1" Moreover, in restricting the scope of interests that trigger due process protection, the
Court has invoked the same concern with inappropriate intervention of the
federal courts in "day-to-day management" that is evident elsewhere in its case
23
law.
Failure-to-train claims represent another interesting linkage between due
process-here, substantive due process-and systemic administration. For example, City of Canton v. Harrisheld that a municipality could be found to have
violated due process for its failure to adequately train its employees, "where the
failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with
whom [its employees] come into contact."" Canton rests on recognition of the
role that general administrative measures such as training and oversight play in
preventing constitutional violations, and thus, like Mathews, constitutes a rare
acknowledgment of systemic administration's constitutional significance. 2
Even so, application of the deliberate indifference standard has significantly
limited the viability of failure-to-train and failure-to-supervise challenges. Although such claims occasionally succeed, such a result is rare.2 6 It is all the
more striking, therefore, that the Canton Court justified its imposition of the
deliberate indifference standard not on due process's substantive demands but
122.

See, e.g., Lightfoot v. District of Columbia, 448 F. 3d 392, 400-01 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Silberman, J., concurring). Preclusion of procedural due process claims in such discretionary contexts leaves open the possibility of a substantive due process challenge, but such a challenge is
unlikely to succeed except in cases where a fundamental liberty interest is at stake or the
governmental action is so extreme and egregious as to "shock[] the conscience." Cnty. of

123.

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482-83 (1995); see also Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503

Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1998).

124.

125.

U.S. 115, 128-29 (1992) ("[T]he administration of government programs is based on a rational decisionmaking process that takes account of competing social, political, and economic forces.").
489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); see also Collins, 503 U.S. at 117, 124 (reaffirming the potential availability of a failure-to-train challenge).
See Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 (indicating that a failure to train is actionable where inadequacy

in training is so likely to lead to a constitutional violation that policymakers can be deemed
to have been deliberately indifferent to the need for such training). In addition, Canton's in-

vocation of an objective measure of deliberate indifference suggests more willingness to consider institutional reality in due process failure-to-train challenges rather than under the
Eighth Amendment. See id. at 389-9o.
126. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 135o, 1359-6o (2011) (emphasizing the stringency

of the deliberate indifference test); Barbara E. Armacost, OrganizationalCulture and Police
Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 453, 472, 476-86 (2004) (noting that "failure to train
claims are very difficult to bring, and even more difficult to win"); see also Bd. of Cnty.
Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407-o8 (1997) (underscoring Canton's emphasis on liabil-

ity being tied to a deficient training program because "[e]xistence of a 'program' makes
proof of fault and causation at least possible in an inadequate training case").
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rather on the prohibition on respondeat superior liability in suits brought under Section 1983."27
b. The Denial of SupervisorLiability
The Court famously articulated the prohibition on respondeat superior liability in Monell v. Department of Social Services, basing it on the language and
legislative history of Section 1983.28 Scholars and jurists have criticized this rationale, but the Court has shown little inclination to revisit the issue. 29 In1 30
stead, it has often reaffirmed the prohibition on respondeat superior liability
and extended it to the context of Bivens suits against federal officers-even
though the availability of Bivens suits is inferred directly from the Constitution
and thus is not limited by any underlying statute."' Hence, although private
employers are vicariously liable for actions taken by their employees in the usual course of employment, public employers are not.
At the same time as it denied respondeat superior liability, Monell ruled
that a municipality could be liable under Section 1983 if"a municipal 'policy' or
'custom' . . . caused the plaintiffs injury," as liability in such a case would be
direct rather than vicarious. 32 In theory, Monell's policy exception represents
another significant incorporation of administration into constitutional rights
enforcement. In practice, however, Monell's policy exception has not lived up to
its billing. Fear of violating the prohibition on respondeat superior liability has
led the Court to restrict liability to actions by an official municipal policymaker
with authority to establish the city's policy in a particular area; to demand a
489 U.S. at 389-92.
128. 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). As to language, the Court argued that § 1983's imposition of liability on "any person who, under color of law... subject[s], or cause[s] to be subjected, any
person," 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to a deprivation of federal rights "cannot be easily read to impose
liability vicariously." 436 U.S. at 691-92. The legislative history emphasized by the Court
was Congress's rejection of the Sherman Amendment, which would have made cities liable
for harms resulting from Klan or other mob riots. Id. at 664, 693-95.
129. For a sampling of these criticisms, see, for example, Brown, 520 U.S. at 431-33 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing both the textual and legislative history arguments); and David Jacks
Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously: MunicipalLiability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Debate over Respondeat Superior, 73 FoRDHAM L. REV. 2183, 2196-2216 (2005).
130. See, e.g., Brown, 520 U.S. at 403; City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121-22 (1988).
127. 42 U.S.C. S 1983 (2012);

131.

132.

See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63 (2001) (declining to allow aBivens claims
"against a private corporation operating a halfway house under contract with the Bureau of
Prisons"). Judicial preclusion of respondeat superior liability for federal employees in common law suits dates back to the nineteenth century. See Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507,
515-16 (1888).
Brown, 520 U.S. at 403-04 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).
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high level of culpability; and to require tight causation "between [a] policymaker's inadequate decision and the particular injury alleged. 1 33 These requirements not only substantially limit the exception's practical utility, but also
preclude consideration of key administrative forces such as street-level decisions and practices. 34 In addition, these tight culpability and causation requirements serve to exclude liability for "'systemic' injuries," which "result not
so much from the conduct of any single individual, but from the interactive
behavior of several government officials, each of whom may be acting in good
3
faith."' s
Perhaps most importantly, the Court's denial of respondeat superior liability precludes consideration of all of the ways that government agencies control
and shape actions by their employees separate from official policies or customs.
The focus is put on individual employees, but individual employees' actions
cannot be accurately assessed in isolation from the institutional contexts in
which they occur. Instead, agency cultures, practices, and structures profoundly affect how personnel act and the weight given certain types of concerns. 136 In
addition, "the threat that damages might be levied against the city may encourage those in a policymaking position to institute internal rules and programs
designed to minimize the likelihood of unintentional infringements on constitutional rights. 1 37 Whether respondeat superior liability would lead to better
deterrence of constitutional violations, overdeterrence, or even any measurable
deterrence is a source of some debate.13 But the key point for my purposes here

133.

Brown, 520 U.S. at 41o, 415; City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391-92 (1989); Pembaur

v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 482-84 (1986); see also Achtenberg, supra note 129, at
2190-91.

134. See Peter H. Schuck, MunicipalLiability Under Section 1983: Some Lessons from Tort Law and
Organization Theory, 77 GEo. L.J. 1753, 1777-79 (1989).
135.

Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 652 (198o); see also Schlanger, supra note 96, at
558-62 (discussing causation requirements).

136.

See, e.g., Armacost, supra note 126, at 455-56, 507-14 (arguing that police misconduct often
arises from mismanaged public safety organizations and discussing the impact of organizational culture on police behavior); Schuck, supra note 134, at 1778; Sidney A. Shapiro &
Ronald F. Wright, The Futureofthe Administrative Presidency: Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 587-89, 592-95, 598-99 (2011).

Owen, 445 U.S. at 652.
138. Compare Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
ConstitutionalCosts, 67 U. CHI. L. Rav. 345, 354-57 (2000) (arguing that government liability
is unlikely to produce deterrence because public employers are not as responsive to costs as
private employers), with Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 854-58 (2001) (arguing that tort
damages against government officials have a deterrent effect), and Larry Kramer & Alan 0.
Sykes, Municipal Liability Under S19 83 : A Legal and Economic Analysis, 1987 SuP CT. REV.
137.
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is that the Court has largely excluded judicial consideration of such incentives
on agency behavior by categorically prohibiting respondeat superior liability.'39
To the extent the Court considers the incentive effects of liability, the Court
maintains an individualistic focus in the context of developing immunity doctrines that limit government officers' personal liability. 4 And strikingly, in doing so, the Court does not consider administrative features such as near universal indemnification of governmental employees, which likely affects how
individual officers respond to the possibility of being sued. 41
The related denial of supervisory liability under Section 1983 and Bivens
serves to further exclude consideration of administration in individual rights
enforcement. Supervisory liability claims represent an effort to avoid Monell's
ban on respondeat superior and vicarious liability by charging high-level government officials with direct liability for their deficient supervision of subordinates. 4 2 A recent assertion of supervisory liability appeared in Ashcrofi v. Iqbal,
in which the plaintiffs brought suit against the Attorney General and FBI Director for, among other things, knowing of and acquiescing in their subordinates' policy of subjecting post-9/11 detainees to harsh conditions of confinement solely on account of their race, religion, and national origins." 3 Appellate
courts had allowed the possibility of such supervisory liability claims under
somewhat varying standards, and the government defendants had conceded
that "they would be liable if they had 'actual knowledge' of discrimination by
their subordinates and exhibited 'deliberate indifference' to that discrimination."' Nonetheless, the Court rejected such deficient supervision as a basis
287 (arguing that government liability is likely to produce better deterrence and training than officer liability).
139. The Court occasionally has discussed the comparative deterrent effect of direct officer liability and governmental liability in the Bivens context, but its analysis is quite superficial and
largely ignores the impact of key factors, such as individual officer immunity or indemnification. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980) (arguing that a Bivens action would
have more deterrent effect than a tort suit against the federal government because officers
themselves would face financial liability).
249,

140. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 8oo, 8oo (1982).
141. See Armacost, supra note 126, at 473; Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The
Strange Results ofPublic Officials' IndividualLiability Under Bivens, 88 GEO.L.J. 65 (1999).
142. See, e.g., Whitfield v. Melendez-Rivera, 431 F. 3d 1, 14 (ist Cir. 2005) (distinguishing be-

tween respondeat superior liability and supervisory liability). See generally Kit Kinports, The
Buck Does Not Stop Here: Supervisory Liability in Section 1983 Cases, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 147

(describing supervisory liability and variations in lower court approaches).
143. 556 U.S. 662, 668-69

(2009).

14. Id. at 690 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 29, id. (No.
07-1015)); see also Sheldon Nahmod, ConstitutionalTorts, Over-Deterrence and Supervisory Liability After Iqbal, 14 LEwis & CLARK L. REv. 279, 292-93 (2010) (describing supervisory liability standards in the lower courts before Iqbal).
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for liability in terms that suggested elimination of supervisory liability altogether, stating that "[i]n a § 1983 suit or aBivens action-where masters do not
answer for the torts of their servants -the term 'supervisory liability' is a misnomer." 45 As a result, in order for the defendant officials to be liable, the plaintiff had to plead and prove that the officials had acted with discriminatory purpose. 46
Iqbal's rejection of supervisory liability is not surprising. Leaving aside the
Court's likely reluctance to second guess high-level officials' responses to the
September ith attacks, parsing the line between direct liability for inadequate
supervision of subordinates who commit constitutional violations and vicarious liability for actions of subordinates is difficult indeed. Worse, unlike respondeat superior, which would impose liability on the governmental employer, liability for deficient supervision would attach to individual superior
officers, whose ability to exercise close supervision may be seriously constrained by institutional forces over which they have little control. Inadequate
supervision seems more likely to be an institutional failing than an individual
one. But the fault for this misframing lies with the Court's insistence on approaching liability under Section 1983 and Bivens in individualized rather than
institutional terms. Having done that, and having developed the deliberate indifference standard in other contexts, 47 the Court's preclusion of supervisory
liability claims subject to this standard is difficult to defend.
D. Recurrent Themes
This overview, spanning a variety of constitutional doctrines, suffices to
demonstrate four key themes. First is the Court's deep reluctance to incorporate general government administration into constitutional law, a reluctance
that is manifested in an array of doctrinal requirements and appears to have increased with time. Second, when administration does enter constitutional analysis, courts emphasize specific, identified practices rather than overall institutional functioning and formal administrative features instead of actual practice.
Third, supervision makes a decidedly one-sided appearance. Although the
Court demands that provision be made for the President and high-level officials to oversee the actions of lower officials, little attention is paid to whether
such oversight actually occurs, and the Court is extremely reluctant to fault
high-level officers for failed supervision. The net effect is that systemic admin145. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677.
146.

Id. at 676.

147.

Cf. Nahmod, supra note

144, at 294-95, 298-305 (defending Iqbal but arguing that the
Court's approach there is inconsistent with City of Canton and failure-to-train cases).
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istrative functioning is denied constitutional relevance, and no constitutional
claim can be made simply because a government agency or institution is inadequately managed or supervised.
The fourth theme is that underlying this exclusion of administration lie
concerns about the proper judicial role. Courts sometimes voice these concerns
in terms of an objection that general policy choices and priority-setting should
be left to politically accountable branches and sometimes in terms of limited
judicial competency, specifically the courts' lack of expertise in assessing administrative adequacy and inability to force meaningful change. Either way, the
gist is clear: systemic administration is beyond the courts' legitimate purview.
But even though constitutional doctrine's exclusion of systemic administration
turns so heavily on distinctly judicial factors, the Court never suggests that
general aspects of agency structure and functioning might carry greater constitutional weight outside the courts. Instead, at most, the Court states that the
Constitution assigns responsibility for shaping administration and overseeing
law execution to the President and Congress. 48
E. Administrative Law and Systemic Administration

A final word should be said about administrative law, which might seem to
be the natural home for fuller judicial consideration of systemic administration.
Administrative law, after all, is centrally concerned with how agencies operate,
and systemic administrative features play a central role in determining how
well an agency performs. Indeed, systemic administration constitutes a central
focus of executive-branch-generated administrative law, perhaps most clearly
evident in presidential creation of a centralized process for regulatory review. 49

148. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) ("[I]t is not the role of the courts, but that of
the political branches, to shape the institutions of government in such fashion as to comply
with the laws and the Constitution."); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984).
149. Exec. Order No. 13,563, S 6, 3 C.F.R. 215, 217 (2012); Exec. Order No. 12,866, §§ 4-6, 3
C.F.R. 638, 642-48 (1994). Plans and high-level oversight are also at the heart of White
House initiatives to increase transparency and address expanded agency reliance on informal
guidance. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, FinalBulletinfor Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72
Fed. Reg. 3432, 3439-40 (2007), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/fedreg

/2007/012507_goodguidance.pdf [http://perma.cc/QX6H-SNUL]; see also Peter R. Orszag,
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: Open Government
Directive (Dec. 8, 2009) (requiring agencies to develop open government plans that specify
in detail steps that the agency would take to encourage greater transparency and participation).
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Nonetheless, judicially enforced administrative law excludes many systemic
aspects of agency functioning in ways very similar to constitutional law."'
Much of this exclusion occurs through jurisdictional doctrines, with the Court
reading the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) provision for review of "final
agency action" to require that suit be brought against discrete agency actions
rather than against the agency's broader policies or programs that those actions
reflect.' s1 Although this line of cases ostensibly turns on the text of the APA, the
Court's separation of powers concerns with judicial involvement in administration plainly fuel its statutory reading. In Justice Scalia's typically pointed
phrasing, the limitation of final agency action to discrete acts ensures that individuals "cannot seek wholesale improvement of this program by court decree,
rather than in the offices of the Department or the halls of Congress, where
programmatic improvements are normally made."'5 2
The effect is not just to preclude "broad programmatic attacks," but more
particularly to forestall challenges to systemic nonenforcement and agency inaction, despite the APA's express grant of review over agency failures to act." s3
The Court's 2004 decision in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance underscored this point, holding that the APA's provision for suit to "compel
agency action unreasonably withheld or unreasonably delayed" s4 was available
"only where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take."' s Rarely do claims of systemic agency failure involve such discrete and required actions; instead, agencies often will have
broad discretion in choosing how to implement their statutory responsibilities,

150. See Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 37-43

(2011); see also Shapiro, supra note 16, at 1 (arguing that the exclusion of internal administrative practice dates back to the early identification of administrative law as a distinct field of
study).
151.

5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012); Lujan v._Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 891-94 (1990). Ripeness
doctrine has also served to preclude challenges to general policies prior to actual application.
See Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57-61, 64-65 (1993).

152.

Lujan, 497 U.S. at 891.

153.Id. The Court's reluctance to review nonenforcement is evident in other decisions as well.
See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-33 (1985) (presumption of nonreviewability for
nonenforcement decisions); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759-60 (1984) (rejecting standing on the grounds that causation between government nonenforcement of prohibitions on
discrimination in granting schools tax-exempt status and plaintiffs' injury was too attenuated).
155. 5 U.S.C. § 7o6 (2012).
155- 542 U.S. S5, 64 (2004).
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and "[g]eneral deficiencies
in compliance .
6
agency action.1

.

. lack the specificity requisite for

The exclusion of systemic administration from administrative law is not total, and sometimes courts will accord weight to more general aspects of agency
functioning. One prominent instance is United States v. Mead, where the Court
tied the deference accorded agency statutory interpretations to the procedures
by which the agencies promulgated them and the extent to which they were
subject to centralized agency review."5 7 Even Mead's engagement with administrative structure, however, was limited. Rather than expressly tying deference
to whether an interpretation is adopted by an agency's leadership, Mead put
prime focus on congressional authorization and agency use of relatively formal
procedures, and it gave no weight to the fact that the interpretation in question
had been made by central headquarters.s' But courts have also been reluctant
to allow judicial review of true agency guidance (as opposed to an agency
statement claiming to be guidance but actually operating as a de facto rule),
notwithstanding the fact that guidance is a central mechanism by which higher
agency officials control lower-level discretion.! 9
In short, the main forces driving agency action fall largely outside of judicial administrative law's ambit. Moreover, administrative law continues to have
a court-centric focus, despite increased attention to administrative law as it surfaces within the executive branch.' 6 ' As a result, as Daniel Farber and Anne Joseph O'Connell recently remarked, the "actual workings of the administrative
state have6 increasingly diverged from the assumptions animating" administrative law.' '

156. Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 644 F. 3 d 845, 870 ( 9 th Cir. 2011) (vacated on other

grounds) (quoting Norton, 542 U.S. at 66).
157. 533 U.S. 218, 233-34 (2001); Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within
Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, lO62-63 (2o11); see also Nat'l Automatic Laundry & Cleaning

Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (emphasizing the decision maker's position
in the agency and the shape of the agency's decisionmaking process as factors affecting
whether agency guidance is considered final and subject to challenge).
Mead, 533 U.S. at 237-38; see also David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation
Doctrine, 2001 SuP. CT. REV. 201, 201-02, 204-05 (arguing that the availability of deference
to agency statutory interpretations should turn on whether the interpretation was issued by
a high level official).
159. See Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 452 F.3d 798, 805 (D.C.
Cir. 2006); Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1482-83 (1992).
16o. Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law, Public Administration, and the Administrative Conference of the United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REv. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 1-2) (on
file with author).
161. Farber & O'Connell, supra note 16, at 1140.
1s8.
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CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS:

DUTY TO SUPERVISE

The mismatch between the current legal constructs and the reality of modern administrative government is reason enough to reconsider existing doctrine's exclusion of systemic administration. As important, however, is the significance that the Constitution itself assigns to systemic administration, in
particular the administrative feature of supervision or internal oversight by
federal officers. This Part offers an argument for inferring a constitutional duty
to supervise. It first sets out two constitutional grounds -one rooted in Article
II and the Take Care Clause, the other in delegation and accountability principles- for inferring such a duty and analyzes the scope of the duty to supervise
that results from each ground. This Part then turns to the question of whether
a duty to supervise is judicially enforceable.
The argument for a constitutional duty to supervise offered here draws on
many conventional sources of constitutional interpretation, including constitutional text, historical practice, precedent, and normative-and pragmatic analysis.162 But the preeminent basis is constitutional structure, with the duty to supervise inferred from the hierarchical ordering and accountability relationships
evident in the Constitution. 6 ' Such structural reasoning frequently appears in
separation of powers analysis and is particularly appropriate in this context,
given limited textual guidance and the lack of prior judicial engagement with
supervision's constitutional underpinnings. Moreover, structural reasoning is
well-suited to instances such as the duty to supervise, where, as I argue below,
64
primary enforcement may often lie with the political branches.

162. For two leading accounts of these standard forms of constitutional argument, see PHILIP
BOBBITT,CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 1-119 (1982); and Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation, ioo HARv. L.
REv. 1189, 1194-1209 (1987).

163. For the classic exposition of structural inference as a method of constitutional interpretation,

see CHARLES L. BLACK, JR.,

STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).

164. In an important recent article, John Manning criticized the Court's reliance on structural
analysis in separation of powers challenges, contending that the Constitution contains "no
freestanding principle of separation of powers," only a grant of general power to Congress
in the Necessary and Proper Clause to structure the federal government subject only to specific constitutional limitations. See John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARv. L. REv. 1939, 1944-47 (2011) (emphasis omitted). But these concerns
about judicial use of structural analysis are not implicated when the focus is on identifying
separation of powers precepts to guide the political branches.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO SUPERVISE

A. Article II and the Duty To Supervise
Article II provides the most express textual constitutional recognition of a

duty to supervise. Unfortunately, such a duty and its implications are lost in
current debates, which focus instead on whether the President has the right to
control administrative decisionmaking. This focus not only downplays presidential obligation in favor of presidential power, but also obscures the fact that
Article II's emphasis on oversight and supervision is not limited to the President. Instead, the need for oversight and supervision represents a broader

structural principle running throughout Article II's treatment of the executive
branch.
1. The Take Care Clause and the Textual Basisfor a Duty To Supervise

As Jerry Mashaw has put it, there is a hole in the Constitution where administration should be. 6 ' Almost none of the federal government's administrative structure -the different departments, their responsibilities, leadership, interrelationships- is constitutionally specified. Instead, the Constitution grants
Congress broad power to construct the administrative apparatus "necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution" the federal government's powers, including not just those granted to Congress but "all other Powers vested ...

in

the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.,,' 6 6 Congress acts, however, subject to some structural limitations, largely
specified in Article 11.167 These include that "[t]he executive Power shall be
vested in a President" and that the President "shall be Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy"; "may require" a written opinion from "the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the
Duties of their respective Offices"; commissions all officers; appoints principal
officers with senatorial advice and consent and inferior officers if Congress
so
68
provides; and "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."
The Take Care Clause is particularly relevant to considering constitutional
supervisory duties. Two points seem evident from its text. The first, indicated
by the Clause's use of the passive voice and the sheer practical impossibility of

165. MASHAW, supra note 36, at 30.
166. U.S. CONST. art. I,

§

8, cl. 18; see Manning, supra note 164, at 1947-48, 1986-93, 2023-24.

167. Other important constraints housed outside Article II are that no member of Congress can
simultaneously be a government officer, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, and restrictions inferred

from general separation of powers principles, see, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 72326 (1986).
168. U.S. CONST.

art. II., §§ 1-3.
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any other result, is that the actual execution of the laws will be done by others.16 9 Despite vesting the executive power in the President, the Framers did
not expect that the President would be personally implementing the laws, with
advocates of strong executive power even acknowledging that "[w] ithout [key]
ministers[,] the Executive can do nothing of consequence."""0 This point is reinforced by the Appointments Clause's provision for executive officers as well
as the Opinion Clause's assurance that the President can obtain written opinions from principal officers. 171 As the Court has stated, quoting George Washington, "In light of '[t]he impossibility that one man should be able to perform
all the great business of the State,' the Constitution provides for executive officers to2 'assist the supreme Magistrate in discharging the duties of his
17

trust.'?

The second point is that the presidential oversight role is mandatory.1 73
This obligatory character is often obscured by the more prominent and ongoing debate over the scope of presidential power. Advocates of a strong unitary
executive use the Take Care Clause's requirement that the President ensure
faithful execution of the laws to infer that he or she must have full power to
control those implementing federal law. 74 Those defending a more constrained
account of presidential power counter by arguing that the fact that the Clause

See HAROLD H.

169.

170.

171.

172.

BRUFF, BALANCE OF FORCES: SEPARATION OF POwERS LAW IN THE ADMINISTRATrVE STATE 455 (2006) (emphasizing passive tense); Peter L. Strauss, A Softer Formalism,
124 HARv. L. REV. F. S5, 60 (2011) ("[T]he passive voice of the Take Care Clause, hidden be-

tween his (not that important) responsibilities to receive ambassadors and to commission
officers, confirms that the President is not the one whose direct action is contemplated.").
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 54 (Max Farrand ed., 1911); see also
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 492 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Fisher Ames)
("[C]ould [the President] personally execute all the laws, there would be no occasion for
auxiliaries; but the circumscribed powers of human nature in one man, demand the aid of
others.").
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see also Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or "The Decider"? The President in
Administrative Law, 75 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007).
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483 (2010) (quoting
30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 334 (John Fitzpatrick ed., 1939)); see also
Saikrishna B. Prakash, Note, Hail to the ChiefAdministrator: The Framersand the President's
AdministrativePowers, 102 YALE L.J. 991, 993 (1993) ("The Framers recognized that the Pres-

ident could not enforce federal law alone; he would need the help of others.").
173.

See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 6, at 799.

174.

See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 484 ("The President cannot 'take Care that the Laws be

faithfully executed' if he cannot oversee the faithfulness of the officers who execute them.");
Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President'sPower To Execute the Laws, 104
YALE L.J. 541, 583 (1994) ("[T]he duty-imposing language of the Take Care Clause makes
sense if the President has already been given a grant of the executive power ....

Otherwise,

how could the President possibly live up to the duty the Take Care Clause imposes?").
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is phrased as imposing a duty counsels against reading it to support assertions
of broad presidential authority. 7 In short, both camps use the obligatory nature of the President's oversight duty primarily as grounds for drawing conclusions about the scope of presidential authority.
But the mandatory character of the Take Care Clause is worth underscoring
in its own right. 17 6 This feature, combined with the Clause's oversight phrasing, means that the Take Care Clause represents the clearest constitutional
statement of a duty to supervise. Indeed, the Clause stands as a rare acknowledgement of affirmative duties in the Constitution. According to David Dreisen, this duty aspect is reinforced by the presidential Oath Clause, which not
only includes a promise "to faithfully execute the Office of President," but also
a commitment to "preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution," thereby
"impl[ying] a ... duty to try to prevent others from undermining it through

maladministration of the law."' 77
Exactly what such a duty to supervise was understood to mean is less clear,
and the drafting history of the Take Care Clause sheds little light on this question. Earlier versions spoke of the President's having power or authority to execute the laws, and the transformation into the ultimate duty phrasing occasioned little discussion. ,8 This suggests that the Framers did not attach
175.

See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 295 (1926) (Holmes, J.,dissenting) ("The duty of
the President to see that the laws be executed is a duty that does not go beyond the laws or
require him to achieve more than Congress sees fit to leave within his power."); Lawrence
Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 62
(1994) ("[T]here is something quite odd about the structure of the Take Care Clause if it
was conceived by the framers as the source of presidential power over all that we now consider administration: Unlike the other power clauses of Article II, the Take Care Clause is
expressed as a duty rather than a power.").

For a rare scholarly emphasis on the importance of the Take Care Clause's obligatory character, see David M. Dreisen, Toward a Duty-Based Theory of Executive Power, 78 FoRDHAM L.
REV.71, 80-94 (2009), drawing on the Take Care and Oath clauses to argue that the Constitution seeks to instill a duty in all executive branch officers to faithfully execute the law.
177.Id. at 84, 86; see also CHARLES C. THATCH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775-1789
at 92, 99 (1923) (describing support of Morris and Hamilton for strengthening the executive); THE FEDERALIST No. 72, at 436 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(arguing that executive officers should be subject to presidential "superintendence").
178. The Virginia Plan, which was used as the basis for the Constitutional Convention's initial
discussion, provided that the national executive should have "a general authority to execute
the National laws." 1 Farrand, supra note 170, at 21; see also id. at 244 (nearly identical phrasing in the New Jersey Plan). Subsequent versions added more implication of execution by
others, stating that the President shall have the "power to carry into execution the national
laws." Id. at 63; see also 2 id. at 32. But it was in the Committee of Detail that the take care
language was incorporated into the Constitution, although the duty phrasing earlier appeared in Charles Pinckney's plan. 3 id. at 6o6 ("It shall be [the President's] Duty ...to attend to the Execution of the Laws of the U S ....
").The Committee itself considered two
176.
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particular significance to the President's having an express duty to ensure law
execution, but that could be because they had always envisioned the power to
execute in similar obligatory terms. 179 Much also turns on what faithful execution of the laws means-itself a source of debate. 80 General agreement exists,
however, that the Clause at least embodies the principle that the President
must obey constitutional laws and lacks a general prerogative or suspension
power. 8'

alternatives: "(He shall take Care to the best of his Ability, that the Laws) <It shall be his
duty to provide for the due & faithful exec-of the Laws> of the United States (be faithfully
executed) <to the best of his ability>." 2 id.at 171. The Committee opted for the take care
formulation, with the slight change of "be duly and faithfully executed." Id. at 185. The additional "duly and" were ultimately removed by the Committee of Style. Id. at 600; see also
Prakash, supra note 172, at 1001-02 (recounting the drafting history of the Take Care
Clause). No discussion of these changes is reported in notes on the Convention. In its final
form, the Clause closely parallels a similar provision in the New York Constitution on gubernatorial duties. See THATCH, supra note 177, at 36-37, 176 (quoting art. XIX of the New
York Constitution and noting its importance in shaping the federal executive).
179. Larry Lessig and Cass Sunstein take a different view, arguing that the change in the lan-

guage that became the Take Care Clause reflects the fact that the Committee on Detail also
added the Necessary and Proper Clause, granting Congress the power to define how administrative powers would be executed. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 175, at 66-68. Although the simultaneity of this change is suggestive, Lessig and Sunstein's account fails to
explain why the alteration triggered no discussion, if indeed it wrought as significant a
change as transferring power to structure administration from the President to Congress.
i8o. In particular, disagreement exists over the extent to which the Take Care Clause allows a
President to refuse to enforce governing statutes he or she considers unconstitutional. Compare, e.g., Eugene Gressman, Take Care, Mr. President, 64 N.C. L. REv. 381 (1986) (arguing
that the Take Care Clause prohibits the President from refusing to enforce validly enacted
laws, even if the President believes them to be unconstitutional), with Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power To Say What the Law Is, 83 GEo. L.J.
217, 221-22, 261-62 (1994) (arguing that the Take Care Clause imposes a duty on the President not only to independently interpret the law, but also to refuse to enforce any laws or
judgments that the President deems contrary to law).
181. See Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of ConstitutionalInterpretation, 81 IowA L. REV. 1267, 1313 (1996) ("[T]he most important, if not the sole, aspect of
[the Take Care Clause] is to make clear that '[t]he executive Power' does not include a power analogous to a royal prerogative of suspension."); see also Calabresi & Prakash, supra note
174, at 582-84, 589-90, 616-17, 620-22 (arguing that the Take Care Clause means that the
President must adhere to the laws, but not those that undermine his or her constitutional
authority); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 175, at 69 ("[T]he Take Care Clause ...obliges

the President to follow the full range of laws that Congress enacts, [including] ...laws regulating execution ....
").
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2. HierarchicalOversight and Article II
These two features of the Take Care Clause -provision for presidential
oversight and language signaling that such oversight is obligatory-combine to
imply a hierarchical structure for federal administration, under which lower
government officials act subject to higher-level superintendence. Article II's
other provisions echo that hierarchy. A prime example is the Appointments
Clause, with its differentiation between "Officers of the United States" and "inferior Officers," the latter subject to appointment by (and thus implicitly subservient to) Heads of Department."2 This implication of hierarchical oversight
is highlighted by current Appointments Clause case law, which defines inferior
officers as "'officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level' by
other officers appointed by the President with the Senate's consent."' 8 Similarly, as David Barron and Martin Lederman have argued, "[T]he textual designation of the President as the Commander in Chief... establishes a particular hierarchical relationship within the armed forces and the militia

. . .

at least for

purposes of traditional military matters.' ', 8 The Opinion Clause also conveys
the importance of oversight, as the President's power to require written opinions from principal officers both signals that the President was expected to play
an oversight role and ensures that such officers cannot keep the President in
the dark about how their departments are operating. 85 To be sure, the Opinion
Clause is permissive rather than mandatory; it stipulates that the President
"may require" opinions rather than that the President must.'8 6 But that phrasing does not undermine the hierarchical oversight dynamic signaled by the
Clause so much as indicate that requesting opinions is just one method that the
President can use to fulfill the Take Care supervisory duty.' 8' Finally, although

182. U.S. CONST. art. II, S 2, cl. 2.
183. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 510 (2010) (quoting

Edmond v. United States,

520

U.S. 651, 663 (1997)).

184.

David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chiefat the Lowest Ebb -Framing
the Problem, Doctrine, and OriginalUnderstanding, 121 HARv. L. REv. 689, 768 (2008).

185.

See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 646-48 (1984).

186. U.S. CONST. art. II,
187.

§

2, cl. 1.

See Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, 82 VA. L. REv. 647, 658-61
(1996) (exploring implications of the Clause's "may require" language and concluding that
"the Opinion Clause clearly exemplifies the President's supervisory power over the executive
departments" and with it "Presidential responsibility and accountability for these departments"); Vasan Kesavan & J. Gregory Sidak, The Legislator-in-Chief,44 Wm. & MARY L.
REv. 1, 8 (2002) (arguing that, in contrast to the mandatory language in the State of the Union Clause, the Opinion Clause's use of "may" signals "an information exchange between a
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the Vesting Clause of Article II less clearly addresses the shape of internal executive structure, this clause's identification of "a President" in whom "[t]he executive Power shall be vested" makes clear that the Article II supervisory hierarchy takes a general pyramidal form, narrowing to an apex at the top.'88
In short, despite leaving open most of the federal government's administrative organization, Article II's text signals that hierarchical supervision within
the executive branch is an important structural principle. This hierarchical
structure also has been central to the debate over the constitutional scope of
presidential power. Unitary executive scholars claim that Article II's hierarchy
requires broad presidential authority to control all executive-branch decisionmaking or at least at-will presidential removal power over those executing
federal law. 8 ' But such a claim of broad presidential authority mistakenly
elides the President's right and duty to supervise law execution with the scope of
such supervision. 90 The structural principle of hierarchy entails that supervision up to the President must occur; it does not require that such supervision
take the form of full presidential decisionmaking control. Only if supervision
could not otherwise occur -a dubious proposition, given the variety of forms
supervision takes today' 9'-would such a broad claim of presidential power
necessarily follow.
Similarly, although the Supreme Court has tied the Take Care duty closely
to the President's power to remove principal officers,' 9 2 it is not obvious that
superior and his inferiors, whereas the State of the Union Clause governs an information
exchange between two equals").
188. See Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the
Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, lOO6
(2007).

189. For unitary executive arguments emphasizing Article II hierarchy, see Calabresi & Prakash,
supra note 174, at 559, 584, 663; and Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural
Constitution: Unitary Executive, Pluraljudiciary, 1O5 HARv. L. REV. 1153, 1165-66 (1992). See
also Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 175, at 4, 9-1o, 84-85 (describing hierarchical account of

Article II though rejecting it as a matter of original meaning).
19o. Although distinct from the unitary executive debate in general, acknowledging Article It's
hierarchical structure is at odds with Lessig and Sunstein's contention that the Constitution
distinguishes between executive and administrative power and requires presidential oversight only of the former. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 175, 38-70. Notably, however,
Lessig and Sunstein ultimately argue that given the dramatic expansion of policymaking by
administrative officials, the constitutional value of political control of policymaking now requires broad presidential oversight. See id. at 93-99. As a result, their argument is not at
odds with my wider project of defending a constitutional duty to supervise, though presumably they would base any such duty on the delegation arguments outlined in Part IIB.
191. See supra notes

24-27

and accompanying text.

See Free Enter.- Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 503-04 (2010)
(discounting functional mechanisms of control and underscoring importance of removal).

192.
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removal should play such a pivotal role. Removal is certainly one means of
achieving higher-level oversight. But other structures for such supervision
plainly exist, whether in the form of traditional mechanisms that enable review
of decisions and policies, or more contemporary audit procedures to monitor
performance and identify potential problems.1 93 The Court recently dismissed
these mechanisms as "bureaucratic minutiae" lacking constitutional significance, 194 yet in practice such bureaucratic minutiae are central to day-to-day
implementation of the laws. Indeed, removal's constitutional centrality seems
to be a further manifestation of constitutional law's rejection of systemic administration- bureaucracy-in favor of the individualistic model of a chief personally firing an assistant. 95
Better clues for divining the Article I1approach to supervision come from
the Appointments Clause. It indicates that the supervision envisioned by Article II extends more broadly than just presidential oversight. The Clause's distinction between principal and inferior officers reveals that supervision was expected to occur at lower administrative levels as well. Indeed, the
Constitution's express authorization of inferior officer appointment by courts
or heads of departments, particularly combined with the Opinion Clause's limited application to principal officers of the departments, makes clear that the
President's direct supervision was expected to be focused on the top of the administrative bureaucracy, at least outside of the military. 96 This further reinforces the concept that supervision should not be equated with removal. Removal is a mechanism best targeted to the top of an agency, given the difficulty
of tracing particular institutional policies to specific lower officials, wellentrenched civil service protections, and the public outcry that removal often

193.

See id. at 527-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing broad oversight of functions made removal less important).

Id. at Sol.
19s. See id. at 496 (holding that double for-cause removal protection prevents "[t]he President
[from] hold[ing] the Commission fully accountable for the Board's conduct [because he
lacks] ... the ability to oversee the Board, or to attribute the Board's failings to those whom
he can oversee").
196. Charles Pinckney's proposal with Gouverneur Morris for a Council of State to assist the
President supports this emphasis on executive branch supervision beyond the President's
own oversight. The proposal provided for five executive departments, with the heads of
three -Commerce and Finance, War, and Marine- required to "superintend every thing" in
their departments or "all matters relating to the public finances." 2 FARRAND,supra note 170,
at 335-36. Of similar effect is Pinckney's suggestion, also not adopted, that the President be
.empowered ...to inspect" certain key departments on the grounds that such inspection
"will operate as a check on those Officers, keep them attentive to their duty, and may be the
means in time not only of preventing and correcting errors, but of detecting and punishing
mal-practices." 3FARRAND,supra note 170, at 111.
194.
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triggers.' 9 7 At middle and lower levels, the other oversight methods detailed
above, along with more indirect measures such as professional norms, agency
culture, or reputational concerns, may be more effective mechanisms for controlling administrative behavior. 98
3. HierarchicalOversight and Executive Branch Supervision in Practice
Given the textual and structural emphasis on hierarchical oversight, some
features of early administrative practice under the Constitution might seem
surprising. In several contexts, presidential supervision and other forms of internal executive-branch oversight were quite circumscribed. One prominent
example concerns district attorneys. "Before 1861, the district attorneys either
reported to no one (1789 to 1820) or to the Secretary of the Treasury (1820
through 1861). Throughout this period, they operated without any clear organizational structure or hierarchy."' 9 9 Although this lack of formal hierarchy did
not preclude presidential supervision and direction, it certainly limited the occasions when such supervision would occur." A second example involves reliance on state courts and state officials for some federal law enforcement, a reliance that the Framers clearly anticipated." Harold Krent emphasizes that
"Congress vested jurisdiction in state courts over actions seeking penalties and
forfeitures, granted concurrent jurisdiction to state courts over some criminal
actions, and assigned state officials auxiliary law enforcement tasks.... [The-

197.

See Richard J. Pierce, Saving the Unitary Executive Theory from Those that Would Distort and
Abuse It: A Review of The Unitary Executive, by Steven G. Calabresiand ChristopherYoo, 12 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 593, 605-1 o (201O) (book review) (describing legal protections and political
fallout).

198. See Shapiro & Wright, supra note 136, at 602-03 (citing studies indicating that civil servants
are strongly motivated by nonpecuniary incentives beyond fear of demotion or other punishment).
199. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 175, at 16-17 (citations omitted). Another example comes from
the Treasury Department, where Congress vested important powers in officials below the
Secretary in the aim of providing internal checks, as opposed to clear hierarchical structure.
See MASHAw, supra note 36, at 40, 5o-51.
2oo. For a well-known instance when the President sought to intervene and forestall a prosecu-

tion for forfeiture, see The Jewels of the Princess of Orange,
201.

2

Op. Att'y Gen. 482 (1831).

See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 9o5-11 (1997) (acknowledging early federal reliance on state enforcement but concluding that the federal government lacked the power to
compel state executive officers to enforce federal law); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field
Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1995-2o6, 2013-30 (1993) (detailing historical refer-

ences to state enforcement of federal law).
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se] state officials ... were far removed from control of the executive branch." 2
A third instance is the widespread delegation of responsibility to nongovernmental actors, such as the use of private merchants as assessors in customs disputes and reliance on the Bank of the United States to control the money supply. Here again, presidential control and executive branch oversight were
lacking." 3
But there were also numerous administrative arrangements characterized
by a fairly high degree of internal oversight. Jerry Mashaw's recent excavation
of early administrative practice emphasizes the central role of what he terms
the "internal law of administration," under which "higher-level officials instruct subordinates and through which they can call them to account for their
actions."'" A key instance was the Treasury Department. Mashaw documents
the way in which two early Secretaries of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton
and Albert Gallatin, exercised close oversight of customs officials through daily
correspondence and frequent circulars."0 5 A similar pattern of central oversight
and instruction of field office personnel is evident in the Land Office context,
albeit with a more uneven record." 6 In addition, early statutes setting up the
administrative departments emphasized internal oversight and stipulated that
lower-level officials would be subject to higher-level "superintendence." Thus,
for example, the 1794 statute creating the Post Office provided that the Postmaster General "shall also have power to prescribe such regulations to the deputy postmasters, and others employed under him, as may be found necessary,
and to superintend the business of the department, in all the duties, that are or
may be assigned to it."" 7 Notably, these statutes focused primarily on superintendence by principal officers, thereby reinforcing the point that hierarchical
superintendence was not seen as coterminous with broad presidential con-

202.

Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over CriminalLaw Enforcement: Some Lessonsfrom History,
38 AM. U. L. REv. 275, 303 (1989).

203. MASHAW, supra note 36, at 36-38; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 175, at 30-31.
204.

MASHAW, supra note 36, at 7. Bruce Wyman first coined the term "internal administrative
law" over one hundred years ago. See BRUCE WYMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW GOVERNING THE RELATIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS 4,14-18 (1903).

2o5.

MASHAW, supra note 36, at 54-57, 91-104; see also LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS 20209 (5 th prtg. 1964) (detailing mechanisms of internal control used during the Washington

and Adams administrations).
2o6. MASHAW, supra note 36, at 124-37; see also MALCOLM J. ROHRBOUGH, THE LAND OFFICE

BUSINESS 33-70 (1968) (detailing internal mechanisms of control in the Land Office).
207.

Act of May 8, 1794, ch. 23, § 3,1Stat. 354, 357; see also Act of Apr.

2, 1792,

ch. 16, § 3,1 Stat.

246, 247 ("The Director of the mint shall have the chief management of the business thereof,
and shall superintend all other officers and persons who shall be employed therein.");
MASHAW, supra note 36, at 56-57.
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trol. ° Moreover, ensuring adequate government administration at the federal
level was plainly a central concern of many Framers, with the Federalist Papers
proclaiming that "the true test of a good government
is its aptitude and ten9
dency to produce a good administration."2

The historical record thus demonstrates that hierarchical executive-branch
oversight was understood to be an important accountability mechanism, particularly in the form of supervision of lower-level government officers by department heads and other top departmental officials. To be sure, such oversight was not uniformly required, nor was it the only means of ensuring
effective government and checking overreach.21 ° Still, according to Mashaw,
"[T]he consistency, propriety, and energy of administrative implementation
was made accountable primarily to high-ranking officials .... These were the
sources of instruction, interpretation, audit, and oversight that counted in the
day-to-day activities of administrative officials. 2 11 Although such internal
oversight sometimes took the form of review of individual decisions, it often
had a more systemic and prospective cast, with the aim being to supervise statutory implementation and administrative performance generally. 12 Frequently,
moreover, such oversight was informal, taking the form of lower officials' consulting with their superiors and their superiors' seeking the President's ad-

2o8. In a few statutes relating to areas of particular presidential authority, provision was specifically made for presidential oversight and instruction. See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 7,§ 1, 1

Stat. 49, 49-50 (creating the Department of War headed by a principal officer, "to be called
the Secretary," wherein "the said principal officer shall conduct the business of the said department in such manner, as the President of the United States shall from time to time order
or instruct"); Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 4, § i, 1Stat. 28, 28-29 (using the same language in
creating the Department of Foreign Affairs); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, The American Model of
FederalAdministrativeLaw: Remembering the First One Hundred Years, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
975, 982-85 (2010) (describing the variation in early administrative structures and concluding that "the conventional story of specific statutes, limited administrative discretion, congressional control of policy, and a unitary executive hardly describes nineteenth-century
federal administration or administrative law").
209.

THE FEDERALIST No. 68, supra note 177, at 414 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); ROHR, supra note 16, at 1-3; see also THE FEDERALIST Nos. 76, 77, supra note 177 (Al-

exander Hamilton) (justifying the Constitution's appointment process in terms of its ability
to select good officials and support administrative stability).
2io. See MASHAW, supra note 36, at 40-41, 64-78 (noting judicial review and congressional oversight as other techniques). See generally NICHOLAS R. PARRiLLo, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTWE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780-1940 (2013) (emphasizing

reliance on private expertise and private financial incentives as a means of improving governmental performance).
211. MASHAW, supra note 36, at 140.
212.

See id.
at 57 (quoting an Alexander Hamilton circular).
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vice -and the President in turn requesting to be kept informed and consulted
on departmental matters.' 3
One final aspect of historical practice worth considering is the development
of the civil service. Beginning with the enactment of the Pendleton Act in 1883
and culminating in additional measures through the 193os, federal workers
gradually gained independence protections in hiring, tenure, and salary. 14 The
result today is a system criticized as limiting managers' ability to fire employees
or reduce salaries in response to poor performance.'" Development of the civil
service therefore might seem at odds with an emphasis on internal supervision.
In fact, however, the opposite conclusion is more accurate. The civil service
arose as a response to the partisan hiring that began with Andrew Jackson and
took hold over the course of the nineteenth century. Under this "spoils system," control over government employment lay with the political party of the
President. ,6 The emergence of the civil service supported a broader transfer of
authority to administrative officials, with bureau chiefs gaining the ability to
select personnel and exercise control over agency activities - a development
that Daniel Carpenter has termed the emergence of bureaucratic autonomy.217
Indeed, the broadest reach of the federal civil service occurred at the heyday of
modern federal administrative bureaucracies, with their characteristic of tight
internal hierarchical control.1 Hence, development of the civil service helps to
illuminate the tension that exists between presidential and political supervision, on the one hand, and internal agency supervision, on the other- a tension
that surfaces today primarily in battles over agency politicization. ' 9

213.

See NOBLE E. CUNNINGHAM, JR., THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT UNDER JEFFERSON, 27-47,
87-133 (1978); MASHAW, supra note 36, at 54.

214. See RONALD

N. JOHNSON & GARY D.

LIBECAP, THE FEDERAL CIVL SERVICE SYSTEM AND THE

PROBLEM OF BUREAUCRACY: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 48-73

(1994); LEWIS, supra note 30, at 17-18.
215.

See, e.g., JOHNSON & LIBECAP, supra note 214, at 1-5; P'SHIP FOR PUB. SERV. & BOOZ ALLEN

A NEW CIVIL SERVICE FRAMEWORK 7-10 (2014).
See DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC
HAMILTON,

216.

AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS,

NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862-1928, at 40-51 (2001).

See generally ARI

HOOGENBOOM, OUTLAWING THE SPOILS: A HISTORY OF THE CIVL SERVICE
REFORM MOVEMENT 1865-1883 (1961).
217.

supra note 216, at 4, 18-27, 353-54. Carpenter argues that civil service reform
alone is not sufficient for bureaucratic autonomy, which he maintains is dependent on the
development of legitimacy and reputation on an agency-by-agency basis. Id. at lO-11.
CARPENTER,

218. See Jon Michaels, An Enduring,Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcom-

ing 2015) (manuscript at 17-18) (on file with author); see also supra notes 28-29 (identifying
merit selection as a core characteristic of modern bureaucracy).
219.

See LEWIS, supra note 30, at 5-8, 20-37.
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Yet the fact that internal oversight and hierarchical supervision were
viewed as important and necessary for effective and accountable government
does not demonstrate that these administrative practices were understood to
have a constitutional basis. The variation in administrative structures and use
of administrative arrangements with limited oversight suggests that early Congresses did not consider hierarchical supervision from the President down to be
a constitutional imperative across the board.' ° Still, that variation leaves the
possibility that internal executive-branch oversight was understood to have
constitutional underpinnings, even if not required in all instances. Early Attorney General opinions offer some suggestions of such a view. Attorneys General
disagreed over the extent of the President's power to direct executive officers
on matters statutorily entrusted to their discretion. In particular, William Wirt,
who insisted that the President was limited to "see[ing] that the officer assigned by law performs his duty ...not with perfect correctness of judgment,
but honestly," also concluded that if an officer had made a "corrupt" decision,
"the President is constitutionally bound to look to the case" and take care that
the officer be punished or removed."L Wirt's distinction of honest and corrupt
decisions suggests that he saw presidential oversight as needed in order to police intentional misuse of governmental power rather than as a broader requirement, but his invocation of a constitutional obligation of presidential
oversight even in this context is noteworthy.
B. Delegation,Accountability, and the Duty To Supervise
Although the Take Care Clause and Article II's provision for hierarchical
oversight within the executive branch represent the most overt constitutional
reference to a duty to supervise, an additional basis exists on which to infer
such a constitutional duty. This approach identifies the duty to supervise as a
necessary structural corollary of the delegation of governmental power -both
legislative delegations to the executive branch and further subdelegation of authority from the top of an agency to lower officials. The connection between
22o.

See MAsH-W, supra note 36, at 82-83; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 175, at 22-32.

221.

The President and Accounting Officers, 1Op. Att'y Gen. 624

(1823), reprinted in H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 29, 30 (1999); see also Rela-

tion of the President to the Executive Departments, 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 453 (1855), reprinted in
POWELL, supra, at 131, 137 (Caleb Cushing) (invoking executive branch hierarchy, the Take
Care duty, and the vesting of executive power in the President to justify presidential power
to direct certain actions be taken by officers below the head of department level); Office and
Duties of Attorney General, 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 326 (1854), reprinted in POWELL, supra, at 78,
86-88 (rejecting Wirt's view of presidential power over heads of department and subordinate officers as too narrow and arguing that "common sense... assumes that the superior
shall overrule the subordinate").
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delegation and supervision is supported both by constitutional references to
hierarchical supervision in delegation contexts and by structural principles that
demand the accountability of governmental power. Like its Article II counterpart, this version of the duty to supervise puts prime emphasis on hierarchical
supervision within the executive branch, but it potentially has a wider and
more flexible import.
1. DelegatedAuthority and the HierarchicalOversight Model
The hierarchical oversight model identified in Article II, under which lower-level officials act subject to higher-level oversight, can also be found in Article III. Article III echoes Article II's distinction between principal and inferior
officers by vesting the judicial power "in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts" as Congress may establish. ' Article III also expressly provides for
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction- suggesting a reviewing and oversight
role for the Court, albeit one subject to "such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make." 3
A number of scholars have argued that Article III's "coordinate requirements of supremacy and inferiority" give the federal judiciary a "pyramidal
structure" and "hierarchical nature."' According to James Pfander, "Supremacy encompasses a power to oversee and control the judicial work of all inferior
courts and tribunals in the judicial department," such that Congress "cannot
place lower courts entirely beyond the [Supreme] Court's oversight and control.""5 Steven Calabresi and Gary Lawson push the point further, drawing on
the uses of "supreme" and "inferior" in the Supremacy and Appointments
Clauses to conclude that "inferior federal courts must be subject to the decisional supervision and control of the Supreme Court, which must be able to
veto (reverse) any decision made by a subordinate court. Otherwise, they are
not hierarchically inferior."' 6 Although others are skeptical that Article III es-

222.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § i, cl. 1. Article I strikes a similar theme in authorizing Congress to
"constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court." Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.

223.

Id. art. III, § 2, cl.

2.

24. JAMEs E. PFANDER, ONE SUPREME COURT: SUPREMACY, INFERIORITY, AND THE JUDICIAL
POWER OF THE UNITED STATES xii, XV (2009); see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S.
211, 227

(1995) (characterizing Article III as creating a "hierarchy").

225. PFANDER, supra note
226.

224,

at xi, xiv.

Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 188, at 1022-23 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also
Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L.
REv. 817, 828-34 (1994); Laurence Claus, The One Court that Congress Cannot Take Away:
Singularity, Supremacy, and Article Ii, 96 GEO. L.J. 59, 66-73 (2007) (articulating a similar
definition of supremacy to Calabresi and Lawson's definition).
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tablishes such a strict requirement of subordinancy, 7 general agreement exists
that the Court cannot be denied review authority in all cases from the lower
federal courts presenting constitutional questions.f 5 To paraphrase Henry
Hart, there is thus a core of supervisory responsibility that cannot be denied
without "destroy[ing] the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan. ' 9
Even more significantly, assertions of some supervisory role for the Supreme Court are now supported by longstanding and contemporary practice.
Since 1875 Congress has granted the Court broad power to review lower federal
court decisions and has granted review of state court decisions rejecting federal
law claims going back to the 1789 Judiciary Act.23 ° Congress has also long authorized the Court to adopt rules of procedure and practice that would bind
lower federal courts, and the Court has asserted such a supervisory role for itself, including by insisting that lower federal courts follow its precedents. 31
Hence, in practice both Congress and the Court have viewed Supreme Court
supervision as a key aspect of the federal court system.
Interestingly, a similar hierarchical oversight structure is not present with
respect to Congress. Instead, Article I proclaims the internal autonomy of the
two parts of Congress by mandating separate passage of legislation by both
houses and expressly providing that "Each House" shall choose its own officers, judge the elections and qualifications of its own members, determine its

227.

228.

229.

For example, some scholars argue that "supreme" and "inferior" can refer to stature or importance instead of hierarchy, in which case "inferior" courts might be courts of limited geographic scope and narrower but not subordinate to supreme courts. See Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, lO6 COLUM. L. REV. 324, 329-30, 344-53
(2006); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate but Equal?: The Supreme Court, the Lower Federal
Courts, and the Nature of the "JudicialPower," 8o B.U. L. REv. 967, 983-94 (2000); David E.
Engdahl, What's in a Name? The Constitutionalityof Multiple "Supreme" Courts, 66 IND. L.J.
457, 466-72 (1991); see also Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-FederalistView of Article III: Separating
the Two Tiers of FederalJurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 229-30, 254-59 (1985) (arguing that
Article III requires only that some federal court have the power to hear federal questions and
that "supreme" means only that the Supreme Court is the court of last resort).
See Richard J. Fallon, Jurisdiction-StrippingReconsidered, 96 VA. L. REv. 1043, 1o89 (2010);
Barrett, supra note 227, at 362-63, 365-66 (acknowledging limited support for a hierarchical
model in Article III to the extent of limiting Congress and rejecting "across-the-board subordination").
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdictionof Federal Courts: An Exercise
in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362, 1365 (1953).

230. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87. For an overview of the development

of federal court jurisdiction, see RicHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COuRTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 294-305 (6th ed. 2009).
231.

Barrett, supra note 227, at 332-33; Bhagwat, supra note 227, at 977-82.
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own rules, police and expel its own members, and keep its own journal.2 32 Although both the House and the Senate are granted distinct powers, only when
it comes to authorizing adjournment are the two branches given express control over each other.233 More common is a model of reciprocal checking, seen
perhaps most clearly in the distinct role each house plays in impeachment.234
Further, the Constitution nowhere specifies how each house is internally structured or how legislative officials are chosen below the highest level. The Court
reinforced this structural independency in Nixon v. United States, where it held
that determinations about which procedures conform to the Constitution's requirement that the Senate "try" impeachments were for the Senate alone to
make."23
This contrast between the hierarchical structure created for the executive
and judicial branches and Congress's internal equality is instructive. One explanation for the equal stature and independence of the House and the Senate
is no doubt the disagreements between large and small states that led to Congress's bicameral structure, as well as ongoing struggles at the constitutional
convention over the two houses' respective powers.23 6 Overt hierarchy or supervisory control by one house over the other might well have precluded the
compromises over Congress that allowed the convention to reach agreement.
But another likely factor is the manner in which Congress was expected to operate. Both houses are required to meet at the same place and take decisions
collectively, with no allowance made for final legislative action other than
through the process of bicameralism and presentment.237 By comparison, the
Constitution expressly authorizes appointment of government officers and inferior federal tribunals, with a plain expectation that executive- and judicialbranch actors would not be limited to the President and the Supreme Court.
Put differently, Congress was thought to be the unique legislative actor,

§§ 5, 7.
Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 4; see also id. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (requiring bills for raising revenue to originate
in the House); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (describing the Senate's role in approving treaties and appointments).
See id. art. I, 5 2, cl. 5 (granting the House of Representatives sole power to initiate impeachment proceedings); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (granting the Senate sole power to try all impeachments).

232. U.S. CONST. art. I,
233.

234.

235.

506

236.

See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
STITUTION 57-93 (1996).

U.S. 224, 229-30 (1993).
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CON-

§ 7; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (discussing the purposes of the bicameral requirement and Presentment Clause).

237. U.S. CONST. art. I,
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whereas it was understood that there would be many executive officials and
judges other than the President and the Justices of the Supreme Court.23 8
These differences in the branches' organization suggest a hierarchical oversight structure as the constitutional companion of delegated implementation.
When a branch is expected to operate through a number of government actors
or institutions, the Constitution invokes a dynamic of supervision. Again, this
is not to say that all implementation of federal law must be subject to full presidential or Supreme Court control. But the repeated supervisory theme evident
in the Constitution, and embodied in longstanding practice, suggests recognition of oversight and internal hierarchy as important ways to control delegated
federal power.
2.

Supervision and Accountability ofDelegatedAuthority

Further support for a relationship between delegation and supervision
comes from accountability principles implied by the Constitution's structure.
Accountability, which is often identified as a core constitutional concern,239 is a
broad and malleable concept. It suggests answerability, and, in public law, the
focus is often on the answerability of governmental officials. But that focus still
leaves key questions open: in particular, which officials, answerable to whom,
through which mechanisms, for what actions or decisions, and measured by
what metric? 4 Not surprisingly, therefore, accountability surfaces in a variety

238.

This view of Congress underlies the argument that broad congressional delegation is at odds
with the Constitution's structure. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative
State, 107 HARV. L. REV.1231, 1237-40 (1994).

239.

See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 497-98
(2010) (expressing concern that "diffusion of power carries with it a diffusion of accountability" in holding a removal restriction unconstitutional); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992) (expressing concern that "where the Federal Government compels
States to regulate, the accountability of state and federal officials is diminished," in concluding that such federal compulsion is unconstitutional).

240.

See Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and InstitutionalDesign: Some Thoughts on the Grammarof
Governance, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 115, 118 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006). According to Ed Rubin, "Accountability can be roughly defined as the ability of one actor to demand an explanation or justification of another actor
for its actions and to reward or punish that second actor on the basis of its performance or
its explanation." Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2073 (2005); see also Barbara S. Romzek & Melvin J. Dubnick,
Accountability in the Public Sector: Lessons from the Challenger Tragedy, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
227, 228 (1987) (arguing that answerability is too narrow and accountability "involves the
means by which public agencies and their workers manage the diverse expectations generated within and outside the organization").
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of constitutional guises."4
Perhaps the most obvious guise is political or electoral accountability, with
officials' need to answer to voters-or to answer to other officials who answer
to voters. The principle of political accountability runs throughout the Constitution's structural provisions. It is evident in the stipulation of electoral selection for members of Congress and the President, political appointment of principal officers, and removal of officers via congressional impeachment.4'
Indeed, these provisions reveal that political accountability itself takes a variety
of forms - forms that have changed over time, involve different voters, and entail more or less immediate control. 3 Political accountability concerns also underlie many constitutional doctrines, such as the nondelegation doctrine, the
federalism anti-commandeering rule, and jurisprudence on the presidential
4
removal power.2
Less textually prominent, but equally basic, is the principle of legal accountability. Legal accountability represents not just the constitutional commitment to "a government of laws, and not of men,""4 but also the core ruleof-law requirement that all exercises of governmental power be subject to constitutional limits that the political branches lack power to alter through ordinary legislation. 46 The principle of legal accountability, which was famously
articulated in Marbury v. Madison's defense of judicial review and repeatedly
underscored by subsequent judicial decisions, is often identified as entailing
court enforcement. 4 7 But the principle of adherence to governing law has
broader reach and applies even when governmental actions lie outside the ambit of judicial scrutiny.48

241.

For different taxonomies of accountability, see Michael W. Dowdle, Public Accountability:
Conceptual, Historical,and Epistemic Mappings, in PUBLIC AcCOUNTABILITY, supra note 240, at
1, 3-8; and Mashaw, supra note 24o, at 118-29. See also Romzek & Dubnick, supra note 24o,
at 228-29 (identifying bureaucratic, legal, professional, and political accountability as central
to public organizations).
art. I, S z§,3; id. art. II, S§ 1, 2, 4.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (establishing direct election of U.S. Senators by popular

242. U.S. CONST.
243.

vote); Victoria Nourse, The Vertical Separationof Powers, 49 DuKE L.J. 749, 752-53 (1999).

245.

See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 497-501; Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S.
457, 472-73 (2001); New York, 505 U.S. at 169.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).

246.

Metzger, supra note 37, at 1400-01.

247.

See id. at

244.

248.

see also Mashaw, supra note 240, at 120, 128.
This marks something of a change in view from my earlier scholarship, in which I identified
legal accountability as more closely tied to judicial review, although as in this Article, I emphasized that governmental supervision was important for ensuring that legal constraints
were enforceable. Metzger, supra note 37, at 1401-02.
1401-02;
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A third form of constitutionally salient accountability is accountability
through supervision and oversight- sometimes referred to as bureaucratic or
managerial accountability. 49 This form of constitutional accountability is far
less commonly acknowledged, despite its embodiment in the textual references
to supervision detailed above." ° Indeed, as Ed Rubin has noted, bureaucratic
accountability is often portrayed as being at odds with political accountability,
a growing phenomenon that, he argues, reflects resistance to the legitimacy of
administrative government."' A striking recent example is Free Enterprise Fund
v. PCAOB, in which Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, rejected
the suggestion that either the presence of administrative oversight or the need
for administrative expertise could justify the removal restrictions at issue:
One can have a government that functions without being ruled by functionaries, and a government that benefits from expertise without being
ruled by experts. Our Constitution was adopted to enable the people to
govern themselves, through their elected leaders. The growth of the
Executive Branch, which now wields vast power and touches almost
every aspect of daily life, heightens the concern that it may slip from the
Executive's control, and thus from that of the people. This concern is
largely absent from the dissent's paean to the administrative state. 5
Such a suggestion of opposition between political and bureaucratic accountability is deeply misguided. Most critically, this argument fails to account
for the reality of delegation that lies at the heart of modern administrative government. Delegation does not only run from Congress to the executive, with
vast responsibilities and discretion delegated to administrative agencies. It also
occurs within the executive branch, with the President and principal officers
regularly assigning significant responsibility to lower officials. 3 Such delegations to and within the executive branch necessitate a hierarchy of supervision
in order for knowledge of official actions and policies to reach elected officials
at the top of government. Furthermore, such internal administrative oversight
is equally required to ensure that policies and priorities specified by elected

249. See Mashaw, supra note 24o, at 120-21, 128; Rubin, supra note 240, at 2120-25.
250.

See supra notes 165-168, 183-188 and accompanying text.

251.

Rubin, supra note 24o, at 2091-98.

252.

561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010).

253. See Cynthia R. Farina, Deconstructing Nondelegation, 33 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 87, 91-93

(2010) (discussing presidential subdelegation); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2101,
2109-14, 2175-81 (2004) (arguing that Congress has exclusive power to delegate authority to

act with the force of law and discussing the scope of presidential subdelegation authority).
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leaders are actually carried out on the ground.5 4 Free Enterprise Fund acknowledges this last point, tying political accountability to internal presidential oversight: "The people do not vote for the Officers of the United States. They instead look to the President to guide the 'assistants or deputies ... subject to his
superintendence.' . . . [W]here [in the administrative system at issue] is the

role for oversight by an elected President?"" s
Internal supervision and oversight are also central to political accountability
for other reasons: they allow the public to be informed about administrative
actions and provide a mechanism for public participation in administration.26
Political accountability in this sense is less about electoral control, though
awareness of agency actions allows stakeholders to exert pressure on elected officials to ensure that their interests are addressed. s7 Instead, the focus is often
on direct involvement by affected groups and other interested parties in administrative decisionmaking.5 s Agency oversight structures help achieve transparency and opportunities for participation, 9 for example, by requiring advance
notice, creating disclosure presumptions, reviewing decisions for responsiveness to identified concerns, and monitoring of agency actions for adherence to
agreed-upon norms and goals.
Supervision and oversight are similarly pivotal when it comes to legal accountability. While courts play a central role in enforcing legal constraints on
government, a variety of factors can limit the effectiveness and availability of
254.

See ROHR, supra note 16, at 85-88, 137-43; Ronald C. Moe & Robert S. Gilmour, Rediscovering PrinciplesofPublic Administration: The Neglected Foundationof PublicLaw, 55 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 135, 138-39 (1995); Rubin, supra note 240, at 2120-22, 2134-36.

255. 561

U.S. at 498-99 (internal quotations and citations partially omitted) (quoting

ERALIST

No. 72, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed.,

1961));

THE

FED-

see also id. at 5o ("A key

'constitutional means' [of preserving the government's dependence on the people] vested in
the President-perhaps the key means -was 'the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws."' (quoting 1 ANNALS

OF CONG.

463 (1789))).

256.

See Farina, supra note 253, at loo-loi.

257.

See Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Proceduresas Instruments of Political Control,
3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 254, 259-60 (1987); Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz,
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am. J. POL. ScI. 165,
166 (1984).

Lobel, supra note 33, at 371-79 (noting increased stakeholder participation). Some argue
that such participation offers more chance for meaningful influence on policy than tradi-

258. See

tional electoral methods. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justificationfor the BureaucraticState, 1O5 HARV. L. REv. 1511 (1992).
259.

See Sidney Shapiro et al., The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking Inside the Agency
for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 463 (2012); see also Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R.
§ 189 (2012) (requiring broad disclosure and participation in rulemaking); Office of Mgmt.
& Budget, supra note 149 (detailing requirements for disclosure and oversight of agency
guidance); Orszag, supra note 149 (imposing open government requirements on agencies).
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such judicial review.26 Internal supervision is free of many of these obstacles
and thus plays a critical role in guaranteeing administrative adherence to governing legal requirements. 6l Reliance on internal supervision and oversight to
achieve legal accountability, instead of solely on courts, also minimizes the risk
that enforcing legal constraints will undermine managerial control and accountability. 6' Despite its resistance to according supervision much constitutional significance, the Court has noted the role that bureaucratic supervision
plays in ensuring legal adherence. For example, it has emphasized the availability of internal administrative complaint mechanisms that can uncover and address constitutional violations in refusing to infer a Bivens right to challenge
such violations in court. 6 A number of scholars have gone further, underscoring the importance of internal administrative constraints in ensuring that delegated power is not wielded in an arbitrary fashion.26 4 And while the scope of
delegated federal power is much vaster today, similar concerns with ensuring
that government officials adhere to governing legal requirements have fueled
bureaucratic supervision since the birth of the nation. 6 , Indeed, the Take Care
Clause formally links supervision and legal accountability by tying supervision
to faithful execution of the laws.266

26o.

See Gillian E. Metzger, The InterdependentRelationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 438-39 (2009).

261.

See Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Executive
Power, 54 UCLAL. REV. 1559, 1562 , 1576-79 , 1595-97 (2007); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HAPv. L. REV. 1688, 1691-93 (2011); see also Anthony M. Bertelli & Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., A Precept of ManagerialResponsibility: Securing Collective justice in Institutional Reform Litigation, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 317, 332-33 (2001) (arguing that responsible

z6z.

managers should be given discretion to balance demands of collective and individual justice
in institutional contexts).
Jerry Mashaw has analyzed the complicated relationship between legal and managerial accountability exceptionally well. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Bureaucracy, Democracy, and Judicial

Review, in THE OXFORD

HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY

569 (Robert F. Durant ed.,

2010).

See, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 67-70,

263.

72-74 (2001).

See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the

264.

Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 461, 516-19, 523-25 (2003) (justifying judicial rejection of broad presidential delegations on the ground that such delegations are likely to lead
to arbitrary decisionmaking); Evan J. Criddle, When DelegationBegets Domination: Due Process of AdministrativeLawmaking, 46 GA. L. REV. 117, 121-22 (2011) (arguing that due process

concerns with arbitrary decisionmaking require that Congress channel delegated administrative power through substantive, structural, and procedural constraints); Metzger, supra

note loo, at 140o-o6, 1471-73 (emphasizing importance of government supervision in ensuring governmental power remains constitutionally accountable in privatization contexts).
265.

See MASHAW, supra note 36, at 53-60.

266.

See supraParts II.A.1-2.
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Put starkly, bureaucratic and managerial accountability in the form of internal executive-branch supervision is an essential precondition for political
and legal accountability given the phenomenon of delegation. Scholars debate
whether the broad delegations that characterize modern administrative government can ever accord with the Constitution's grant of legislative power to
Congress and separation of powers principles. That debate will no doubt continue, but it has been eclipsed by reality; modern delegation is here to stay.267
The more pressing question today is how best to integrate the inevitable phenomenon of delegation into the Constitution's structure. The answer, as I argue, lies in recognizing that delegation creates a constitutional imperative to
ensure that the powers transferred are used in accordance with constitutional
accountability principles. In short, delegation creates a duty to supervise delegated power.
This argument for a duty to supervise is more intuitively plausible with respect to legal accountability than with respect to political accountability. To
begin with, the connection between supervision and adherence to law is familiar and already embodied in the Take Care Clause, as well as failure-to-train
doctrine. Even if this link were not formally mandated, however, it is not difficult to see how internal supervision (through review mechanisms, training,
and the like) can help ensure that specific agency decisions and actions adhere
to legal requirements. To give just one example: The Department of Justice's
(DOJ) requirement of approval by a high-level DOJ official before U.S. attorneys can use wiretaps, contained in DOJ's U.S. Attorneys' Manual, plays an
important role in enforcing constitutional and statutory limits on federal law
enforcement.26 8 By contrast, the Constitution's express requirements of political accountability-election of members of Congress and the President, and the
political branches' mandated role in appointment of principal officers -lack a
similar formal tie to supervision. Moreover, the relationship between supervision and political accountability is more diffuse, and the Court has rejected the
suggestion that political accountability requires political control of specific decisions.269 Indeed, substantial disagreement exists about the degree to which

267. See Gillian E. Metzger, Delegation, Accommodation, and the Permeability of Constitutional and

Ordinary Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 1-2, 5-6, 8-9) (on file with author) (describing scholarly debate
over delegation and the Court's acceptance).
268. See U.S. Attorneys' Manual, Title 9: Criminal Resource Manual, U.S. DEP'T JUST. § 9-7.0109-7.500

(2oo6), http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/titleg/title9

.htm [http://perma.cc/SUM3-ZKBF].
269. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 496-97, 5o8-

09 (2010) (upholding an arrangement under which the President can only control PCAOB
decisionmaking by removing a member of the SEC, after excising a provision granting
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political oversight of administrative decisionmaking is even constitutionally required.2 70
Yet these factors have more to do with limiting the extent of supervision
that political accountability may require than with denying that the two are
constitutionally connected at all. The basis of this constitutional connection is,
to be sure, functionalist and pragmatic; the claim is that supervision is in practice necessary to achieve political accountability in a world of delegation. But
functionalist analysis is a core feature of separation of powers jurisprudence. 7
If the principle of political accountability has any constitutional heft beyond its
specific express constitutional manifestations -and the Court often has suggested it does 72 - then the functionalist and diffuse nature of a relationship between supervision and political accountability should not preclude its recognition.
As described, the link between delegation, accountability, and supervision
is a structural one, but it can also be viewed as rooted in due process's prohibition on arbitrary exercises of governmental power. This prohibition is often invoked as a central concern in delegation, with due process considered to require
that delegations be structured so as to prevent delegated power from being
used arbitrarily.273 Moreover, arbitrary action is understood to include not only
unreasonable actions, but also actions that are at odds with constitutional acPCAOB members for-cause protection); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 661, 697 (1988)

(upholding a grant to independent counsel of power to undertake all investigative and prosecutorial decisions on matters within the counsel's jurisdiction without Attorney General
approval and thus independent of presidential control).

This disagreement arises most prominently in the debate over presidential administrative
oversight, with strong unitary executive theorists insisting on a thick version of political accountability in the form of presidential power to control all administrative decisions, see Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 174, and others countering that more minimal presidential supervision satisfies the Constitution's demands for political control, see Strauss, supra note

270.

185, at 648-50.
271. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 267, at 9-11.

e.g., supra text accompanying note 244; see also Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 86S-66 (1984) ("While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices [left unresolved by Congress.] . . . [F]ederal judges who have no constituency -have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those
who do.").

272. See,

273.

See Bressman, supra note 264, at 516-19, 523-25, 529-33 (emphasizing the constitutional con-

nection between delegation and concerns with arbitrary action); Criddle, supra note 264, at
121-24, 157-59 (arguing for reconceiving nondelegation doctrine as rooted in due process and
requiring sufficient procedural and structural checks functionally comparable to the checks
in Articles I and II); Donald A. Dripps, Delegation and Due Process, 1988 DuKE L.J. 657, 659
(arguing that due process challenges operate as an enforcement tool for nondelegation doctrine); Metzger, supra note 37.
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countability requirements.2 74 Other administrative mechanisms help prevent
arbitrary decisionmaking, and judicial review of administrative action plays a
starring role in this context as well."s Due process, therefore, does not necessarily require internal executive-branch supervision to prevent arbitrary exercises of power. At a minimum, however, internal supervision is an important
means of guarding against arbitrary use of governmental power, and one that
becomes particularly important when judicial review is lacking.
3. The Alternative ofJudicialReview
The close connection between delegation and supervision makes it all the
more surprising that the Court in 2001 strongly rejected the suggestion that
agencies' interpretation of the scope of their delegated authority may affect the
constitutionality of the delegation 6 Yet even the earlier delegation jurisprudence, which did acknowledge the relevance of internal constraints on delegated authority, viewed any constitutionally required oversight in quite limited
terms. 77 Moreover, the need for supervision to preserve legal accountability, by
preserving among other things the applicability of constitutional requirements
to those wielding governmental power, is not now part of private delegation
analysis.27 8 Current doctrine does suggest a link between delegation and supervision in one context: due process claims for failure to train.279 But the individual liability focus of such claims, reinforced by the Court's imposition of the
deliberate indifference standard, obscures recognition of supervision as a structural constitutional requirement of delegation.
The lack of development of the supervisory implications of delegation is
puzzling. If delegation does indeed present such a challenge to the accountabil-

See Bressman, supra note 264, at 499 (connecting the prohibition on arbitrary action to requirement of political accountability); Criddle, supra note 264, at 179 (arguing that due process requires that delegations be structured to preserve political accountability); Dripps, supra note 273, at 659-60, 675 (identifying a due process right "to protection against exercise
of legislative power except as the Constitution provides").
275. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, JudicialReview, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 333-37 (1993); Shapiro & Wright, supra note 136, at
585-89 (emphasizing the importance of close bureaucratic monitoring, professionalization,
and public service commitments in ensuring the legitimacy of administrative action); Simon, supra note lo, at 5-6 (emphasizing transparency and participation as accountability
mechanisms and rejecting administrative law's traditional focus on delegation).
276. See supra notes 98-1oo and accompanying text.
27. See supra note ioo and accompanying text.
278. For the argument that it should be, see Metzger, supra note 37, at 1444-45, 1457-61.
274.

279.

See supra notes

124-127

and accompanying text.
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ity of government, why hasn't the linkage between delegation, accountability,
and supervision received more judicial attention? One partial explanation for
the courts' failure to draw this connection is the availability of judicial review of
specific administrative decisions. Rather than emphasizing internal supervision's importance for ensuring accountability, courts have relied on external
judicial scrutiny of specific actions to achieve this result. This reliance on judicial review in lieu of supervision is clearest with respect to legal accountability,
given that the federal courts themselves lack direct electoral accountability. But
judicial review also operates to reinforce political accountability by ensuring
that agencies adhere to congressional instructions embodied in statutes.'o Indeed, the deference doctrines that courts have constructed to guide their review
of administrative action can be viewed as efforts to mediate control of agency
action by two political principals - Congress and the President."'
Interestingly, direct judicial review of administrative action is a modern
phenomenon, developed only at the outset of the twentieth century under particular statutory schemes. 28 Although such review was subsequently codified
in the trans-substantive APA in 1946 and is now the norm, for long periods of
the nation's history such direct review was only narrowly available and limited
to nondiscretionary or ministerial executive action. 8 ' Yet the absence of direct
legal challenges to administrative decisions did not mean that judicial review
was lacking. Instead, courts employed other techniques to enforce legal constraints on agencies, in particular common-law suits for damages against individual officers.8' Individuals could also assert lack of legal authority or jurisdiction as a defense to suits by government officers to enforce the law.8'
A striking feature of many contemporary administrative contexts is the extent to which judicial review of specific administrative decisions is absent or
substantially curtailed. Further, several statutory and doctrinal developments such as the creation of broad official immunity doctrines, the limited availability of Bivens actions, the substitution of the government as a defendant in tort
280. See Gillian E. Metzger, EmbracingAdministrative Common Law, 80 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1293,
1322-32 (2012) (arguing that judicial review of administrative action can serve congressional

interests).
231.

Id.; see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Proceduresas Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L.

REV. 1749, 1753
dent).

(2007)

(identifying the need for mediation between Congress and the Presi-

282.

See Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate Review
Model of AdministrativeLaw, iii COLUM. L. REv. 939, 953 (2o).

283.

See MASHAW, supra note 36, at 249-50, 301-3o8; Stuart J. Land, Judicial Control of Administrative Action, 75 YALE L.J. 12o8 (1966) (book review).

284. MASHAW, supra note 36, at 66-73, 3O1-O8.
285.

Id. at 68.
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suits under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the APA's provision for direct suit
against agencies, and indemnification provisions-have undercut individual
federal officer suits as a method of ensuring accountability.8 6 Whether or not
such limitations on judicial review are constitutional in their own right, they
underscore the need to illuminate the constitutional linkages between delegation, supervision, and accountability that have previously lain dormant. Traditional judicial review of specific administrative actions is increasingly unable to
substitute for internal supervision.
C. The Scope of the Duty To Supervise
This Article has demonstrated that two alternative bases support recognition of a constitutional duty to supervise: the Take Care Clause and repeated
suggestions of hierarchy in Article II; and the Constitution's structural connection of delegation, supervision, and accountability, which can also be rooted in
due process. But a critical piece of the analysis for such a duty is still missing:
what exactly does such a duty to supervise entail, and does the scope of the duty to supervise differ according to the basis on which it is justified?
In large part, these two bases yield overlapping versions of the duty to supervise, reflecting the fact that both share two key precepts. The first is an emphasis on hierarchy and accountability. The duty to supervise identifies the
oversight of lower-level exercises of governmental power by higher-level officials-and ultimately the President-as a central principle of constitutional
structure. The core scope of the duty to supervise follows from this precept:
the duty requires internal executive-branch supervision sufficient to ensure
that this hierarchical structure is honored and that delegated power is used in
accordance with governing requirements. Although the Weberian ideal connects hierarchy to bureaucracy and to detailed specification and review of lower-level decisionmaking by higher-level officers,2 7 nothing in the principle of
hierarchy per se demands this type of higher-level control of subordinates.
What the principle of hierarchy entails - and more importantly, what the hierarchical structures in the Constitution entail -is simply levels of authority,

a86. See David Zaring, Three Models of Constitutional Torts, 2 J. TORT L. 1, 5, 7-9,

1o & n.39 (2oo8)
(describing the broad immunity standard for government officials, obstacles that Bivens
plaintiffs face, the low likelihood that the plaintiffs will be awarded damages, and the almost
guaranteed indemnification of government officials). But see Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequencesfor the Individual Liability Model, 62
STAN. L. REv. 809, 837, 851 (2oO) (offering empirical evidence to show that Bivens actions
are more successful than commonly acknowledged, though noting the role of indemnification in limiting actual officer liability).

287. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
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with lower-level officials controlled by and accountable to those higher up.28
In other words, the principle of hierarchy does not require a particular form of
control.
Here is where the second key precept of the duty to supervise becomes central: the duty is a systemic and structural one. It requires systems and structures of supervision adequate to preserve overall hierarchical control and accountability of governmental power. Failures of supervision in discrete
circumstances are not constitutional violations if the underlying system for supervision is sufficient and generally employed. Moreover, given the systemic
and structural character of the duty to supervise, this duty is fundamentally
possessed by government institutions even if it is asserted in suits against individual officers in charge. This systemic focus marks a significant difference
from the individualistic cast of current constitutional doctrines implicating supervision. S' And it means that whether the duty to supervise is violated should
not turn on the state of mind of particular officials, but rather on an objective
assessment of the adequacy of the supervisory arrangements in place.

z88. See Rubin,

supra note

240,

at

2082-83,

2120-22;

Hierarchy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER

(2015), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hierarchy
[http://perma.cc/T2PD
-ACLC] (defining hierarchy as a "group that controls an organization and is divided into
different levels").
289. See supra text accompanying notes 142-146. Interestingly, a duty to supervise appears to be
emerging in private corporate law. Delaware courts have emphasized the importance of a
corporation's board of directors assuring that "information and reporting systems exist in
the organization that are reasonably designed to provide to senior management and to the
board itself timely, accurate information sufficient to allow management and the board...
to reach informed judgments concerning both the corporation's compliance with law and its
business performance." In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del.
Ch. 1996). As a result, under Delaware law board members can be liable for "utterly
fail[ing] to implement any reporting or information system or controls; or ...having implemented such a system or controls, consciously fail[ing] to monitor or oversee its operations." Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006); see also Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970
(stating that directors can be liable for failing to attempt in good faith to assure a reasonable
information and reporting system exists). This private law analog for the duty to supervise
differs significantly from the public law version in that it is only triggered by a finding that
"directors fail[ed] to act in the face of a known duty to act, thereby demonstrating a conscious disregard for their responsibilities." Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. Yet a corporation already
faces institutional liability for objectively unreasonable actions of its employees under respondeat superior. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006) ("An employer is subject to liability for torts committed by employees while acting within the scope of their employment."). So the bad faith requirement seems intended to limit the possibility directors
will be found personally liable, a concern that is less applicable in the constitutional context
given immunity doctrines and the systemic aspect of the duty to supervise. See supra notes
136-138, 286 and accompanying text.
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Exactly which types of supervisory systems satisfy the duty will no doubt
depend on context, as is currently true for the duty to train. 9 Additional supervision may be needed for agency actions that are critical to an agency's functioning or that implicate important private interests.2 9' There may be occasions
and contexts in which only one or a few methods of supervision will satisfy the
duty. Much of the time, however, a variety of supervisory approaches should
suffice, ranging from detailed review of specific actions to more general monitoring or guidance. 9
The appropriateness of a variety of approaches provides a response to concerns that recognizing a duty to supervise is in tension with the contemporary
governance trends toward more collaborative and decentralized administration,
under which lower-level federal officials - along with stakeholders, private contractors, state and local agencies, and the like -exercise substantial discretion
and control over the shape of government programs. 93 The duty to supervise
does not preclude such lower-level and nongovernmental discretion, provided
that systems exist to ensure a minimum level of hierarchical oversight as
well.2 4 That said, the duty to supervise does impose a constitutional barrier to
administrative arrangements that diffuse governmental power to such a degree
that such a minimal level of higher-level oversight is prevented. A potential example is found in privatization arrangements that involve private entities' exercising significant control over program participants without any mechanism by
which participants can obtain government review of decisions that centrally affect the government services participants receive. 9" The Central Intelligence
Agency's (CIA) detention and interrogation program provides another instance. A recent Senate report concluded that meaningful high-level executivebranch oversight of the CIA's use of enhanced interrogation techniques was
lacking due to the agency's failure to provide the White House with full and
accurate data on its interrogation activities296 Given the contentiousness, ques-

29o.

291.

See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390-91 (1989).
Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (stating that due process protections

depend on the extent to which private and governmental interests are affected).
292. See supra text accompanying notes 24-32 (noting different forms of supervision).
293. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35; see also Simon, supra note lo, at 11-13 (comparing
the old view of administration as a hierarchy with the new view that deemphasizes hierarchy
and in which supervision changes depending on context).
294. So the duty would appear to be satisfied by systems in which supervision takes the form of
requiring explanations to peers and supervisors for deviations from agreed-upon approaches
and monitoring of results, see Noonan et al., supra note 24, at 536, or that incorporate staff
independent judgment and peer review, see Shapiro et al., supra note 259, at 493-50 1.
295. See Metzger, supra note 37, at 1471-72.
296. See S. REP. No. 113-288, at xv-xvi (2014).
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tionable legality, and tremendous potential for harm associated with enhanced
interrogation, a strong constitutional case can be made for close presidential
2 97
supervision in this context.
The acceptability of a range of oversight mechanisms also importantly differentiates the duty to supervise from unitary executive approaches. As noted
above, strong unitary executive advocates insist on full presidential control of
all executive-branch decisionmaking or executive officials.298 But insistence on
such broad presidential supervision does not follow from the President's supervisory obligation to ensure faithful execution of the laws. 99 The general
phrasing of "faithful execution of the Laws" seems to be satisfied by oversight
that ensures overall or systematic legal adherence, rather than by presidential
policing of individual decisions.3"' Moreover, the systemic focus of the duty to
supervise is shared by governing case law. The Supreme Court has upheld forcause limits on presidential removal of an inferior officer, emphasizing the
presence of "several means of supervising or controlling" the official's powers
and viewing the constitutional inquiry as whether there existed "sufficient control ... to ensure that the President is able to perform his constitutionally assigned duties."" 1 Similarly, in the Appointments Clause context, the Court has
not required that an officer exercise no independent judgment or discretion to
qualify as an inferior officer, instead simply requiring that an inferior officer's
work be "directed and supervised at some level" by other officers.3" 2

297.

By comparison, such direct presidential oversight is present with respect to the selection of
targets for CIA drone strikes. See Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret 'Kill List' Proves a Test of
Obama's Principles and Will, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, http://www.nytimes.con/2oi2/oS

/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html

[http://perma.cc/K8L2-2FXT].

298. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
299.

See Strauss, supra note 185, at 648-49 (stating that the responsibility of the President to
faithfully execute the laws does not necessarily provide information about the extent of his
authority to supervise, but he has at least some oversight power); see also Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654, 692-93 (1988) (holding that the Attorney General's power to remove independent counsel for good cause does not impede the President's duty to faithfully execute
the laws); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 50-O8

(2010) (reading a good cause provision not to allow removal for disagreement with an officer's policies and priorities, and sustaining the statute that contained one level of for-cause
protection).
300. Indeed, this limited scope helps explain why strong unitary executive theorists ultimately
find support for their theory in Article II's Vesting Clause, though they also argue that the
Take Care Clause supports their theory. See, e.g., Calabresi &Prakash, supra note 174, at 570-

85.
301.

Morrison,487 U.S. at 696.

302.

Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 51o (quoting Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663
(1997); see also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671-73 (holding an independent counsel to be an inferi-
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The core meaning of the duty to supervise -a mandate of actual supervision or at least supervisory systems adequate to preserve overall hierarchical
control and accountability of governmental power-does not vary with the
constitutional basis from which the duty is derived. But because the delegation
account derives the duty to supervise from a broader concern with avoiding arbitrary and unaccountable uses of governmental power, it might seem to be
more easily satisfied by arrangements that achieve this goal even if actual supervision is minimal. For example, requirements of expertise-based decisions
and professionalized staff can be an important safeguard against abuse of power, and including such requirements in statutes is a means by which Congress
can control executive-branch decisionmaking. Yet it is harder to argue that professionalization satisfies the Article II version of the duty to supervise, particularly given that professional expertise can operate to insulate lower-level decisionmaking against direction and oversight from higher-level executive-branch
officials.3 °3 An even clearer instance of differences between the two bases for
the duty comes from the use of judicial review to prevent abuse of delegated
power, which seemingly foregoes internal supervision altogether in favor of external constraints." 4 In reality, however, the difference between the two accounts on this score is not that great, given that the Article II-based duty does
not require presidential or higher-level review of all lower-level decisionmaking and that the delegation account requires some hierarchical supervision.
The more salient difference between the two accounts concerns the individuals to whom the duty to supervise applies under each. The Article II version is limited to the executive branch and emphasizes presidential supervision
in particular. Supervision within the executive branch is also the prime target
from a delegation and accountability perspective, but this account potentially
has a wider range of application. Political accountability, for example, should
lead the supervisory duty to extend to Congress and not just to the President or
the executive branch. Indeed, congressional supervision not only is necessary to
ensure political accountability but can also be an important mechanism for reinforcing legal accountability by investigating allegations that agencies have violated governing law. 05 Yet inferring a congressional duty to supervise executive-branch administration is hard to square with the separation of Congress
and the executive branch that is central to the U.S. non-parliamentary sys-

or officer notwithstanding that "she possesses a degree of independent discretion to exercise
the powers delegated to her").
303.

See Shapiro & Wright, supra note 136, at 596-97 (describing economic and political science
analysis disputing the reliability of government employees to serve in the public interest).

304. See supra Part II.B.3.
305. Metzger, supra note 26o, at 437-38.
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tem.3o6 On the other hand, extensive congressional oversight of the executive
branch is a constant feature of contemporary federal administration, driven by
politics and long periods of divided government. 3 7 Perhaps the most relevant
implication of the duty vis- -vis Congress, therefore, is to sanction such extensive congressional oversight.
A more striking contrast relates to whether the duty to supervise extends to
state and local governments. The Article II version is limited to the federal government, which is also the focus of the delegation and accountability approach- resting heavily as it does on federal separation of powers. But the legal
accountability principles underlying the delegation basis for the duty, to the
extent that they are rooted in due process prohibitions on arbitrary uses of governmental power, are not so limited." 8 Whether this means that the same duty
to supervise applying to federal executive officers also applies to state and local
executive officers is a much harder question. Such a conclusion seems dubious,
given not only the duty's separation-of-powers basis but also the longstanding
understanding that constitutional separation-of-powers principles do not apply
to state governments. 30 9 Still, the delegation-due process link suggests that supervision might be a relevant factor in assessing the constitutionality of state
and local administrative arrangements in some circumstances.
D. JudicialEnforceability andJudicial Supremacy
The availability of judicial review of specific administrative actions as a
means of policing agency action may help explain why federal courts have
failed to develop the idea of a constitutional duty to supervise. But the more
central reason is likely the concern that articulating and enforcing such a duty
would exceed the judiciary's proper role and violate constitutional separation of

306. See U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 6;

Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721-23 (1986).

307. Joel D. Aberbach, What's Happened to the Watchful Eye?, 29 CONG. & PRESIDENCY 3, 18-19

(2002); see also Brian D. Feinstein, Avoiding Oversight: LegislatorPreferencesand Congressional
Monitoring of the Administrative State, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 23, 25-28 (2011); Douglas Kriner

& Liam Schwartz, Divided Government and CongressionalInvestigations, 33 LEGIS. STUD. Q_
295, 313-14 (2008); Thomas 0. McGarity, Administrative Law As Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in
A Highly PartisanAge, 61 DuKE L.J. 1671,1673-82 (2012).
308. Metzger, supra note loo, at 1400-02.
309. See, e.g., Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 352 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he separation-of-

powers principle, like the political-question doctrine, has no applicability to the federal judiciary's relationship to the States.").
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powers.31 ° Administrative arrangements for overseeing actions by government
officials are deemed not to fall within the courts' proper realm.3 '
A central question, then, is whether Article III or the separation of powers
precludes judicial articulation and enforcement of a constitutional duty to supervise. This question requires a more nuanced assessment than the Court has
so far provided. In some contexts, barriers to direct judicial enforcement of a
duty to supervise are quite substantial, but these barriers do not apply across
the board, and room may still exist for indirect enforcement through other
constitutional or subconstitutional means. Regardless, judicial recognition of a
central constitutional duty that the courts play a decidedly secondary role in
enforcing would be valuable for the wider enterprise of constitutional interpretation. Such recognition would illuminate the complexities of how constitutional demands are met and how constitutional understandings are generated
in the modern administrative state.
i.

Article III and PoliticalQuestion Barriers

One set of potential separation of powers obstacles arises out of Article III.
As noted earlier, 312 the Court frequently invokes standing requirements rooted
in Article III's "case or controversy" requirement as the basis for rejecting efforts to challenge systematic aspects of administrative functioning. A separate
Article III-based concern, which has been incorporated into current political
question doctrine and which also serves as a barrier to federal-court jurisdiction, is that courts may lack judicially manageable standards for determining
what the duty to supervise requires and when it is violated. 3 3 Yet another barrier invoked to preclude judicial consideration of systemic administration is
that such consideration would lead the courts to intrude in contexts that are reserved for the political branches. Again, this concern connects to the politicalquestion doctrine, this time to the preclusion of federal-court jurisdiction when
there is "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department."3" 4

310. See supra Part I.C; supra note 148 and accompanying text. The Court also has invoked feder-

alism concerns as a reason to limit federal judicial intervention in some state and local contexts, see, e.g., Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 448 (2009), but my focus here is federal judicial
enforcement of a duty to supervise against federal officers, a context in which federalism
concerns would not arise.
311. See Lewis v. Casey, S18 U.S. 343, 349 (1996).
312. See supra Part I.C.1.
313. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (plurality opinion).
314. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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Article III standing requirements do not justify judicial refusal to recognize
a duty to supervise. In fact, recognition of such a duty to supervise could alleviate rather than intensify the standing concerns associated with systemic challenges. These concerns typically center on lack of the requisite injury or causation relationship, with the Court at times skeptical that the systemic problem
caused the discrete or particular injuries plaintiffs assert." ' Yet if the injury at
issue is being subjected to inadequately supervised governmental action, then
systemic improvements in supervision would be directly correlated to the
claimed injury. Moreover, recognition of a constitutional duty to supervise can
help to establish that being subjected to inadequately supervised action is, on
its own, a constitutionally cognizable harm. A separate question is whether the
structural nature of the duty to supervise means that its violation would represent a generalized grievance. But the Court regularly allows individuals to enforce general structural principles when they can show a distinct connection to
the principle's violation., 6 Hence, even if the duty to supervise is such a general structural precept, individuals should have standing to allege its violation
in a number of contexts when they can demonstrate this requisite connection,
as when they are participants in the inadequately supervised institution or program at issue, or potentially when they would benefit from better supervised
governmental action.317
By contrast, both political-question concerns -that judicially manageable
standards for enforcing the duty to supervise may be lacking and that this duty
is in any event textually committed to the political branches -represent more
substantial obstacles to justiciability. Determining the prerequisites of constitutionally inadequate supervision, as well as identifying the forms of supervision
that suffice to remedy violations, will often be quite difficult. Myriad forms of
supervision exist, and the level of supervision required likely varies in different
contexts. Judges are ill-equipped to identify which techniques are best suited
for a particular administrative context, and they are not likely to have any particular expertise or competence in identifying when the supervision provided
sinks below a minimally adequate threshold. In short, duty-to-supervise cases
are likely to lack many of the indicia of judicially manageable standards, such as
the ability to produce tests that have analytic bite, yield predictable and con-

315. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
316. See Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355,

2361-62,

2364-65

(2011).

317. In the beneficiary context, more of a question might be raised as to whether the failure to
supervise caused the plaintiffs inability to obtain the desired benefit, but that would lead to
exclusion on a case-by-case basis, rather than the current insistence that questions of administrative supervision are more categorically off limits.
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sistent results, avoid overextending the courts' capacities, or guide remedial
awards."'8

The danger that courts will intrude on the constitutional responsibilities of
the other branches in duty-to-supervise challenges is equally serious. As the
Court put the point in Allen v. Wright, rejecting a challenge to the IRS's implementation of charitable deduction limitations on standing grounds: "The
Constitution . . . assigns to the Executive Branch, and not to the Judicial

Branch, the duty to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."'319 Assessing claims that high-level agency officials failed to adequately supervise
lower-level officials can involve the courts in second-guessing central features
of executive branch functions. The scope and nature of supervision reflect policy choices about how to structure agencies and administrative regimes; an
agency's decision to pursue more discretionary and flexible implementation,
for instance, will entail a different form of supervision than the choice to pursue a heavily rule-bound approach? 0o Supervision is also intimately tied to policy priorities and an agency's resource allocations. Moreover, the separation of
powers concerns raised by such judicial scrutiny are even more acute when at
issue is deficient supervision by the President or by Congress, as suggested by
case law that limits the exercise of judicial process against the President.32 ' All
of this supports viewing the duty to supervise as textually committed to the political branches in at least some contexts. Indeed, in Gilligan v. Morgan, the
Court held as much with respect to military force, concluding that "[i]t would
be difficult to think of a clearer example of the type of governmental action that
was intended by the Constitution to be left to the political branches" or "in
which the courts have less competence" than the "power of oversight and con3
trol of military force." 2
Yet neither of these concerns justifies deeming duty-to-supervise challenges
categorically nonjusticiable. It is possible to envision some cases in which the
failure of supervision is so extreme -for example, a complete lack of oversight
in a context in which government employees have an obvious capacity to inflict

318.

See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119
HARv. L. REv. 1274, 1287-93 (20o6).

319. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984).
320.
321.

322.

See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 8oo-ol (1992) (refusing to find the President
subject to the APA); Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 499 (1866) ("An attempt
on the part of the judicial department of the government to enforce the performance of [the
President's take care duty and commander in chief supervision] might be justly characterized, in the language of Chief Justice Marshal [sic], as 'an absurd and excessive extravagance."').
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 1O-11 (1973).
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great harm, or a longstanding and well-documented pattern of oversight failures and other conduct that falls below accepted norms - that identifying a violation of the constitutional duty to supervise could be manageable. Acute instances of institutional failure, like deep inadequacies in prison medical and
mental-health services that have deadly consequences and go unremedied by
state corrections agencies over many years, are an example.323 Moreover, other
constitutional contexts exist in which the Court is quite reluctant to hold that
governmental action crosses the constitutional line but nonetheless does not
find the constitutional claim at issue to be nonjusticiable. Prime among these
are challenges to legislation as unconstitutionally delegating legislative power 324 or to spending measures as unduly coercive on the states.32 Instead of categorically excluding these challenges from the judicial purview, the Court has
simply made clear that it will rarely find a constitutional violation or concluded
that wherever the constitutional line on the merits may lie, a challenged measure crosses it."'
Similarly, enforcement of the President's own Take Care duty or Congress's supervision obligations seems most clearly assigned to the political
branches. Gilligan signals a similar conclusion for supervision in the military
context, and other areas may seem to be sufficiently entrusted to the political
branches to justify the same result, with foreign affairs and national security
coming particularly to mind. But this conclusion would not follow for most areas of federal administration, where the courts are regularly involved in reviewing executive-branch action and enforcing legal obligations.32 7 Moreover, the
Court frequently has enforced duties imposed on high-level officials despite the
risk of interfering with presidential instructions, even in rare cases against the
President.2 8 In fact, the Court has shown itself to be quite willing to police the

323.

324.
325.
326.
327.

328.

Such failures existed in the California prison system prior to imposition of a special master
and receiver, and continued after as well. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923-27 (2011).
See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457,474-75 (2OO).
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).
Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606-07 (2012).
See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1424-25 (2012) (rejecting a claim
that the constitutionality of a statute governing the wording of passports issued to Americans born in Jerusalem was a political question over which the courts could not assert jurisdiction).
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 686 (1974) (upholding a lower court opinion
compelling President Nixon "to produce certain tape recordings and documents relating to
his conversations with aides and advisers" and "reject[ing] the President's claims of absolute
executive privilege [and] of lack of jurisdiction"); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2Cranch) 170,
176-79 (1804) (invalidating a presidential executive order as being a "misconstruction" of an
act of Congress). See generally Kevin M. Stack, The Reviewability of the President's Statutory
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constitutionality of governmental structures on separation-of-powers grounds,
even when neither of the political branches is complaining. 9 Insofar as the duty to supervise rests on a delegation and due process basis, as opposed to representing just a distinctly presidential obligation rooted in the Take Care Clause,
its nonjusticiability is yet harder to justify. As noted above, delegation and due
process failure-to-train challenges are regularly entertained, although they are
rarely if ever successful.
In practice, duty-to-supervise challenges seem likely to prove closely analogous to excessive-delegation claims. Courts will "almost never fe[el] qualified
to second-guess Congress"33 or the President with respect to the appropriate
form and scope of supervision. Put differently, the duty to supervise is primarily given over to the political branches to enforce:
Congress and the Executive supervise the acts of administrative agents.
The powers of departments, boards and administrative agencies are
subject to expansion, contraction or abolition at the will of the legislative and executive branches of the government. These branches have
the resources and personnel to examine into the working of the various
establishments to determine the necessary changes of function or management.33'

Still, this leaves room for judicial prompting when the political branches fail to
undertake the supervision for which they are better equipped, or even for more
direct judicial enforcement in discrete contexts where courts are competent to
act. The duty to supervise thus may well be judicially underenforced, but that
does not make it categorically unenforceable.332

Powers, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1171 (2009) (providing an account of when the President's actions

are reviewable).
329. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,

561 U.S. 477, 497 (2oo) (explaining that "separation of powers does not depend on the views of individual Presidents,"
because one President "cannot... choose to bind his successors by diminishing their powers").

330. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (2OO)

(quoting Mistretta v.

United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
331.

Stark v. Wickard,

321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944).

332. Cf.Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HApv. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1978) (arguing that "we should treat... 'underenforced'
constitutional norms as valid to their conceptual limits, and understand the contours of federal judicial doctrine regarding these norms to mark only the boundaries of the federal
courts' role of enforcement").
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Departmentalismin a World ofJudicial Supremacy

The real question is then not whether judicial articulation and enforcement
of the duty to supervise would violate constitutional limitations on the federal
courts' role. Instead, it is whether such judicial articulation is appropriate and
worthwhile, particularly given the likely limited scope of judicial enforcement
and the fact that the duty to supervise is primarily a responsibility of the political branches. Put even more pointedly, what exactly does judicial articulation of
the duty to supervise gain over current practice, in which supervisory obligations are judicially acknowledged in narrow circumstances and the political
branches already put substantial emphasis on oversight and supervision?
Despite its limited enforceability, judicial articulation of a constitutional
duty to supervise could yield two important benefits. The first, more immediate and practical, would be improvements in current doctrine and case law. In
particular, forthright judicial acknowledgement of a constitutional duty to supervise could allow current doctrine to move away from its excessive resistance
to cognizing issues relating to systemic administration and its flawed insistence
on framing challenges to general administrative features solely in individualistic terms. Such acknowledgement would also allow courts greater room to enforce supervision requirements indirectly, through such subconstitutional
means as administrative law. At a minimum, judicial recognition of a duty to
supervise would create a counter to existing precedent suggesting that statutory measures such as the APA should be narrowly read to preclude systemic
challenges. I explore these benefits in Part Ill, along with a more detailed account of what recognizing a constitutional duty to supervise might mean in
practice.
The second benefit is more intangible and relates to the increasingly dominant role the courts play in constitutional interpretation in the United States.333
Ours is a world of judicial constitutional supremacy, with the Court recently
reemphasizing its "primary role" in determining constitutionality: "[W]hen an
Act of Congress is alleged to conflict with the Constitution, '[i]t is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."' 334 To
be sure, opportunities exist for constitutional interpretation by the political

333.

For history and different accounts of the growth of judicial supremacy, see Barry Friedman
& Erin F. Delaney, Becoming Supreme: The FederalFoundation ofJudicial Supremacy, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1137 (2011); Larry D. Kramer, We the People: Who Has the Last Word on the Constitution?, 29 Bos. REv. 15 (2004); and Keith E. Whittington, The Political FoundationsofJudicial Supremacy, in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTION MAKING,
MAINTENANCE, AND CHANGE 261, 271 (Sotirios A. Barber & Robert P. George eds., 2001).

334. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2688 (2013) (quoting Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky
v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427-28 (2012) (second alteration in original)).
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branches, but these opportunities are sometimes vanishingly thin.33 s In a world
in which enforcing the Constitution is seen as overwhelmingly the responsibility of the courts, assignment of constitutional questions wholly outside of the
judicial branch too easily becomes equated with denying that those questions
have any real constitutional basis.
Judicial articulation of a duty to supervise, even with limited direct enforcement, can help ensure that the constitutional status of the duty to supervise is acknowledged by all the branches. But this approach is not without risks
of its own, in particular that the constitutional scope of the duty to supervise
will be equated with its judicial manifestations.1 6 One way to counter this risk
is for courts to indicate explicitly that their constrained enforcement reflects
specifically judicial limitations that do not extend to the political branches.337
Alternatively, courts could expressly acknowledge that their enforcement of the
duty to supervise takes an indirect form; it occurs largely through subconstitutional mechanisms and incentivizes greater supervision rather than mandating
it.
Such transparency about the courts' secondary role and their reliance on
indirect mechanisms to enforce constitutional obligations would be a welcome
development for constitutional law generally. The Supreme Court has been
open about its use of statutory interpretation to address constitutional concerns, invoking the canon of constitutional avoidance in prominent cases with
regularity."' 8 But it has been far more reticent in other contexts, most notably
about the ways in which ordinary administrative law serves to address constitutional concerns. 33 For example, courts developed the APA's initially modest
prohibition on arbitrary agency actions into a robust reasoned decisionmaking

335.

336.

See, e.g., id. at 2683-84, 2689 (noting the President's refusal to defend the constitutionality
of a statute based on a theory yet to gain judicial recognition); Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 142728 (emphasizing that it is the judicial branch's task to assess the constitutionality of statutes); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
See Mitchell N. Berman, Aspirational Rights and the Two-Output Thesis, 119 HARv. L. REv. F.
220 (2006).

337. Richard Fallon has suggested that in some contexts the practical barriers that limit judicial

338.
339.

enforcement of certain constitutional requirements, in particular the difficulty of crafting
judicially manageable standards, may also justify limited political enforcement. As a result,
he argues that some constitutional rights may be aspirational. See Fallon, supra note 318, at
1323-27. Others have criticized the suggestion that the reasons for limiting judicial enforcement extend to the political branches. See Berman, supra note 336. But even accepting FalIon's account, supervision and systemic oversight are areas where the executive branch in
particular has substantial capacity and a central constitutional role and so lacks the liabilities
that courts encounter.
See, e.g., Nat'l Fed'n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593-94 (2012).
See Metzger, supra note 1O5, at 506, 534-36.
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requirement and similarly strengthened the statute's minimal rulemaking demands. A major factor underlying these transformations was constitutional
concerns with unchecked agency power and the breadth of modern rulemaking. Yet the Court has never acknowledged this constitutional basis."4 Similarly, the Court has at times sought to incentivize greater agency attention to the
constitutional dimensions of agency actions through deference doctrines and
has indicated that adequate administrative proceedings can substitute for constitutionally mandated habeas review.' But it has failed to identify these incentivizing efforts as a form of constitutional enforcement and has rejected the
suggestion that agencies should
be particularly sensitive to constitutional val34 2
ues in their decisionmaking.

The net result is too limited an understanding of how constitutional demands are met, and constitutional understandings generated, in the modern
administrative state. Failure to articulate administrative law's constitutional
underpinnings leads to a false perception of constitutional law as separate and
distinct from other forms of law and of agencies as having little role as independent constitutional enforcers. 3 Failure to acknowledge the complicated interplay among courts and agencies with respect to constitutional enforcement
also makes it difficult to develop an account of the proper bounds of this relationship, particularly concerning the issue of when the courts should be primary constitutional interpreters and when instead they should play a secondary
role. One of the benefits of the duty to supervise is that, as an instance in which
primary responsibility for constitutional enforcement falls to the political
branches and agencies, it puts these issues front and center.
III. IMPLEMENTING

THE CONSTITUTIONAL

DUTY TO SUPERVISE

Judicial articulation of a constitutional duty to supervise could yield real
benefits. The difficult tasks that remain are to identify how a duty to supervise
should be implemented in practice: what would such a duty look like, who
would enforce it, and how would recognition of such a duty address the mismatch between current doctrine and contemporary administrative practice?

340. Id. at 490-94.
341. Id. at 497-501.

342. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 516-17 & n.3 (2009). But see Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2259 (2013) ("[W]e think that-by
analogy to the rule of statutory interpretation that avoids questionable constitutionality validly conferred discretionary executive authority is properly exercised (as the Government
has proposed) to avoid serious constitutional doubt.").
343. See Metzger, supra note 14, at 1914.
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The discussion that follows begins by examining the possibility of direct judicial enforcement in privatization contexts, institutional reform litigation, and
Bivens actions. It then turns to examining the possibility of judicial enforcement of the duty through administrative law. Here, recognition of the duty
could lead to a refraining of judicial analysis, allowing administrative law to reinforce supervisory obligations in a way that current doctrine precludes. Finally, this Part takes up the question of what enforcement of the duty to supervise
might look like outside the courts, through presidential and congressional action.
A. DirectJudicialEnforcement

As indicated earlier, judicial involvement often may be limited to acknowledging the existence of a constitutional duty to supervise, with direct enforcement left to the political branches. But there will be some contexts in which direct judicial enforcement may be appropriate. Extreme instances of supervisory
failure are one such context. Three other instances, worth exploring in detail
because they showcase the possibilities and obstacles to direct enforcement, are
privatization, institutional reform litigation, and Bivens actions.
1. Privatization

Delegation and due process are central concerns implicated by privatization. Privatization implicates delegation because many forms of privatization in particular, instances when the government contracts with private entities to
provide services to third parties or to manage government programs on its behalf- are best understood as instances in which the government is delegating
government power to private hands.' Privatization also implicates due process because often these private delegates have their own financial and institutional interests in the decisions they make about which services an individual
receives or how programs will be run. 4 In addition, such private decisions
substantially affect whether these aspects of government operate in a consistent, non-arbitrary fashion and adhere to governing legal requirements. Yet
as noted, the government's private partners are frequently exempted from due
process and other constitutional constraints.

344. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
345. See Gillian E. Metzger, Private Delegations, Due Process, and the Duty To Supervise, in GovERNMENT BY CONTRACT,

supra note 37, at 291, 299-3o6.

346. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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I have elsewhere proposed addressing the deficiency in the current constitutional treatment of privatization through a delegation approach that emphasizes the government's duty to supervise its private delegates. 347 Under this approach, when the government authorizes private entities to interact with third
parties on its behalf, it would be required to provide adequate supervision of
the actions of its private delegates or otherwise structure the powers it grants
so as to ensure that constitutional limits on government power are preserved.
The judiciary could directly enforce such supervision requirements by hearing
challenges seeking invalidation of privatization arrangements as unconstitutional private delegations or challenges seeking direct application of constitutional constraints to private actors.
The challenge for courts will be to determine what qualifies as constitutionally adequate supervision. No doubt this determination would vary depending on the extent of control that a private entity wields over others and the
significance of its determinations. But a core aspect of the supervision would
likely be complaint or appeals systems through which individuals could obtain
governmental review of private decisions that determine their access to government benefits or participation in government programs. Not only do such
systems enable government oversight of private decisions that are taken on the
government's behalf, but they also preserve constitutional accountability by
providing governmental action - the government's decision on review- against
which constitutional claims can be lodged. 8 Adequate supervision might additionally necessitate requiring private entities to promulgate standards and
procedures, both to regularize their decisionmaking and to better enable oversight. Alternatively, the government could itself detail how programs should
operate and the criteria and procedures for benefit determinations. In instances
where the benefits and services at stake are highly discretionary, so that no individual could demand individualized process if the program were implemented by the government directly, the duty to supervise might be limited to requiring government scrutiny of overall program functioning rather than review
of specific decisions. 349 And less government supervision should be required
when program participants themselves exercise significant control over the
benefits and services they receive, because less government power over others
would then be delegated.
Such variability might raise a question about whether judicially manageable
standards exist to implement the duty to supervise. However, the fact that this
approach would be tied to instances of privatization should mitigate the man347. See Metzger, supra note 37, at 1457-86.
348. See id. at 1471-73.
349.

See Metzger, supra note 345, at 306-09.
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ageability concern. Privatization contexts present distinct issues of self-interest
and private control of governmental power. In addition, courts have the oversight and review structures of publicly run programs as a baseline against
which to assess the adequacy of privatized arrangements. Moreover, private
delegation and due process jurisprudence already identify the constitutional
danger of public power being wielded over third parties for private gain, as
well as the importance of government supervision in mitigating that risk. Although private delegation and due process precedent often have focused on
formal oversight instead of the active oversight proposed here, moving from
formal to active oversight is less draconian than asking courts to consider the
adequacy of supervision when supervision is not currently part of their analysis
at all.
2. InstitutionalReform Litigation
Litigation involving publicly administered institutions presents a more
complicated case for direct enforcement of a duty to supervise. As noted above,
although framed in terms of violation of discrete constitutional and statutory
rights, much institutional reform litigation is centrally concerned with improving how the government programs and institutions in question are systemically
administered. 5 Forthright recognition of a duty to supervise may therefore
seem particularly fitting and would allow such litigation to directly target those
systemic administrative features leading to violations of individual rights. Indeed, such recognition could have real benefits. For one, it could bridge the gap
that some claim exists between the violated right and judicially ordered relief in
institutional reform cases, because requiring reformed administrative structures is closely tied to remedying violation of a constitutional duty to supervise.
Acknowledging a duty to supervise could also mitigate doctrinal obstacles such
as standing, since plaintiffs should be able to call upon a broader range of evidence to demonstrate injury and causation due to an allegedly unconstitutionally supervised institution than if they had to demonstrate violation of a discrete right. Relatedly, focusing on general supervisory failures might enable
broader and more effective remedies than reforming a discrete area where
problems have emerged, and, at a minimum, will avoid the need to demonstrate that unconstitutional actions by street level officials are attributable to
policy or actions of higher-level officers."'

350. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.

Sabel & Simon, supra note 92, at io85,
tional reform litigation).

351. See

1095-96

(identifying these obstacles to institu-
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These benefits of a duty to supervise in the institutional reform context are,
however, double-edged; they demonstrate the broad potential reach of enforcement of a duty to supervise in this context. Uncabined by a requirement of
privatization or other threshold constraints, such a duty could encompass a
large swath of public administration, including many government programs
outside of the traditional institutional settings in which institutional reform litigation previously has been focused. The risk of intruding on political branch
prerogatives thus appears significantly greater, as does the likelihood of exceeding judicial competency, particularly the courts' ability to render coherent
and consistent decisions. Another major complication is that institutional reform litigation overwhelmingly involves state and local institutions, requiring
courts to assess how, if at all, the duty to supervise applies outside of the federal government.
To be sure, these dangers are easy to exaggerate. Over time, courts would
likely develop context-specific standards for what constitutes adequate supervision, as scholars maintain has occurred in current institutional reform litigation.352 In addition, although a duty to supervise may have a broader range of
application, the remedies it supports would likely be a step removed from dayto-day administration, with courts requiring officials to devise plans and structures to oversee failing public institutions more effectively instead of imposing
detailed requirements on how these institutions operate. If so, then enforcing a
duty to supervise might be in line with remedial trends in institutional reform
litigation, under which courts are giving public officials more discretion to
remedy identified institutional failures with remedial orders stipulating performance goals instead of mandating operational details. 3
Nonetheless, the potential intrusion simply from greater instances of court
involvement and the difficulty entailed in assessing what constitutes adequate
supervision in different institutions and programs-not to mention the courts'
increasing resistance to undertaking reform of public institutions -suggests a
limited role for direct enforcement of the duty to supervise in institutional re352. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN
STATE: How THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS 149-71 (1998) (documenting the

emergence of agreement on acceptable practices in prisons); Brandon L. Garrett, Structural
Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 873 (2007) (explaining that a consensus on institutional best practices gradually emerged in such litigation); David Zaring, National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big Case and InstitutionalReform, 51 UCLA L. REv. 1015, 103842 (emphasizing how a standard set of remedial options in institutional reform litigation
emerged from collaboration among officials, advocates, and experts across cases).
353. See Sabel & Simon, supra note

92,

at

18-19, 1O67-73. Focusing on systemic issues rather

than individual challenges might also limit the degree of federal court intervention in contexts where a private right to demand federal court review exists. See, e.g., Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010).
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form litigation. Instead, here the duty to supervise may work best as a supplement to other constitutional and statutory claims in institutional contexts
where there is substantial evidence of systemic failure. Recognition of even a
limited duty to supervise in these contexts could still prove quite important.
Doing so renders explicit an assumption that underlies institutional reform litigation but is rarely voiced directly: ensuring that government institutions are
adequately supervised and managed is a crucial element of honoring constitutional and statutory rights in an administrative state. Acknowledging the duty
to supervise therefore also helps to justify judicial authorization of systemic
remedies. For instance, acknowledging that all prisoners have a right to be
housed in institutions with adequately supervised medical and mental care facilities provides an additional basis for allowing prisoners who have not yet
suffered Eighth Amendment violations to sue and for granting broad systemic
relief in Plata, where the record demonstrated widespread failure in the Cali-:
fornia prisons' provision of medical and mental care.
3. Bivens and Duty-To-Supervise Claims
Bivens actions are a third potential context for direct judicial enforcement of
the duty to supervise. Indeed, Bivens actions represent the context in which supervisory obligations of federal officials most frequently surface today, with Iqbal being only one of several actions alleging supervisory failure by high-level
officials in the national-security context.3 4 Nonetheless, Bivens actions are a
poor vehicle for asserting the duty to supervise. Part of the reason is the Supreme Court's recent resistance to addressing supervisory deficiencies in the
Bivens context.3"' But the bigger problem lies with a feature that goes to the
heart of Bivens actions: the focus on individual officers and individual liability
rather than government institutions. This feature-embodied in the Court's
rejection of efforts to bring Bivens actions against government agencies, the
prohibition on respondeat superior, and the fact that Bivens actions seek only
money damages" 6 - fits poorly with the systemic and structural orientation of
the duty to supervise. As a result, incorporating the duty to supervise would
entail a fundamental reorientation of Bivens actions, potentially undermining
the availability of Bivens actions to those seeking to obtain compensation for

354. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2079-80 (2011); Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F. 3 d
193, 203-05 ( 7 th Cir. 2012) (en banc).

355. See supra text accompanying notes 130-131, 140-146.
356. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 483-86 (1994); supra notes 128-147 and accompanying text.

On the issue of Bivens's individual focus and the possibility for a more hybrid individualinstitutional approach, see Reinert, supra note 286, at 814-18, 846-50.
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constitutional violations committed by individual federal officers.35 7 Given that
the APA provides a right of action through which claims of duty-to-supervise
violations often can be brought in federal administrative contexts - suits that
are brought against agencies directly and are therefore institutional rather than
individual in nature -there is little reason to try to use Bivens to target failed
supervision."'
B. AdministrativeLaw and the Duty To Supervise
Administrative law will often be a better mechanism than direct constitutional enforcement for implementing the duty to supervise in publicly administered programs and institutions. In many ways, administrative law seems ideally situated to enforce a duty to supervise with respect to federal agencies. The
ostensible statutory, regulatory, and common law bases of administrative-law
doctrines allow room for interbranch dialogue and political-branch tailoring
even when administrative law is serving, as it often does, as a constitutional
surrogate." 9 Statutory and regulatory enactments already reflect attention to
supervision; frequently, they set up mechanisms for oversight and internal
agency review. 360 Judicially developed administrative law is in turn built
around the need to enforce legal requirements while acknowledging agencies'
primacy in law implementation. In this way, administrative law better accommodates executive-branch discretion than direct constitutional enforcement.
For example, the standard administrative law remedy for an identified violation is a remand to the agency; even the invalidation of administrative statutory interpretations as contrary to law can result in a remand so that agencies can
rethink their regulatory policy in light of statutory demands. 6 ' Moreover, the

357. See Reinert, supra note 286, at 846-50.
358. To be sure, the APA route has its limitations. In particular, it is only available to target con-

stitutional violations that are ongoing and thus is not an option for those no longer subject
to challenged exercises of governmental authority, as in Iqbal. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662 (2009). On the other hand, recognition of a more systemic duty to supervise may itself
expand the category of ongoing violations. See supra text accompanying note 351.
359. See Metzger, supra note 28o, at 131o-16, 1343-52; supra notes 339-342 and accompanying text.
360. See, e.g., Shapiro et al., supra note 259, at 493-96 (describing the process of internal oversight used by EPA in setting Clean Air Act standards); supra note 149 and accompanying
text (collecting federal oversight orders and memoranda governing agency review).
361. See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 55S U.S. 511, 514, 523-24 (2009) (concluding that the Board of
Immigration Appeals misapplied governing precedent in promulgating statutory interpretation under review and remanding "for the agency to interpret the statute, free from the error, in the first instance," stating that such a remand is the "the proper course, except in rare
circumstances" when an agency "has not yet exercised its Chevron discretion to interpret the
statute in question") (internal quotations omitted).

1918

THE CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO SUPERVISE

target of administrative review is expressly institutional, with the APA affording review only of actions by agencies and not individuals.362
Administrative law therefore offers an important means by which courts
could require agencies to pay greater attention to their supervisory obligations
without assuming responsibility for enforcing those obligations in the first instance. The vehicle would be the standard APA challenge to agency action as
arbitrary and capricious, but the agency action being challenged would be internal supervision mechanisms such as plans, oversight arrangements, program
review structures, and the like. Yet efforts to use administrative law in this
fashion would run into significant obstacles in the absence of changes to current doctrine. In particular, the Court would need to allow systemic aspects of
administration to come under judicial review and could no longer insist that
only discrete agency actions qualify as final agency action subject to challenge
under the APA- or Congress would need to amend the APA to make clear that
systemic aspects of administration can be challenged in court. 6 3
Insofar as agencies would now need to explain and justify broader programmatic, structural, and policy choices as well as specific actions, using administrative law to enforce the duty to supervise risks worsening the burdens
that administrative law judicial review already imposes on agencies -burdens
that many administrative law scholars argue already severely constrain agency
action. 36 4 On the other hand, focusing on agency oversight structures and supervision might also justify limitations or deferral of judicial review in some
circumstances where judicial review currently occurs. Such a focus is consistent
with greater insistence on exhausting administrative remedies, so that agency
supervision mechanisms can be allowed to work. Similarly, courts should give
agencies more leeway to issue informal guidance without running afoul of the
APA's notice-and-comment requirements, on the grounds that such guidance
is a crucial part of agency efforts to fulfill their internal oversight responsibili-

362.

See, e.g., SU.S.C. §§

551, 706(2) (2012).

363. See supra notes 15o-156 and accompanying text.

364. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, PragmaticPathologies ofJudicialReview of Administrative Rulemaking,
78 N.C. L. REV. 1013, 1019-57 (2ooo) (describing the "discrete pathological effects" of judi-

cial review on agency action, including agenda disruption and forced ossification); Wendy
Wagner, Revisiting the Impact ofJudicialReview on Agency Rulemakings: An EmpiricalInvestigation, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1717, 1749,

1752-56, 176o,

1771-72

(2012)

(discussing an em-

pirical study of judicial review's negative impact on the EPA's agenda). For a more optimistic view of judicial review of administrative action, see Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb
Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An EmpiricalExamination of FederalRegulatory Volume
and Speed, 195o-199o, 8o GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1414, 1422 (2012) (suggesting that agencies

still "propose and promulgate historically large numbers of regulations, and.., do so relatively quickly").

1919

THE YALE LAW JOURNAL

124:18 36

2015

ties and curtail lower-level discretion. 36 s And courts could incentivize greater
agency oversight efforts by deferring more strongly to agency decisions that
demonstrate high-level internal agency oversight. 366 Courts could also defer
substantially to specific agency determinations when those determinations represent implementation of a general plan or policy that an agency has adequately
justified.
As a result, incorporating a duty to supervise into administrative law could
produce a fundamental reorientation of judicial review of agency action. Under
this refraining, judicial review of agency action would become the inverse of
the current administrative model. Rather than targeting specific decisions or
actions, judicial review would scrutinize programmatic structures and broader
aspects of agency policy and functioning.
A clearer sense of how administrative law enforcement of a duty to supervise might work in practice can be gleaned by examining what such an approach would entail in the contexts of federal-state cooperative programs, crisis
governance, and current debates over presidential oversight.
1. Federal-StateCooperativePrograms
As mentioned, federal administrative oversight increasingly represents the
key mechanism of control over state implementation of federal law. 6 ' The
availability of such federal oversight at a retail level varies widely. For example,
state agency determinations that an individual applicant is not medically disabled and not entitled to social security disability benefits are reviewed by federal administrative law judges if the applicant appeals. 6 8 By contrast, in the education context, federal law requires that local school districts provide hearings
at which students and parents can challenge unfavorable decisions relating to
education disability services and further provides that states must have a complaint process at which local decisions can be challenged. But the federal Department of Education, as part of its role in distributing federal grants, investigates only complaints of discrimination and oversees state and local

For an instance when a court failed to do so, see Chamber of Commerce v. Department of Labor, 174 F. 3 d 2o6, 211-13 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
366. See Barron & Kagan, supra note 158, at 235-36, 241-46 (advocating such an approach and expounding on its normative basis).
367. See supra text accompanying notes 58-64.
365.

368.
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See 42 U.S.C. § 421 (2012) (detailing requirements for federal supervision and provisions for
administrative and judicial review of a state agency's disability determination on an applicant's request).
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performance generally. 36, In the environmental context, the EPA has authority
to review, reject, and override specific state permitting decisions, but it also enjoys broad discretion over whether to exercise this authority.370
Instead of reviewing individual determinations, federal agency oversight
predominantly takes a broader, more systemic cast. Governing federal statutes
require federal agencies to review and approve state implementation plans and
processes before states can receive federal funds or exercise regulatory authority; federal agencies are also required to oversee agency implementation generally once approval is granted.3 7 Although statutes specify criteria that must be
met prior to approval, federal agencies wield substantial discretion in determining when those criteria are met and even more discretion in determining
whether approval should be rescinded.372 Recently this discretion was prominently on display when the Department of Education granted waivers to fortythree states and other jurisdictions exempting them from basic requirements of
the federal No Child Left Behind Act. 373 In some instances, these federal agency
oversight decisions take the form of discrete decisions and agency rules that are
subject to judicial review, but quite often judicial review is unavailable.3 74 Real-

§§ lOO.1 to .13 (2014) (regulations implementing prohibition on discrimination based on race, color, or national origin); id. SS 104.1 to .61 (2014) (regulations imple-

369. See 34 C.F.R.

menting prohibition on discrimination based on handicap); id. §§ lo6.i to .71 (2014) (regulations implementing prohibition on discrimination based on sex); id. §§ 300.151 to .153
(2014) (mandating state complaint procedures); id §§ 300.507 to .516 (2014) (due process
hearing requirements and right to sue). To the extent it occurs, federal oversight of individ-

ual state and local disability education decisions takes a judicial rather than administrative
form, with individuals allowed to file suit in federal or state court once state and local administrative proceedings are exhausted. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2012).

§

370.

See, e.g., 40 C.F.R.

371.

See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2OLO) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1003, §1321(C)(1)(B)); 45 CFR §5 154.210, 155.105

123.44 (2014).

(requiring HHS to determine the adequacy of state premium increase review processes and
to approve state health benefit exchanges); Clean Air Act (CAA) §5 741o(a)(1)-(3), (k), 42
U.S.C. § 7401 (2006) (requiring federal approval of state plans in the CAA); Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative ProxiesforJudicialReview: Building Legitimacyfrom
the Inside Out, 37 HARv. ENVTL. L. REY. 313, 330-32
372.

See

CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN

& DAVID

(2013).

L. MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL EN-

FORCEMENT &THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 93-111, 116-19 (2003).
373.

374.

See U.S. DEP'T EDUC., ESEA Flexibility, http://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/esea
-flexibility/index.html [http://perma.cc/8UMM-BR6J] (listing jurisdictions receiving waivers from the basic requirements of the NCLB).
See, e.g., Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1210-11 (2012);
RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 372, at 95-96; Hammond & Markell, supra note 371,
at 335-42.
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istically, moreover, agencies almost never try to rescind state authority or significantly cut funding.375
Some scholars suggest that cooperative federalism programs may be unconstitutional because they "essentially transfer broad and effectively unsuper376
vised responsibility for the administration of federal law to state agencies.
Insofar as this claim rests on the unitary executive view that the President must
be able to exercise direct formal control of all federal law enforcement, it goes
too far. As discussed earlier, this claim for direct presidential control overreads
the constitutional requirement of adequate supervision, which could take a variety of forms, as mandating the possibility of complete presidential direction.37 In addition, there are questions as to whether state agencies are best
viewed as implementing federal or state law (or some combination thereof)
and whether an agency head's statutory power to approve proposed state implementation plans suffices to meet constitutional requirements for the selection of inferior officers. 78
The problem is therefore less that insufficient formal mechanisms exist for
control of state implementers, but more that federal agencies do not wield the
available mechanisms adequately. Put differently, the real issue is enforcing
federal agencies' constitutional duties to supervise their state partners. Courts
should not play a major role here, given the extent to which federal oversight of
state implementation turns on agency resources, priorities, and determinations
about how best to realize programmatic goals.379 Courts will need to accord
broad deference to agency choices about the best mechanisms for state oversight. Still, courts can play an important function by requiring federal agencies

See Krotoszynski, supra note 55, at 1635-39; Eloise Pasachoff, Agency Enforcement of Spending

375.

Clause Statutes: A Defense of the Funding Cut-Off, 124 YALE L.J. 248, 252-53 (2014).
376. Krotoszynski, supra note 55, at 1639.
377. See supra notes

189-191 and accompanying text. Ronald Krotoszynski bases his argument
about the potential unconstitutionality of cooperative federalism on the formalist bent in recent Supreme Court separation of powers decisions like Free EnterpriseFund, see Krotoszynski, supra note 55, at 1607-1611, but those decisions are also striking in their unwillingness to
call into question the constitutionality of well-established administrative arrangements, like
cooperative federalism.
378. See Evan Caminker, The Unitary Executive and State Administration of FederalLaw, 45 U. KAN.

L. REV. 1075, 1078, 1102-03 (1997) (arguing that in some instances state agencies in coopera-

tive federalism arrangements are better viewed as implementing state law); Harold J. Krent,
Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the FederalGovernment, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 62, 95-96 (199o) (arguing that a delegation

379.
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of authority outside the federal government might pass Article II muster if the executive retains some practical or supervisory authority).
Cf Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-33 (1985) (explaining why the courts are generally
unsuited to review agency decisions not to take enforcement action).
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to explain their oversight choices or justify widespread practices of failing to
enforce statutory or regulatory requirements on their state partners. In the context of waivers, for example, courts could require agencies to explain the policies regarding circumstances under which
waivers will be granted and the
8
grounds on which they may be rescinded.3 o
2. Crisis Governance

A similar emphasis on internal agency processes appears to be well-suited
to address concerns raised by crisis governance. Here, too, judicial involvement
will be highly limited, given time pressures, statutory constraints, and general
unwillingness to sue, and courts will defer strongly when suits do arise. 8
Congressional and other forms of oversight are also often minimal. Internal
constraints and internal oversight will therefore be the core mechanisms for ensuring that the duty to supervise is met.
The urgency of agency decisions in crisis governance contexts means that
they often are subject to substantial high-level executive-branch oversight. Accounts of recent crisis governance decisions, such as determinations by the
Federal Reserve and the Department of the Treasury on how to respond to
bank failures or the authorization of different national security actions ranging
from drone attacks to communication interception programs, reveal heavy involvement by agency heads, political appointees, and the White House.382 Yet
as crisis governance regimes become a more familiar aspect of agency operations, there is a risk that such high-level oversight will dissipate. Moreover, the
nature of crisis decisionmaking creates a danger of inconsistent and arbitrary

380.

381.

For an example of the sort of document courts might force agencies to produce, see U.S.
DEP'T EDUC., supra note 373, which describes the requirements for obtaining an NCLB

waiver.
See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. ill203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 5 5382(a)(1)(A)(iii), (v) (2012))
(limiting the scope of standard of review and providing that after twenty-four hours, if the
court has not made a determination, "the Secretary shall appoint the Corporation as receiver"); Posner &Vermeule, supra note 65, at 1654-59.

382.

See, e.g., DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN BERNANKE'S WAR ON THE GREAT PANIC
(2009) (describing the close involvement of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chair of
the Federal Reserve in financial bailout measures); Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 67, at
465 (same); see also Peter Baker, In Terror Shift, Obama Took a Long Path, N.Y. TIMES,

May

27,

2013, http://www.nytimes.coM/2o13/o/28/us/politics/in-terror-shift-obama- took

-a-long-path.html [http://perma.cc/KBC9-DTLH] (noting the extensive involvement of

President Obama, key White House personnel, and agency heads in setting drone policy).
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determinations that ad hoc internal supervision may not alleviate., 8' And highlevel officials may be more inclined to support actions that push the limits of
agency authority in response to immediate problems than career officials with a
384
longer-term perspective.
The inevitable pressures of crisis governance contexts suggest there are
benefits to encouraging agencies to develop strong decisionmaking structures
or to address key issues about the scope of their authority ahead of time. Public
guidelines developed by Treasury officials have helped provide clarity and consistency to the Department's Capital Purchase Program, under which the federal government bought substantial equity stakes in banks. 8 s In a similar vein,
the Dodd-Frank Act requires the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to
promulgate rules that would govern its decisions to put banks deemed too big
to fail into receivership. 8 6 Scholars have proposed that better administrative
oversight systems are critical to ensure that national security data collection is
accountable. 87 And current proposals to address concerns raised by the U.S.
government's use of drones to kill suspected terrorists center on constructing
governing rules and strong internal processes to guide specific drone decisions. 88
Courts could use administrative law to encourage such proactive supervisory actions. For instance, they could allow individuals greater room to challenge
agency failure to promulgate rules or issue guidance when judicial review of
specific agency decisions is likely to be unavailable. Alternatively, courts could
make clear that they will defer more to agency actions undertaken with strong
internal processes when those actions are reviewed ex post. The Supreme
Court recently suggested such an approach outside of the administrative-law

383.
384.

Concerns of this kind were raised about some of the decisions made during the financial crisis. See Davidoff& Zaring, supra note 67, at 499-5oo, 529-31.
See Stavros Gadinis, From Independence to Politics in FinancialRegulation, iOi CALIF. L. REv.
327, 386-88 (2013) (describing the disparity between short-term political interests and longterm bailout outcomes and arguing that independent bureaucrats are best positioned to respond to financial crises).

385. See William Perdue, Note, Administering Crisis: The Success of Alternative Accountability
Mechanisms in the CapitalPurchaseProgram, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 295, 333 (2010).
386.

See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
209, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 5 5389 (2012)).

§

387. See, e.g., Renan, supra note lo6, at 18-40.
388. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense University
(May 23, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2o13/os/23/remarks-president
-national-defense-university [http://perma.cc/XS2H-9JMFI (describing proposals to expand the oversight of drone strikes, including an independent oversight board in the executive branch).
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context, in Boumediene. 8 9 Needless to say, such efforts to tie administrativelaw review to general aspects of agency functioning, rather than to the substantive merits of particular agency decisions, are at odds with current doctrine.
But these approaches could be justified as ways to ensure that agencies adhere
to the duty to supervise in crisis governance contexts.
3. PresidentialAdministration

Finally, it is worth considering how a duty to supervise might affect administrative law's treatment of presidential oversight. The most frequent judicial
response to presidential oversight of administrative decisionmaking is to ignore
it. Agencies rarely acknowledge presidential involvement in explanations of
agency decisions, and courts rarely invoke it on their own.3 90 This approach is
in some ways a sensible compromise; it allows presidential oversight to occur
but guards against excessive presidential influence by requiring agency decisions to be independently defensible. It also avoids the difficult task of having
courts determine which political influences are acceptable and which are not - a
determination that risks politicization of the judiciary and pushes the limits of
its institutional competence.3 9' But the lack of transparency about presidential
involvement undermines public awareness of the realities of administrative decisionmaking and can have an insidious influence on supposedly apolitical
agency processes. 39 And for my purposes here, opacity about presidential involvement provides little guidance about when such influence is an appropriate
manifestation of the duty to supervise and when it crosses the line. Such a line
is unquestionably difficult to draw, and determining where it lies will largely
be a responsibility of the political branches. Yet some judicial engagement on
the proper bounds of presidential oversight seems to be a necessary corollary of
acknowledging a constitutional duty to engage in internal executive-branch
supervision.

389. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 781 (2008) ("[T]he necessary scope of habeas review
in part depends upon the rigor of any earlier proceedings .... ); see also Metzger, supra note
1o5, at 498 (discussing this dimension of Boumediene).
390. See Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing"Political"Oversightof Agency DecisionMaking, 1o8 MICH.
L. REV. 1127, 1146-59 (2010); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposinga Placefor Politics in Arbitrary and
CapriciousReview, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 15-32 (2009).

391. See Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politicsfor Arbitrary and CapriciousReview, 90 WASH.
U. L. REv. 141, 158-6o, 171-95
392.

(2012).

See Watts, supra note 390, at 40-45; see also Mendelson, supra note 390, at 1159-75 (noting

the costs of a lack of transparency, but advocating for greater agency disclosure rather than
acknowledgement of politics in judicial review).
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Administrative law again appears to be the best vehicle for courts to address
presidential oversight-for example, in suits challenging presidentially directed
agency policies as unauthorized or arbitrary.39 3 Using administrative law allows
courts to play a secondary policing role instead of serving as the primary articulators of the shape that presidential oversight should take. In addition, administrative law's capaciousness and common-law character allow for more flexibility in addressing different instances of presidential oversight and greater
responsiveness to political-branch views.3 94 Once more, an administrative law
approach to the duty to supervise would require changes in current administrative law doctrines, particularly insofar as the presidential policy involves nonenforcement. Suits challenging overall policies absent specific enforcement actions currently run into ripeness and finality barriers; failures to enforce are
presumptively nonreviewable, and courts often are reluctant to order agencies
to formulate policy even when statutorily required. 39 ' Notably, however, courts
often appear to respond to presidential involvement in their application of administrative law scrutiny without being open about doing so or offering a justification for their approach. 396 As a result, although acknowledging the duty to
supervise might entail changes in stated doctrine with respect to presidential
administration, it may not require much change in current administrative-law
practice.

393.

See Watts, supra note 390, at 57-60,

72-73.

394. See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 2o86-89

(2oo8) (discussing the "doctrinal capaciousness" of administrative law).
395. See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004) ("[A] claim under
[the governing statute] can proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to
take a discrete agency action that it is required to take."); Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc.,
509 U.S. 43, 56-6o (1993) (holding that a class action challenging INS regulations lacked jurisdictional ripeness); Heckler v. Chaney, 47o U.S. 821, 831-33 (1985) (stating that "judicial

396.
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review of agency decisions to refuse enforcement" is "generally unsuitabl[e]"). But see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522, 527, 534 (2007) ("EPA has offered no reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate change.
Its action was therefore 'arbitrary, capricious, . . . or otherwise not in accordance with
law."').
See Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007
SuP. CT. REv. 51, 107 (suggesting that even though "it is inevitable that political considerations will come into play in executive agencies headed by political appointees who are accountable to the President," the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA may have believed that administrative law had crept "too far... in the direction of strong presidential administration,
and.., wished to nudge it in the other direction").
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C. The Duty To Supervise in the PoliticalBranches
The discussion so far has focused on the forms and limits of judicial enforcement of the duty to supervise. Yet enforcement of the duty will often fall
to the President, executive branch, and Congress. A full account of the duty's
implementation therefore requires examination of what such political-branch
enforcement would look like.
Actual supervision of administration is, of course, ubiquitous in the political branches; it is a constant focus of centralized presidential staff and congressional hearings as well as agency managers.3 9 7 Moreover, executive-branch and
congressional oversight centrally focuses on policing the quality of agency supervision by investigating and responding to agency managerial failures. 98 Po-

litical-branch enforcement of supervisory responsibilities is thus already a
common phenomenon. The question here is therefore whether and how recognition of a constitutional duty to supervise might alter the nature of such enforcement.
The Obama Administration's recent immigration enforcement initiatives
offer an interesting context in which to assess this question. In 2012, the
Obama Administration and the Department of Homeland Security adopted a

397. See Gene A. Brewer, In the Eye of the Storm: Frontline Supervisors and Federal Agency Performance, 15 J. PUB. ADMIN. RESEARCH & THEORY 505, 5o6-07 (2005) (describing the role of
agency managers); Kriner & Schwartz, supra note 288, at 523-24 (identifying 3,507 congres-

sional hearings representing committee investigations into alleged executive branch misconduct in the period 1953-2oo6); Mendelson, supra note 390, at 1146-55 (describing presi-

dential oversight of agency rulemaking).
398. See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin & Ed O'Keefe, White House Sends Obama Aide To Investigate Deaths
Linked to VA Center in Phoenix, WASH. POST, May 20, 2014, http://www.washington

post.com/politics/as-outrage-over-va-allegatons-grows-obama-and-aides-scramble-to-resp
ond/2o14/o5/19/2bo1ed3c-df 7 l-ine3-810f-76 4 fe5o8b82d story.html [http://perma.cc/R3X3
-YLEP] (describing a top White House aide being sent to investigate problems at Veterans
Administration hospital in Phoenix); U.S GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-14 -694,
HEALTHCARE.GOV:

INEFFECTIVE PLANNING AND OVERSIGHT PRACTICES UNDERSCORE

NEED FOR IMPROVED CONTRACT MANAGEMENT (2014)

THE

(a report prepared at Congress's re-

quest assessing the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services' management of federal
health exchange website development); Memorandum from Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector
General, to the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General, Top Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Justice - 2014 (Nov. iO, 2014), http://
www.justice.gov/oig/challenges/2014.htm [http://perma.cc/9RXU-SPUS] (the Office of
the Inspector General's annual report on management issues at the Department of Justice);
Eric Katz, Obama Announces Plans To Reform and Modernize the Senior Executive
Service, GOV'T ExEC. (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.govexec.com/management/2o14/2/obama

-announces-plans-reform-and-modernize-senior-executive-service/ioo8i8 [http://perma.cc
/9TQM-N 3SM] (detailing Obama administration initiatives to strengthen the top level of
career federal managers).
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policy of using prosecutorial discretion to defer immigration enforcement actions against several million individuals brought here illegally as children who
have done well academically and avoided criminal involvement. 399 In November 2014, President Obama and DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson expanded this policy and announced a further deferred-action program, this one aimed at parents of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents.4 ° ° Under both programs,
eligible individuals must apply for deferred action status, but if it is granted,
they are protected from deportation for three years and granted work authorization. 41 The new actions are estimated to shield another five million people
from deportation.40 2
On the one hand, such broad programs, provided on a prospective and essentially categorical basis, might seem to cross the line from legitimate nonenforcement discretion to unconstitutional suspension of the immigration laws
and thus violate the President's Take Care Clause obligation.40 3 In line with
this view, Zachary Price has argued that constitutionally legitimate exercises of
enforcement discretion must occur only in a case-by-case manner or on the basis of clear statutory authorization, with categorical and prospective nonen-

399. See Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Immigration, supra note 74;
Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to David V.
Aguilar, Acting Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. & John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (June 15, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/si-exercising-prosecutorial
-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [http://perma.cc/8JWQZ7RNQ.
On the overlap of the group affected by the Obama Administration's policy and those covered by the Dream Act, see Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 6, at 787-91.
4oo. See President Barack Obama, Weekly Address in Las Vegas, Nevada (Nov. 22, 2014), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/1i/22/weekly-address-immigration-accountabi
lity-executive-action [http://perma.cc/JV9D-WGQZ]; Memorandum from Jeh Charles
Johnson to Leon Rodriguez et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals
who are Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents (Nov. 20, 2014) at 3-5.
401. Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 400, at 3-4.
402. See Michael D. Shear, Obama, Daring Congress, Acts To Overhaul Immigration, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 20, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2o14/11/21/us/obama-immigration-speech

.html [http://perma.cc/43RD-W86F]. A federal district court in Texas preliminarily enjoined implementation of the November 2014 deferred action policies, in a suit brought by
twenty-six states, on the ground that DHS violated the APA's requirements for notice-and-

comment rulemaking. See Texas v. United States, Civil No. B-14-254,
*56, *62 (D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2015).

2015

WL 648579, at

403. See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 6, at 784-85; Price, supra note 75, at 759-61. Concerns of

presidential overstepping are further heightened by the fact that Congress failed to enact the
Dream Act granting amnesty to this group shortly before President Obama acted. See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 6, at 784, 789-91.
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forcement approaches, such as those adopted in the recent immigration actions, being unconstitutional. °4
Yet from another perspective, by openly stating a generally applicable policy and then instituting an administrative scheme to implement that policy, the
President and DHS Secretaries Napolitano and Johnson were actually fulfilling
their constitutional duties to supervise. Given current budget and personnel
constraints, full enforcement of the immigration laws is simply not a possibility.4"' Hence, the alternative to the Obama Administration's approach is not
full enforcement, but rather case-by-case discretionary decisions by low-level
officials over which meaningful supervision is very hard to exercise. The public
articulation of the administration's policies ensured that enforcement choices
would be more transparent, thereby enhancing political accountability, as well
as more consistent across the nation and among immigration personnel. °6
Precluding prospective and categorical articulation of immigration enforcement
policy and priorities is tantamount to insisting that nonenforcement decisions
be made by lower-level officials, a requirement as much at odds with constitutional structure as a presidential dispensation power.
Acknowledging a constitutional duty to supervise thus indicates that presidential efforts to direct nonenforcement on a categorical, prospective, and
transparent basis can have strong constitutional roots. 4°7 And executive-branch
implementation of the duty to supervise seems likely to result in greater and
more overt instances of presidential direction. Importantly, however, recognizing the duty does not require acceptance of all instances of presidential direction and administration. ° 8 Given that a core part of the duty to supervise is ensuring legal accountability, such presidential policies must accord with
governing statutory requirements or have a basis in the President's constitu4 9
tional authority.

404.

Price, supra note 75, at 704-11.

See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 6, at 788; see also Adam J. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez,
The Presidentand Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 510-28 (2009) (detailing broad de facto
delegation of authority to the President in the immigration context).
406. For data demonstrating serious inconsistency in immigration enforcement, focusing on immigration adjudication, see Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparitiesin Asylum
Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REv. 295 (2007).
405.

407.

For a recent argument in support of greater presidential attention to enforcement policy,
and in particular of how focusing on policy can avoid troubling politicization in particular
cases, see Kate Andrias, The President's Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1101-04
(2013).

408.

See supra notes 298-302 and accompanying text.

409. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., con-

curring). The extent to which governing statutes constrain presidential direction will de-
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In addition to the President and the executive branch, Congress also plays a
role in enforcing the duty to supervise. Congressional oversight of administration is already quite energetic, as evidenced by the dramatic rise in congressional investigations over the last few decades.4 1° This rise is tied to the phenomenon of divided government, when one party controls one or both houses
of Congress and that party does not control the White House. In a regime of
divided government, investigations of executive branch failures are a major
way for one party to score political points.411 It is hard to believe that recognition of a constitutional duty to supervise would trigger more congressional
oversight of agencies and the executive branch than already occurs simply because of politics.
Instead, the intriguing possibility here is whether such recognition might
affect the focus and potentially the rhetoric of congressional oversight. Congressional investigations tend to focus on discrete high-profile scandals or government breakdowns, rather than on ongoing systemic administrative failures. 412 One systemic administrative issue needing congressional action
concerns the recruitment and retention of a skilled federal workforce and particular talented managers. Scholars repeatedly identify problems in the federal
government's management, ranging from increased politicization to lack of capacity in critical areas to recruitment and retention in the senior executive service, which largely contains high-level career managers. 4 3 Taken seriously,
pend on whether statutes are read as allowing such direction unless it is expressly precluded
or there is provision for independent decisionmaking. Compare Kagan, supra note 72, at
2326-31 (urging this approach as an interpretive default), with Kevin M. Stack, The Presi-

dent's Statutory Powers ToAdminister theLaws, io6 COLUM. L. REv. 263, 268 (2006) (rejecting
this view).
41o. See Paul C. Light, Investigations Done Right and Wrong: Government by Investigation, 19452012, BROOKINGS INST. 2

(Dec. 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files

411.

/papers/2013/12/04%20government%20investigations%201945%2012%201ight/lightpaperde
c2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/87NL-WRV9]; David C.W. Parker &Matthew Dull, Divided We
Quarrel: The Politics of CongressionalInvestigations, 1947-2004, 34 LEGIS. STUD. Q 319, 319,
334-35 (2009).
See Kriner & Schwartz, supra note 307 (arguing that a shift from unified to divided partisan
control of the House and the presidency increases the number of hearings and their duration
five- and four-fold, respectively); Parker & Dull, supra note 410, at 321-22 (concluding that
"[d]ivided government is clearly related to an increase in the number and intensity of congressional investigations in the House").

412.

See

413.

See MAEVE P.

PAUL C. LIGHT, GOVERNMENT BY INVESTIGATION: CONGRESS, PRESIDENTS, AND THE
SEARCH FOR ANSWERS 1945-2012, at 30-31, Box 2-1 (2014) (listing the one hundred most significant investigations from 1945 to 2012).
CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R418ol, THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE:
BACKGROUND AND OPTIONS FOR REFORM 12-21 (2012) (detailing challenges facing the SES);

LEWIS, supra note 30, at 19-21, 137, 195-97 (noting increased politicization and finding lower
performance ratings for political appointees compared to career managers and suggesting
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recognition of a constitutional duty to supervise should yield sustained congressional attention to the development of adequate managerial capacity in the
executive branch.
Recognition of a constitutional duty to supervise is also particularly relevant to debates over government funding. Recent years have witnessed a number of battles over the nation's budget and debt ceiling. In 2013, this conflict led
to a sixteen-day shutdown of the federal government when Congress did not
enact the appropriation bills needed to keep the government running.1 4 These
clashes over government funding were deeply political and ideological, with
Democrats and Republicans deeply divided on budgetary priorities, including
within their own ranks."' The Constitution entered the debate in a limited
fashion, primarily in relation to the debt ceiling crisis and the President's powers. 41'6 Largely absent was discussion of the constitutionality of Congress's actions or of whether Congress had a constitutional obligation to fund the government so it could meet its statutorily mandated responsibilities.4" '
Yet the duty to supervise arguably requires Congress to provide adequate
funds for the government to function. On this view, Congress can alter the

414.

415.

416.

417.

that "reducing the number of political appointees is one means of improving performance");
Shelley Roberts Econom, Confronting the Looming Crisis in the FederalAcquisition Workforce,
35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 171, 173 (2006) (discussing inadequacies in the federal contractor workforce oversight).
See Jonathan Weisman & Ashley Parker, Republicans Back Down, Ending Crisis Over Shutdown and Debt Limit, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 16, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2o13/1o/17/us
/congress-budget-debate.html [http://perma.cc/LR7Z-HVKP].
See id. (tying the government shutdown to an effort by congressional conservatives to
repeal the Affordable Care Act); Matt Bai, Obama vs. Boehner: Who Killed the Debt Deal?,
N.Y. TIMEs MAG., Mar. 28, 2012, http://www.nyrtimes.coM/2o12/o4/o/magazine/obama-vs
-boehner-who-killed-the-debt-deal.html [http://perma.cc/M7SF-WCZC] (describing disagreement that underlay the failure to reach a debt deal in 2011).
See, e.g., Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, How To Choose the Least UnconstitutionalOption: Lessons for the President (and Others)from the Debt Ceiling Standoff, 112 COLUM. L. REv.
1175, 1177-81 (2012) (discussing several options for President Obama to take on the debt ceiling issue and concluding that the least unconstitutional would be for President Obama to
ignore the debt ceiling, relying on the protection for the federal government's debt in Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Jack M. Balkin, 3 Ways Obama Could Bypass Congress,
CNN.COM (July 28, 2011), http://www.law.yale.edu/news/1348 4 .htm [http://perma.cc
/4DZE-VFWH] (arguing that President Obama should mint two one-trillion-dollar platinum coins).
See, e.g., Josh Chafetz, Congress's Constitution, 16o U. PA. L. REV. 715, 725-35 (2012) (arguing
that each house of Congress has the power to refuse to appropriate funds and shut down the
government). Discussions of the constitutionality of Congress's actions tend to focus on the
constitutionality of debt ceiling legislation. See Josh Hazan, Note, UnconstitutionalDebt Ceilings, 103 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 29, 29-30 (2014), http://georgetownlawjournal.org/files/2o14/o9
/Hazan-UnconstitutionalDebtCeilings.pdf [http://perma.cc/JCV6-VB6F].
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government's substantive responsibilities, but it violates the duty if it leaves
these responsibilities in place but sabotages the government's ability to meet
them.
An account of the duty to supervise as mandating government funding is
certainly contestable. The power of the purse-and thus the power to deny
funding-is one of Congress's core constitutional powers.4 8 Requiring Congress to provide adequate funding would be dramatically at odds with the endemic feature of budget constraints in government and would be at odds with
contemporary legislative practice in which appropriations riders have replaced
substantive enactments as the means for Congress to control the executive
branch. 1 9 As a result, the notion that Congress must provide funding may be
limited to the extreme circumstances of a government shutdown or funding
crisis. Still, a critical point to bear in mind is that Congress is the branch
charged with enforcing the duty to supervise with regard to itself; no court will
intervene to do so. It is therefore up to Congress to determine what level of
funding is constitutionally required. Identifying a connection between the duty
and government funding is perfectly compatible with acknowledging Congress's preeminent role in appropriations.
CONCLUSION

Constitutional law's current resistance to incorporating systemic administration is doubly mistaken. It creates a mismatch between the realities of government and our most fundamental legal framework for controlling governmental power. At the same time, it obscures the importance the Constitution
actually assigns to administration in the form of supervision. The neglect of
systemic administration in constitutional doctrine is justified as necessary to
ensure that the federal courts stay within their constitutionally proper sphere.
Yet judicial recognition of a constitutional duty to supervise need not entail a
dramatic expansion in judicial review or intrusion into the constitutional responsibilities of the political branches. Instead, such recognition can be accom-

41S. See HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 77-83 (2005) (discussing the scope and limits

of the appropriations power); Jack M. Beermann, CongressionalAdministration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 84-91 (2006) (describing Congress's use of the appropriation power).
419. See Jason A. MacDonald, Limitation Riders and CongressionalInfluence over BureaucraticPolicy
Decisions, 104 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 766, 767-70

(2010)

(documenting the use of hundreds of

appropriations riders on an annual basis to overturn agency policy decisions); Thomas 0.
McGarity, DeregulatoryRiders Redux, I MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 33, 36-39, 51-70 (2012)
(describing the use of appropriations riders to prohibit or delay regulatory initiatives instead
of forestalling such initiatives through substantive legislation).
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plished through mechanisms that largely assign to the courts a secondary enforcement role.
Indeed, one of the most serious failings of constitutional law's current exclusion of administration is that it has stymied development of more flexible
models of constitutional interpretation and enforcement. By insisting that the
federal courts' purview is simply discrete governmental actions and not the
wider administrative contexts in which these actions occur, the current approach also casts judicial constitutional enforcement as operating independently of the wider contexts. Even if this portrayal were ever true, it would be false
in the world of the modern administrative state. Instead, courts are dependent
on administrative structures and oversight to ensure that judicial constitutional
interpretations are actually enforced. And in this world, administrative agencies, along with Congress and the President, play crucial roles in generating
constitutional understandings that reflect the needs of contemporary society.
Acknowledging the constitutional status of administration is thus a crucial
step in the development of models of constitutional interpretation and enforcement that better accord with the reality of administrative constitutionalism. Doing so will require changes not only in existing doctrine, but also in the
reigning image of constitutional law. Constitutional law in the modern administrative state does not have hard edges allowing for a clear demarcation between that which is constitutional and that which is not. Rather, constitutional
law today is a porous entity. Constitutional requirements mingle with numerous forms of subconstitutional law, often functioning more as background
norms than as direct commands. This means that constitutional implementation will centrally involve other governance institutions. It also means that
courts will inevitably engage in law creation as they seek to enforce constitutional concerns indirectly. Instead of insisting on an image of constitutional
law that misleadingly excludes administration, courts need to turn to the task
of crafting a constitutional law that properly reflects the contemporary administrative age.

